711.56373/6–254: Telegram

The Consul at Benghazi (Summers) to the Department of State1

secret

118. From Villard. Pitt-Hardacre made private call on me yesterday following delegation meeting (my telegram 117 of May 31)2 to discuss offer of $2 million. He said Libyans were in state of shock over low figure and inclined reject offer outright but he had startled Prime Minister by counseling acceptance. Hardacre had pointed out desirability conclude agreement before US military requirements still further reduced, Wheelus Field perhaps lost to Libyan economy and good relations with US impaired. He had, however, been impressed personally by my proposed statement regarding sympathetic US attitude toward possible further requests for economic aid (Department telegram sent Tripoli 386 of May 29)3 and by US willingness spend additional $300,000 on Karamanli Mole, which he took as evidence US good intentions.

Hardacre said that for political reasons Benhalim could in effect neither accept nor reject offer. In view exaggerated expectations US aid, it would probably be necessary to outline situation in secret session of Parliament, obtain mandate seek higher figure by visit to Washington and report results in second Parliamentary session.4 Only if it could be demonstrated that every avenue on compensation had been thoroughly explored was there chance Prime Minister could convince Parliament it should accept US proposal. First step, of course, was to call special meeting Council of Ministers and take matter up with King.

[Page 588]

I said that in my opinion Hardacre had given Libyan Government good advice but that while I could understand political considerations likely to motivate Prime Minister, I felt trip to Washington would be waste of time and money. US position was firm and there was no possibility offer could be increased.

Hardacre replied that even though fruitless he thought such visit would be prerequisite to any action on agreement by Parliament. He, therefore, expected Libyan delegation including Benhalim, Aneizi and himself would try proceed US soonest for discussions with Department.

Hardacre inquired whether fact of his British nationality might be misinterpreted if he went Washington and emphasized he was serving only Libyan interests. I assured him this would be understood. He was exceptionally bitter in his remarks about Aneizi, whom he blamed for “hardening” American attitude by fantastic demand of 7 million pounds, and I did not disabuse him of this impression.

I have feeling that Benhalim will propose Washington trip if it can be fitted in with projected visit to Ankara this month and that he may utilize occasion carry out his original plan to bargain jurisdiction against compensation (my telegram 85 of April 6).5

Summers
  1. This telegram was repeated to Tripoli and Paris for CINCEUR.
  2. Not printed; the Minister said he had offered the Libyans $2 million per year. He informed them that if the agreement was ratified before June 30, 1954, they could receive an initial payment of $6 million almost immediately. (711.56373/6–154)
  3. Not printed; it authorized the Minister to tell the Libyans the United States was making provision, subject to Congressional authorization and appropriations, for further contributions to Libya’s economy. (711.56373/5–2954)
  4. Tripoli telegram 441, June 9, informed the Department that Villard would try to persuade the Libyans to postpone their trip to Washington, but he considered the trip inevitable. It seemed doubtful that the Prime Minister would risk his political future by presenting the agreement to Parliament for ratification until every means of getting a higher payment had been explored. (711.56373/6–954)
  5. Not printed, but see footnote 2, supra.