Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

511.45S/1–853

The Consul General at Nairobi (Dorsz) to the Department of State¹

confidential
No. 203

Nairobi, January 8, 1953.

Ref:

• Consulate General’s Restricted Despatch 204²

Subject:

• IIA: Semi-annual evaluation report for period ending December 31.

1A—Factors Affecting the Local Situation:

The socio-political milieu in which IIA operates in British East Africa has altered during the period under review. While the delicate balance between the multi-ethnic components of the society has been chronically beset by underlying tensions, the situation heretofore has been relatively stable. This still applies to Uganda and Tanganyika; in Kenya, however, a serious change for the worse has occurred.

Uganda

Members of the European commercial community in Uganda at times claim that the administration of Sir Andrew Cohen³ is accelerating the advancement of African interests too rapidly. However, no significant increase in tensions adversely affecting the stability of the Protectorate has occurred.

Major developments in the industrialization foreshadowed by the completion of Owens Falls hydro-electric project, could prove more provocative of social unrest. The integration of African producers in a cash crop economy through the cooperative movement is being accomplished with but few disturbances. However, before this step is fully completed, Uganda will be developing manufacturers and mining. This concurrent introduction of more complex patterns in several phases of the economy may overstrain temporarily mechanisms of adjustment and weaken for a time, socio-political stability. Since skilled Africans are few, the technical and managerial staffs of the mines and factories will be manned largely by Europeans and Asians. African leaders are apprehensive that the economic importance of these communities may be enhanced and the predominance of African interests somewhat eclipsed.

Tanganyika

Beneath the apparent socio-political stability in Tanganyika, there lurks considerable latent tension largely arising from the trust status of the territory. The government is irritated by any action of the Trusteeship Council which it considers intervention in the affairs of the Administration. While the Trusteeship Council is the major target for the hostility, the generally held opinion by the European community that the United States is anti-colonial directs a considerable amount of criticism to the United States.

Tanganyika Europeans consider that the situation is so weighted in a Trust Territory in favor of the indigenous population that only a federation of East African territories can preserve White dominance. Any degree of success in furthering this objective would greatly alarm the African and Asian populations with possible adverse effect on the Territory’s stability.

Kenya

In the last half of 1952, Kenya became one of the world’s trouble spots. Formerly ignored by the world press and radio news services, the Colony now shares, from time to time, the news spotlight with Malaya and Indo-China. From an area covered by the occasional visiting correspondent, it has become the primary beat of twelve foreign correspondents and one BBC representative. The disturbances in Kenya have not and probably will not attain the magnitude of those in such trouble spots as Malaya and Indo-China because (1) the malcontents are not in as favored a position to receive arms and other forms of assistance from a neighboring or nearby communist state, (2) thus far, the unrest is confined to the Kikuyu who number about a fifth of Kenya’s African population, and, (3) latent inter-tribal hostility may serve as a break in its spread throughout the area.

The essential nature of the change in the situation in Kenya is (1) the rejection by the Kikuyu of a multi-racial society as the goal which the Colony seeks to attain, and (2) the resort to subversive tactics, particularly violence, in an effort to create a purely African state in Kenya.

This threat to the existing order is a two-prong challenge. The overt Kenya African Union (KAU) led by English-educated Jomo Kenyatta, is a political organization patterned along non-African lines and operating through such devices foreign to indigenous culture as schools and branch organizations with elected officers, charters and constitutions. From the secret society complex common to most African cultures has arisen the covert Mau Mau, the esoteric and “strong arm” phase of the opposition to duly constituted authority.

The convergence of these two streams of resistance to British rule is responsible for the serious nature of the disturbances in Kenya. Through the trial of Mr. Kenyatta and five other leaders of the KAU, the Colonial Administration seeks to prove that co-operation between Mau Mau and KAU has been deliberate and planned. It is, however, within the realm of possibility that congruent objectives furnished sufficient grounds for joint ad hoc action.

In its broadest context, the present disturbances in Kenya can be interpreted as an eruption of Kikuyu frustration produced by their failure to attain satisfaction (rewards) from participation in the complex European-Asian-African society being created in the Colony. The inability of the African to cope with the new situation is evidenced by the fact that he receives a smaller share of goods and services than members of other communities and is unable to command the means for improving his position. He is the most poorly housed, poorly clothed and poorly fed. He receives inferior educational facilities and medical attention. He is found most frequently occupying menial positions, is subject to wage and social discriminations and believes, with some justification, to discrimination in job opportunities. Lastly, he believes that he is herded into overcrowded reserves because European settlers have pre-empted all remaining land suitable for expanding native agriculture while on the other hand, his advancement in the skilled trades and commerce is blocked by superior Asian competition.

The appeal of Mau Mau lies in its simple and direct answer to African frustration. Like its predecessor Dini ya Jesu Christo,⁴ and its less successful contemporary Dini ya Massabura,⁵ Mau Mau would solve the problem by eliminating it. The clock would be turned back, Europeans and presumably Asians, would be driven out and pre-European contact conditions would be re-established.

In a more limited context, interest in the Kenya disturbances centers in their relation to world communism. At the outset it is necessary to distinguish between, (1) organized assistance by communist agents and provocateurs within and without the territory furnished on instructions from the Kremlin; (2) the encouragement of and sympathy for movements useful to communist objectives but unaccompanied by assistance in arms, funds or personnel.

The present unrest in Kenya is not receiving type one communist support. Kenya authorities are convinced that the subversive movement is entirely propelled from within.

. . . . . . .

In addition to world communism, the other source of outside influence on the subversive nationalist movement in Kenya has been Republic of India sources.⁶ The Indian Commissioner in British East Africa has assiduously and openly courted the leadership of KAU. At official Indian functions, the presence of Mr. Kenyatta and his coterie of associates was made more significant by the absence of Africans holding official connections with the Kenya government. Both Commissioner Pant and his wife Dr. Pant were frequent visitors at the Kenya Teachers’ College operated by the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association, the educational arm of KAU. Mrs. Pant dedicated the new girls’ dormitory at the College in September, 1951. In operating the Republic of India scholarship program, close liaison was maintained with KAU rather than with the education department of the Kenya government. When a successful candidate departed for study in India, KAU staged a send-off demonstration. Since the arrest of Kenyatta, some Indian papers reaching Nairobi have presented the KAU leaders as “martyrs in the war of independence.” Mr. Chamanlal, a member of the Indian Parliament is associated with the Kenyatta defense.

Starting from the Indian aversion to colonialism, the Representative of the Republic of India advanced to an active support of African nationalism. It appears that the premise motivating this action is the belief that interests of the Asian community would be best secured by creating an Asian-African front against the European community. The implications of support for KAU appear to have offered no difficulties.

When the nationalist movement entered a violent phase through Mau Mau terrorism and the existence of a connection between Mau Mau and KAU became a decided possibility, it is believed that the close ties between the Indian Commissioner and the KAU became somewhat of an embarrassment. The unreality of an Asian-African front became apparent when considerable terrorist activities were directed against the Asian community. Also, terrorism negates the doctrine of non-violence, and if the connection between Mau Mau and KAU is proven, it will appear that encouragement has been given to a movement which did not subscribe to the policy revered by Indians because of its development as a political weapon by Mahatma Gandhi.⁷ Finally, the activities of the Commissioner’s office are viewed with suspicion by the Kenya authorities.

The unrest in Kenya which culminated in the proclamation of a State of Emergency on October 21st, has made significant changes in the life of the Colony which in turn affects the IIA program in British East Africa. The judgment as to the overall effect of the State of Emergency is commonly stated in terms of turning back the clocks of progress and development.

The Legislative Council has appropriated £750,000 and was asked for an additional appropriation in like amount to defray expenses of restoring order, funds urgently required for expanding and improving services of all types. Deeply affected has been the confidence of inter-community cooperation in the political developments of the Colony by constitutional means. In the face of what, in European eyes, amounts to a Kikuyu rejection of the goal of a multi-ethnic society, the European non-government community is demanding (1) unqualified European paramountcy in the affairs of the Colony, and (2) a greater measure of the self-government. The latter demand is provoked by the feeling that the disturbances in Kenya are (1) made a politicial football in the U.K., and (2) that the Colonial Office inhibits local authorities from taking swift and vigorous action in dealing with terrorists. As the Emergency enters its third month, there is growing apprehension on the part of the Europeans that the government’s efforts to deal with the situation will end in a stalemate and that, therefore, terrorism will become chronic rather than epidemic.

Considerable disruption in the normal routine of daily life has occurred for a period, virtually no public gatherings were held in Nairobi after dark. Attendance at the 9:00 p.m. cinema shows was cut by half and people still prefer to patronize matinee performances. European men have been called to serve with the Police Reserve and the Kenya Regiment which has created personnel problems for business firms and reduces audiences at public gatherings. Europeans, Asians and more recently Africans are participating in home guard duties which cover the hours from 8:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. Travel outside municipal areas is prohibited after 7:00 p.m. except by pass. Even with permission, no one travels outside city limits after dark except in an emergency. In most areas of Kikuyuland, the movement of Africans is forbidden by a 7:00 p.m. curfew. All Kikuyu are required to carry special identification.

The heaviest burden is borne by (a) loyal Africans, and (b) Europeans residing on isolated upcountry farms. While Mau Mau terrorism is directed against Europeans, it also seeks by terrorism to enforce African solidarity. Therefore, the number of murders and atrocities committed against Africans far exceeds those suffered by all other communities. The police have been signally unsuccessful in protecting headmen, chiefs, informers and government witnesses from Mau Mau vengeance. It is equally true that European farmers are, to a large measure, without police protection. Although the police have been fairly successful in apprehending offenders, it is necessary for Europeans and loyal Kikuyu to take positive measures to defend themselves against the commission of crimes. The possibility exists that the Kenya settler community, under the tension of ever lurking terror, may attempt to take matters into their own hands and defy constituted authority. With one lawless element pitted against another, the situation could rapidly get out of hand. Furthermore, resort to vigilante action holds unequalled possibilities for bringing tribes hitherto unaffected by Kikuyu nationalism into a common front against Europeans.

Under the conditions just described, the difficulties of conducting an effective IIA program have increased many fold:

1. There has been an increased isolation from world events owing to preoccupation with the local situation. Korea, the U.N. and the cold war have almost disappeared beneath a lowered horizon.

2. The outbreak of limited hostilities has sharpened identification of friend and foe. The IIA operation has always involved the danger of falling into Charybdis while avoiding Scylla, now this danger is more acute.

a. Europeans display less tolerance than formerly. Therefore, IIA must exercise extreme care in tailoring its output. There is also greater reason for observing the mores of the community.

b. The in-group feeling has been heightened among local Europeans with a corresponding suspicion of outsiders and their activities. This attitude appears to have arisen from the considerable amount of criticism leveled at the European by the U.K. press. Feeling abused and misunderstood, the local community tends to hold an outsider at arms length until his friendly intentions are known beyond question. Thus, the difficulty of establishing rapport with local groups has increased.

c. African reactions are a blend of confusion and fear for their position in the Colony. Every effort must be put forth either to restore or strengthen Africans’ faith in the fair and just nature of democratic principles and procedures.

3. Curtailment of several aspects of the program owing to emergency conditions as detailed under the discussion of various media activities.

The present threat to peace and stability heightens the urgency of IIA’s mission in British East Africa. Now that the uneasy equilibrium formerly prevailing in the area has been shattered, it is possible that the basic problems faced and, therefore, the objectives to be achieved by IIA may be undergoing clarification. Until the Emergency is resolved by the establishment of a new working relationship between the various communities, the IIA program must remain extremely flexible and capable of rapid revision to meet contingencies which arise almost daily.

1C—Targets:

Depending upon the outcome of the current Emergency, a reweighing of target priorities may be necessary. We assume that law and order will eventually be restored. In that event, no major revision of priorities will be required. European paramountcy may be temporarily advanced and this group will remain our first priority target. Conversely, the importance of the African community in the affairs of Kenya may temporarily suffer a decline. However, owing to sheer weight of numbers and worldwide nationalist trends, it appears that African interests over the long haul will acquire at least equal importance with those of other communities. While the African community is under a cloud owing to its unfortunate participation in the current disturbances, it would be shortsighted to neglect this group, particularly since the Emergency has revealed that African nationalism in Kenya is powerful and could be captured and used by the Soviets.

In previous reports it has been argued that the growing economic importance of the Asian community and the frequency of indecision regarding alignment with the West or with Communism, should advance the priority rating of this group. In the main these arguments remain valid. Many Europeans feel that Hindu Asians have covertly sympathized with subversive elements in the African community. If as the outcome of the emergency the position of Europeans is strengthened, efforts might be made by the European community to restrict the role of the Asian community in Kenya’s affairs.

It is too early and the possibility appears too remote to speculate on alterations in priorities which might follow a failure of the government to establish law and order in the colony.

No change is proposed in target priorities for Tanganyika or Uganda.

III—General Summary:

The summary given in the previous evaluation report (Nairobi’s Despatch 310 of June 20, 1952)⁸ remains basically valid. The overall picture conveyed is that of an operation which has reached maximum expansion under present personnel and allotment limitations. It is recognized that maximum expansion is not synonymous with maximum effectiveness. Changes in emphasis, methods and approaches offer opportunities for improvement in the achievement of program objectives. Although it is presumed that continual progress will be made in attaining maximum effectiveness, the question of the adequacy of the program in relation to developments in the area affecting U.S. interests remains to be answered.

What new factors point to the need for an expanded IIA program in British East Africa?

1. The current challenge to British rule by a subversive and nationalist movement. This challenge adversely affects the stability of the area which has been assumed to rest upon orderly progress toward self-government under British tutelage.

2. The subversive character of African nationalism is revealed by present disturbances in Kenya. It is disturbing to realize that, despite fifty years of rule by a democratic power with all the supporting influence of democratically patterned institutions, the most effective leaders in the African community are those who subscribe to subversive ideologies. Equally alarming is the success which these leaders have had in winning a following among Africans with a program designed on non-democratic lines. These developments underscore the necessity for intensified activity among both leader groups and the semi-literates who have proven to be strikingly amenable to subversive leadership.

3. The more than negligible volume of anti-West, anti-U.S., opinion which prevails among the Hindu (Republic of India sympathizers) Asians. Such attitudes range from “a soft line on communism” to outright identification by a few with this movement. The danger in this situation lies not only in the defection of a considerable sector of the Asian population in the event of a West-Soviet conflict but also in the encouragement which this group gives to subversive African movements.

4. The presence of an active source of anti-West, anti-U.S. propaganda in the activities of the Indian Information Service. The importance of effectively countering such propaganda reaches beyond East Africa. Asians in the area maintain close ties with India and Pakistan so that the effects of the Information Program in East Africa will be felt in these two strategic countries.

It is recommended that under an enlarged program immediate steps be taken:

1. To open an IIA office in Uganda.

2. To replace the local employee at Dar es Salaam with an American.

3. To augment the Nairobi staff by no less than two European local employees.

Justification of Items 1 and 3 have [has] been offered previously. In support of the second recommendation, the following points merit consideration:

1. Dar es Salaam is the seat of a territorial administration and to operate effectively high level contacts must be maintained. There is evidence that the local employee does not have entree to officials or higher echelon. Difficulties frequently arise because the point at issue reaches responsible officials through a subordinate.

2. The present local employee has and any local employee engaged probably would have difficulty in formulating what are the U.S. interests involved in a given situation. This difficulty is compounded in instances where U.S. and U.K. interests fail to parallel. From the inability to define the issues at stake, arises a failure to comprehend the significance and hence the usefulness of media materials.

The proposal to replace the local employee with an American officer does not imply criticism of the present incumbent. It merely reflects the opinion that the job to be done in Tanganyika is beyond the capacity of a non-American.

For the Consul General:

John A. Noon
Regional Public Affairs Officer

1. This despatch, which was repeated to London, was drafted by John A. Noon, the Regional Public Affairs Officer.
2. Not printed; it detailed the information activities conducted by the Mombasa and Dar es Salaam Consulates in addition to those of the Consulate General. (511.45R/1–853)
3. Assistant Under-Secretary of State in charge of the African Division of the Colonial Office since 1947.
4. Dini ya Jesu Kristo was a violent Kikuyu messianic movement led by Reuben Kihiko, who was executed following a clash with the police in December 1947.
5. Dini ya Msambwa was organized in 1943 by Elijah Masinde who called for a return to Vugusu traditional religion and, subsequently, in July 1947, called for the expulsion of all Europeans. He was arrested and deported and his movement was banned as an unlawful society. A last, bloody clash with his followers took place in April 1950.
6. Angus Ward, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan who had previously served as Consul General at Nairobi, reported in telegram 267 from Kabul of Nov. 13, 1952, not printed, that the Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan had indicated to him that “we and possibly Paks have organized and supported movement and are continuing do so”. (870.411/11–1352)
7. Gandhi was assassinated on Jan. 30, 1948.
8. Not printed; this despatch prepared by Noon covered developments through June 30, 1952. (511.45P/6–2052)