033.7311/7–2954: Circular airgram.
The Secretary of State to the Legation in Libya1
CA–716
Subject:
- Negotiations in Washington with the Libyan Prime Minister
Negotiations with the Libyan Prime Minister in Washington lasted from July 14 to July 20. Actually, only three meetings involving negotiation were held with the Prime Minister himself. In addition, however, he had an appointment with the President followed by luncheon at the White House (July 15); was received by the Secretary (in spite of the Secretary’s busy schedule) before the Libyan departure (July 20); and was the guest of honor at a luncheon given by Mr. Byroade on July 16 and at a reception that evening at the Shoreham Hotel given by the Libyan Minister to Washington. Vice President Nixon attended both the White House luncheon and the reception given by the Libyan Minister. The Secretary of Defense attended the former as did Senators Knowland and Fulbright and Representatives Bolton and Morano. Senator Wiley and Representative Meader attended Mr. Byroade’s luncheon. Secretary Dulles was able to attend the Libyan Minister’s reception. On one occasion or another the Prime Minister thus met a wide cross-section of the leading civilian and military officialdom of Washington.
Furthermore, he and Dr. Aneizi were official guests at Blair House for the first four nights of their visit and received various attentions from American oil companies interested in Libya, including a weekend trip by chartered plane to the oilfields of Texas and Louisiana. The Prime Minister and his Minister of Finance seemed highly pleased with the hospitality and quite content with the outcome of the negotiations. Perhaps the only factor marring the generally flattering reception given the Libyans was the general lack of interest of the American press in their visit. So far as the Department is aware none of the [Page 592] leading New York or Washington newspapers carried the joint communiqué released at the conclusion of the talks (Department’s telegram 5)2 or referred to it in any way.
At the first of the negotiating meetings, on the morning of July 14, the Prime Minister outlined the Libyan position and two sub-groups were appointed, one to discuss remaining problems in the base agreement and the other to discuss economic aid. At the second meeting with the Prime Minister on the morning of July 20, he was given the US reply in the form of a memorandum (enclosure 1).3 At the final meeting in the afternoon the Prime Minister returned to make certain comments on the US memorandum and to discuss a few final matters.
Mr. Byroade was the principal US representative in the three negotiating meetings with the Prime Minister. Minister Villard, representatives of the Office of African Affairs and representatives of the State Department offices dealing with mutual security aid and economic development also participated. Defense was represented by Major General Harris, Assistant Director of Plans, USAF; Mr. John Johnson, General Counsel of the Department of the Air Force; and others. FOA was represented by Mr. Norman Paul, in charge of operations in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia, Mr. William Moran, Director of African Operations, and others.
Libya was represented at the first two meetings by its full delegation. The final meeting with the Prime Minister was a small one in Mr. Byroade’s office. The principal Personalities present in addition to Mr. Byroade and the Prime Minister were Mr. Paul, Mr. Utter. Dr. Aneizi and Mr. Pitt Hardacre.
The sub-group on economics held two meetings, at which Mr. Pitt Hardacre was the principal spokesman on the Libyan side. At the first Mr. Pitt Hardacre presented a long list of development projects estimated at a cost of £55 million. Mr. Pitt Hardacre subsequently stated privately that what the Libyan side really wished for, aside from a general assurance of US help, was a specific undertaking to assist with the five most urgent projects, which he listed as development of the Benghazi harbor, development of the Tripolitania power system, irrigation in Cyrenaica, irrigation in Tripolitania and federal roads. These he estimated would cost £10 million and take about 5 years to complete. At the second of the two meetings, however, Mr. Pitt Hardacre expanded on a Libyan desire to use initial funds from the US grant for the development of a government banking system particularly in the field of agricultural credits.
Suleiman Bey Jerbi and Dr. Fekini were the principal Libyan spokesmen at a series of technical level meetings on the base agreement. The first several of these were devoted entirely to the question [Page 593] of criminal jurisdiction. Agreement in principle was reached on a Libyan compromise proposal represented by attachments A, B and C to the enclosed memorandum.
At the first meeting with Mr. Byroade, the Prime Minister stated unequivocally that the US could be assured of a base agreement, that he had not come to haggle over a price and that the base agreement should be dealt with as a matter separate from Libya’s needs for US economic assistance. He did, however, emphasize the importance of US economic assistance in convincing Parliament and the Libyan people of the desirability of cooperating with the US. He made clear, in fact, that Parliament’s reaction to the base agreement would depend largely on the degree to which it was satisfied with the promise of US assistance with Libya’s economic needs.
In the final meeting with Mr. Byroade on July 20, the Prime Minister expressed his gratitude for the economic aid which the US had offered in the memorandum handed to him that morning. He asked only whether the assurance with regard to future US economic assistance could be made more specific and proposed that the US Government undertake now in writing to seek future appropriations from Congress. Both Mr. Byroade and Mr. Paul stated categorically that this was a legal and practical impossibility, but they did agree to revise the language in the final paragraph of Section III in the US memorandum to make it more acceptable to the Libyans. The revised language, worked out on the spot with the Prime Minister, is that which now appears in the memorandum enclosed with this despatch.
The Prime Minister also thought that the sort of public statement which Minister Villard was proposing to make in Libya on the wind-up of negotiations would carry somewhat greater impact there if it were issued from the Department of State itself, Mr. Byroade accepted this idea. He also agreed, on the Prime Minister’s request, to see to what extent the language of the assurance in the final paragraph of Section III in the memorandum could be incorporated in such a public statement by the Department of State. Finally, Mr. Byroade assured the Prime Minister that the contingency with regard to ratification of the base agreement mentioned in Section V of the memorandum referred specifically to the funds forthcoming from US Air Force appropriations and would not hold up any shipments of grain to meet consumption requirements in Libya in the period prior to ratification.
The Prime Minister in turn assured Mr. Byroade that the base agreement could be signed in Libya as soon as the final drafting details had been worked out and that he proposed to call a special session of Parliament before the end of September at which time the base agreement would be presented for approval.
A number of steps are now required both to complete action on the [Page 594] base agreement and to implement our undertakings with regard to economic assistance. The Legation will receive instructions on these matters as soon as it is humanly possible to forward them.
At the final meeting with Mr. Byroade the Prime Minister submitted a proposal for expansion of the Libyan Army to a strength of 5,000, for which he sought US assistance. Mr. Byroade said merely that we would study the proposal in light of our many commitments elsewhere.
Enclosure 2 of this instruction contains the text of the base agreement revised in the light of the discussions in Washington. Enclosure 3 is a proposed understanding with respect to Article XX. Enclosure 4 is a memorandum of understanding with respect to other articles in the Agreement. These are for your information only pending further instructions from the Department, although you may if you wish review them with Suleiman Jerbi.