771A.00/8–2453: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1
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627. For Ambassador and Achilles. Inform Laniel and Bidault personally soonest that I have decided to vote against inscription of Moroccan case on Security Council agenda.2 While we have been motivated [Page 628] by desire to assist our French friends and allies, especially at present when France has such grave and difficult problems at home, in Indochina as well as in North Africa, you should make very clear to Laniel that this decision will be most unpopular with certain important elements of US opinion in addition to causing us further and serious difficulties in our relations with Arab-Asian States. These repercussions at home and abroad will be even more pronounced as it is highly likely, in view composition of Security Council, that our vote will determine the action taken.
You should take this occasion to impress upon Laniel our gravest concern that time is running out and that if France does not institute quickly a reform program with real substance with view to granting internal autonomy not only to the Moroccans but to the Tunisians and show real determination to move along this path notwithstanding the obstruction of local French officials and colons alike, we do not see how we can long pursue our present course. You should remind Laniel that US has long been told by French Government that ex-Sultan was main stumbling block to reform program because of his “all or nothing” attitude and his constant tactical refusal to approve any reform measures. With this obstacle removed, we are now confident that France will make good the opportunity to take rapid strides forward. It is because of this full confidence in intentions of Laniel and French Government that we have taken decision to vote with France in Security Council.
I trust that this proof of further support of our French allies (on April 14, 1952 we only abstained re inscription of Tunisian case in SC) coming as it does after a period of over a year during which implementation of reform programs in both Tunisia and Morocco has been virtually nil, should convince Laniel of sincerity of our desire to be helpful to France and North Africa. At same time I believe that this full support justifies our making US views known to French Government frankly and fully.
I will talk to Ambassador Bonnet 5 o’clock today along above lines, but consider essential that you impress upon Laniel and Bidault personally gravity with which we view North African situation and motives which lead us to support France.
Strictly for your information US Government decision has not been taken concerning inscription Moroccan and/or Tunisian item on Agenda 8th UNGA.
- This telegram was drafted by Knight and cleared in draft in the offices of MacArthur (C), Merchant (EUR), and Byroade (NEA). It was repeated to Tangier, Rabat, and Casablanca.↩
- Telegram 74 to USUN, Aug. 24, instructed the Mission to vote against the inscription of Morocco on the Security Council agenda on the grounds that the situation in Morocco was not one that would endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. (320/8–2153)↩