711.56373/3–854: Telegram
The Consul at Benghazi (Summers) to the Department of State1
54. From Villard. Since my arrival Benghazi and conversations with members new government, I have impression (a) that policy present Council of Ministers is to speed base negotiations, but to drive hardest possible bargain with United States on economic aid, and (b) that it regards economic aid as quite unrelated to scope our military requirements. Belief that reduced requirements would prove shock to Libyans (Tripoli’s telegram 270 of February 16)2 seems unfounded, especially as this is Cyrenaica Government and Cyrenaicans are determined obtain maximum amount assistance to rebuild their shattered Province. When they learn that only real benefits accruing to Libya under scaled down requirements will go to Tripolitania, they will undoubtedly be fortified in this attitude.
In view probable indifference of Libyan Government to argument that reduced requirements warrant less economic help, I believe our only hope avoid deadlock over question of compensation lies in King. I hope therefore, that some formula can be devised which would satisfy him as to United States interest in Libyan economic progress, as outlined my immediately preceding telegram. Without any “fringe benefits” or hope of United States aid in future, we might find Libyans prepared reject agreement and place us in embarrassing position of maintaining armed forces in country without legal sanction.
I have feeling that tenacious desire of Libyans to insure United States economic help may be based on (a) fear of exploitation by United Kingdom as country with major financial and economic responsibility for Libya, now or in future, and (b) anticipation that United Kingdom funds may be drastically curtailed, or ended certain circumstances, eliminated altogether, after five year treaty period. Latter [Page 583] could come about if British decide Libyan economy could do on lower contribution or if Libyans themselves should follow Egyptian lead and abrogate present treaty.