771.00/8–1753: Telegram
The Consul at Rabat ( Dorman ) to the Department of State 1
32. We believe important this time recapitulate urgently our concern immediate and far-reaching consequences present coup. Sultan’s withdrawal today previous approval dahirs ceding power2 and expected French reaction raise immediate and pressing question US Government [Page 617] position re forced abdication. Resident General just informed Deane situation now fluid and test of strength expected immediate future.
For Department’s urgent consideration following is summary Rabat’s views:
A. Present Crisis
- 1.
- Coup has full support residency which attempted strip Sultan of temporal powers on August 13 and religious on August 15 leaving him powerless prisoner French.
- 2.
- French will probably attempt force Sultan abdicate near future.
- 3.
- “Popular support” for Glaoui-led pasha’s caids grossly exaggerated.
- 4.
- Separation Sultan’s temporal spiritual powers believed unacceptable orthodox Moroccans.
- 5.
- Fez treaty flagrantly violated.
B. Immediate Considerations
- 1.
- Virtual removal Sultan means loss young intelligent unifying force whose leadership vitiated Communist attempts penetrate Nationalist movement and whose consistent pleas calm usually been effective restraining Nationalists.
- 2.
- Although French repeatedly charge Sultan employing obstructionist tactics they have offered him almost no substantive reforms leading toward increased Moroccan participation real government powers.
- 3.
- Replacement of Sultan by Glaoui adherent may win for French support some political feudal Berber tribes at expense support more educated politically-conscious Arabs thereby delaying long overdue political development Morocco.
- 4.
- Coup will doubtless swell number embittered Nationalists already deprived civil liberties who may well resort underground program sabotage terrorism, easy prey Communists eager exploit anti-American feeling.
- 5.
- Repressive measures needed maintain order presumably will be intensified, thereby increasing rather than diminishing year-old tension.
- 6.
- Basis for genuine Franco-Moroccan mutual confidence being sacrificed for Franco-Berber master-servant relationship.
- 7.
- French losing sight own (and our) long-range interest for shortsighted expediency.
- 8.
- Department can better judge reactions Moslem countries to current situation here.
C. US Interests
- 1.
- In event underground terrorism US Air Force, Navy bases Morocco will become logical target sabotage by Moroccans irate US passive acceptance French coup. This also independent conviction of US Air Force office special investigation Rabat.
- 2.
- In long-range interest our military installations US cannot afford arouse hostility local population.
- 3.
- Although Moroccan people cognizant US concern crisis January 1951, no such cognizance exists now although US military stakes today Morocco inestimably higher than two and half years ago.
- 4.
- Potential installation puppet Sultan would offer French opportunity abrogate US-Morocco treaty 1836.
D. US Responsibility
- 1.
- As long as US is only country maintaining special treaty rights Morocco we are expected by educated Moroccans concern ourselves plight their country, privilege implying responsibility. We cannot accept usual French charge US interest orderly political development Morocco based solely unrealistic emotional sympathy for dependent peoples. If our special treaty rights are outdated they should nevertheless not be surrendered by default.
- 2.
- Confidential advice French now may avoid risk publicly aired Franco-US differences over Morocco at UN.
In view French apparent refusal take US attitude into consideration and Residency’s deliberate deception while engineering coup which threatens legitimate US interests Morocco, we feel that before deposition Sultan becomes accomplished fact French should be made to realize, at highest level, degree of seriousness with which US Government is concerned over consequences “ill-advised and ill-timed action”.