751S.00/2–2752

The Consul General at Algiers ( Lockett ) to the Department of State 1

confidential
No. 239

Subject:

  • Observations on Stability of French Control in Algeria.

Introduction

Recent events in Tunisia and Morocco raise the question whether similar disturbances cannot be expected to occur in Algeria. That the possibility of outbreaks in this territory exists is certain, since there is no reason to believe that the character of the population has changed radically since 1945, and that circumstances identical to those existing at that time, or other circumstances of equal force, could not lead to the same violent results. This report attempts to examine what circumstances would be conducive to serious disorders in Algeria, and how serious such disorders could become.

It is the habit of French authorities to say, and it is substantially correct, that active nationalists represent a very small proportion of the native population of Algeria. The great mass, in vast majority rural people, are interested primarily in their own tranquility, and are largely indifferent to events which do not directly affect their daily lives. They seem to have little if any patriotic feeling for Algeria as such. If such a feeling existed it would be surprising since (as the prominent nationalist leader Ferhat Abbas pointed out in a famous quotation while he was still pro-French), no such entity as Algeria, by name and dimensions, existed before it was established by the French. They have also little or no patriotic feeling for France and like every mass, they can be whipped into emotion and action by agitators.

Possible outbreak of unrest in Algeria, therefore, can be said to depend on two groups of very unequal size, the Nationalist parties (including the Communist Party) on the one hand and the vast majority of the Moslem population on the other. If the Nationalist leaders deem the occasion propitious; if they believe, for example, that the United Nations would give them favorable consideration, that they could hope [Page 383] for support from the United States, or that world opinion would exercise effective pressure on the French Government, they could at any time promote public manifestations and, if they chose, provoke violence. Any such disorder could probably be brought immediately under control by French authorities. In other words, disorders in Algeria might well be precipitated by developments which do not impinge on the great mass of the population, such as deliberations of the United Nations, but the intensity of such disturbances will be limited unless the population is stirred up by factors to which it is more directly susceptible.

Factors which may provoke unrest in Algeria can be divided into those of a political-religious nature and those of an economic nature.

Political-Religious Factors

Recent events in Tunisia have certainly led to a tension in French-Moslem relations in Algeria. On January 31, for example, physical combat between first and second college delegates broke out on the floor of the Algerian Assembly and the tenor of the remarks made became so sharp that the President of the Assembly, a Moslem, refused to preside over the session. The subject under discussion had no remote connection with Tunisia, but concerned a project for eliminating the ban on advertising of alcoholic drinks. It is certain, however, that the incident was caused primarily by the tense atmosphere existing. Parenthetically it may be noted that the episode passed with no more serious consequences than some embarrassment to the Algerian budget, but as long as the Tunisian affair continues, tense situations threaten to recur each time a controversial subject is discussed.

On the other hand, it is clear that the mass of Algerian Moslems has not yet been penetrated with any strong emotion towards events in Tunisia. Communist and Communist-front organizations, as well as the MTLD, made as strong efforts as French surveillance permitted to organize demonstrations on February 1 as a “Day of Solidarity with Tunisia”. Police intervention was limited to the seizure of two issues of Liberté and one issue of Algérie Libre, Communist and MTLD organs respectively, confiscation of some lots of handbills, and the disposition of sufficient security forces to cope with emergencies that might arise. These measures did not prevent the dedication of February 1 as a day of manifestations in sympathy with Tunisia from receiving a great deal of publicity. Nevertheless, the result was approximately nil. No departure from normal activity was visible, and no disorders of any kind occurred. It was obvious that solidarity with Tunisia had little if any mass appeal in Algeria.

In addition I have been assured by the Governor General, and I have no evidence to the contrary, that no acts of disorder connected with Tunisian events have yet taken place in any part of Algerian territory [Page 384] and that such manifestations as have occurred have been confined to a limited number of meetings.

The Governor General also emphasized, however, that the possibility, and even the probability of disturbances in Algeria are not to be discounted depending on the evolution of the Tunisian situation.

If violence flares again in Tunisia and remains uncontrolled for any appreciable length of time, it is almost certain that incidents will occur in Algeria. Some leaders of Nationalist movements here feel that the present opportunity to assert themselves should not be missed. Such a feeling is no doubt reflected in the recent formation of a North African Front comprising representatives of nationalist groups of the three North African territorities.

Algerian Nationalists are also sensitive to events in the Middle East, in particular Egypt, and the development of the situation there influences to some extent attitudes in this territory.

However, regardless of how the situation may develop in Tunisia or elsewhere in the course of the next few months, I see, for the short run, little danger of serious mass disturbances in Algeria. This country covers a large area which cannot be under complete police surveillance continually; hence, individual acts of sabotage or violence may well occur. The Governor General has assured me that he sees little or no danger of any mass disorder; and as far as the near future is concerned, I believe that he is correct.

To all appearances nationalist sentiment is materially weaker here than in Tunisia and Morocco. In addition the higher degree of French penetration and the greater organization of transportation, communications and administrative machinery facilitate the maintenance of good order.

It is pertinent, however, to inquire what may be the more long-term effects in Algeria of the adjustments that will be made in Tunisia following the present situation, and also of similar changes to be expected perhaps in Morocco.

In this connection it is important to bear in mind that the status of Algeria is completely different from that of the two neighboring territories.2 The former comprises three departments of Metropolitan France and will always remain, according to French plans, an integral part of France. In negotiations between the French Government and local representations of Tunisia and Morocco the former can always point to the goal of eventual independence, or at least internal autonomy. This is not the case with Algeria. Political reforms may be instituted here whereby the native population exercises a greater influence [Page 385] in proportion to its greater number but no steps can be taken in the direction of independence. Thus, while concessions may be made by France to Tunisia, for example, at a more or less rapid rate and a time-table conceivably be established calling for complete internal autonomy at some hypothetical date in the future, no such concessions are possible in the present relations between Metropolitan France and Algeria. At least, the possibility of such change is excluded by France.

Therefore the further Tunisia and Morocco advance in the direction of independence, the more difficult will become the French position in Algeria, and the more rapidly progress is made by the two other territories, the sooner will the position here tend to become more acute.

If, for example, the present affair in Tunisia results in a drastic retreat by the French from their previous position, the result can only be to encourage Algerian nationalist leaders to intensify their agitation.

Similarly, if the Tunisian question is placed before the United Nations and receives sympathetic consideration therefrom, and particularly if as a result France is obliged to make substantial concessions, it is almost certain that Algerian nationalists will exert every effort to duplicate the Tunisian performance, including if necessary, the preliminary violence.

Any outbreak of disorder which may occur will be encouraged and exploited by the Communists, who by their high degree of organization can exert a force disproportionate to their numbers.

Up to now the anti-Western spirit which has flared in a number of countries of the Moslem World has not significantly affected the masses of Algeria. There is no reason to believe, however, that in the course of time such an anti-Western wave will not spread here as elsewhere and it is the aim of Nationalist parties, in particular the MTLD and the Communists, to propagate it.

The Economic Factor

The mass of the Moslem population lives close to the minimum level of sufficiency. The vast majority of the rural population are small farmers who have no reserves and depend on each year’s crop to carry them through to the next, or in the case of nomads, depend entirely on natural range forage for the sustenance of their flocks. When a drought destroys the crops and reduces range forage, the farmer is left completely without resources. Government-supported credit institutions alleviate distress that occurs normally here and there each year in a climate so erratic as that of Algeria. Occasionally, however, the entire country is afflicted by a severe and protracted drought. At such times vast numbers of farmers are thrown into misery and starvation, far beyond the power of the government to fully alleviate.

[Page 386]

Such a situation occurred in 1945, and it is unquestionable that this disaster was an important factor in the insurrection of May 1945.

Should a severe and general drought afflict Algeria for the remainder of the current growing season, destroying the grain crops and drastically reducing pasturage, and assuming that the Tunisian question remains unsettled, one could foresee that disorders would probably occur in Algeria in such a fertile field for Nationalist and Communist agitation.

Fortunately nothing points to such an eventuality at the present time. Rangelands were never in better condition, and prospects for grain crops are as promising as is possible for this time of year.

Extent of Danger

As indicated above, we foresee no likelihood for the near future of any outbreak in Algeria other than isolated incidents that could be rapidly brought under control.

If subsequently, however, some of the eventualities referred to above as favoring the nationalist movement should materialize, how serious could any possible insurrection become?

Assuming that at such time France is not involved in a European war, the Tunisian incident no doubt provides, or will provide, the answer. Military forces already present in Algeria, or quickly brought in, could presumably quell disorders in a relatively brief period. The limiting factor would not be the lack of military force, but the extent to which public opinion, particularly in France but also in the Western World, would tolerate the firm measures which might be necessary to maintain order, measures which would be the more severe, the more the insurrectional movement shared popular support. French opinion would be more disposed to tolerate whatever repressive action might be required in Algeria since France would surely consider any insurrection as an attempt to dismember the French Republic.

It is in the realm of pure conjecture to speculate on possible developments in case France should be involved in a European war with the maximum number of troops committed elsewhere, and a minimum available to maintain order in Algeria. Such circumstances would certainly incite Nationalist leaders to capitalize on the situation and to provoke rebellion if they saw chance of success. It may be suggested, however, that the humanitarian convictions of the public which, to a large extent, exclude in peacetime the possibility of bombing and machine-gunning recalcitrant villages by air, are more quiescent in war time; and that even a large-scale rebellion poorly armed is no match against modern war machines wielded by a very small number of troops.

One factor which tends to restrict the extent of a possible insurrection is the lack of homogeneity of the native population. In particular [Page 387] the Kabyles form a fairly numerous group which has never been fully penetrated by the Arab influence in Algeria, and which remains, in fact, somewhat hostile to the latter. French efforts toward education have met less resistance in Kabylie than elsewhere, and the French believe, rightly or wrongly, that they can count on the loyalty of the Kabyle population, and especially on the loyalty of numerous Kabyle veterans of the French Army who, it is asserted by French officers, have acquired patriotic sentiments toward France.

Conclusions

No one would be so bold as to deny that current events in Tunisia and Morocco, particularly if violence flares out again, are not likely to have repercussions in Algeria. For the next few months at least, however, we see little or no possibility of the occurrence of other than isolated incidents.

For the longer-term future it is by no means certain that the situation will improve. The farther and the faster that Tunisia and Morocco advance towards independence, the more will Nationalist leaders here be tempted to follow their example, and the mass of Algerian Moslems is not immune to being penetrated by the spirit of independence that is strong in the Moslem world at the present time.

The only real solution to the problem thus posed is to Westernize and modernize Algeria and its people, bringing the latter to a standard of living and to a psychology closer to those of the French. Earnest efforts have been exerted and progress has been made in this field. Schools are being built, irrigation works extended, agricultural extension programs carried out and the development of natural resources encouraged. It is true that the rate of progress on such projects is less rapid than the Administration would have desired, since their execution depends to a large extent on aid from the Metropolitan budget which is chronically overstrained.

If a sufficiently impressive rate of progress can be achieved and maintained in the broad program of social and economic investments, the problem of French-Moslem relations in Algeria should be eased, since it would seem that only a relatively small number of fanatics would fail to recognize that the costly investments required are far beyond the means of Algeria alone. On the other hand, if progress falters, discontent can only increase as a result of disappointment in the hopes that have been raised.

In any case, for the foreseeable future it is extremely difficult to conceive of any situation in which French control of Algeria could be seriously threatened by action of the native population regardless of difficulties that may occur.

Thos. H. Lockett
  1. This despatch was sent also to Paris, Tunis, Rabat, and Casablanca.
  2. Despatch 69 from Algiers, Sept. 14, 1950, transmitted an analysis of the legal status of the Algerian Departments within the governmental structure of France. Two of the sources used were the Statute of Algeria, Law No. 47–1853, Sept. 20, 1947, Article 50; and the Constitution of the French Republic, Article 60. (751S.01/9–1450)