Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

611.70/5–853

The Consul General at Salisbury (Hoover) to the Department of State

restricted
No. 256

Salisbury, May 8, 1953.

Ref:

• Despatch 238, April 15, 1953¹

Subject:

• United States Policy Toward Central Africa: Facts, Discussion and Recommendations.

I have the honor to submit for your consideration some thoughts with respect to United States policy toward Central Africa. These have been based on what I believe to be the realities of the present situation and the national interest of the United States.

[Here follows a description of the Central African Federation and an expression of personal opinions on related matters.]

III. Policy Considerations

A. Importance of Central Africa. From the viewpoint of the national self-interest of the United States, the importance of Central Africa is based on the:

1. Present large and potentially greater production of minerals (copper, asbestos, chrome, cobalt among others) and the probability of important reserves of uranium.

2. Potential capacity of this large area to provide homes and livelihoods for surplus population from Free World countries, and a surplus of agricultural and industrial production.

3. Contribution that its military forces (land and air) can make to the defense of the Free World.

4. Reasonable hope that the success so far achieved in developing a harmonious multi-racial society may assure political, economic and social stability in Central Africa, which may serve as an example to other areas where similar problems have been handled less successfully.

5. Possibility that the Federation may become the foundation on which an even larger political unit may eventually be built, thereby offering a reasonable hope that a broader area of political, economic and social stability within Africa may result.

B. United States Interests in Central Africa. American interests in Central Africa are represented by the following:

1. An estimated $250,000,000 in private investments, mostly in minerals production.

2. Loans and grants by United States government agencies totalling $30,200,000.

3. United States interest in loans by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, totalling $42,000,000.

4. The value of Central African exports to the United States and other Free World countries, approximately $425,000,000 annually.

5. The value of imports into Central Africa from the United States, now approximately $20,000,000 annually.

6. The work, activity and financial contributions of American missionary groups operating in this area. (No figure can be given here; but, from a domestic United States political viewpoint, the importance of these groups is suggested by the fact that the Protestant groups represent and are supported by church memberships in the United States totalling about twenty million people. While individual Americans serving here with Roman Catholic missions are not identified separately as “American”, it may be assumed that the Roman Catholic population of the United States has an interest in Roman Catholic missionary activities in Central Africa.)

7. The activities of a number of private Americans engaged in farming, ranching, engineering and trade.

C. Historical Role of the United States with Respect to Central Africa. While American popular interest in Central Africa probably dates from the Stanley-finds-Livingstone affair in the latter part of the last century, United States official interest was expressed by its participation in the Conference of Berlin and its signature of the General Act of the Conference on February 26, 1885. (This Act and the various so-called “Congo Basin treaties” negotiated there apply to much of the new Federation’s territory.)² Whether there was any official interest in Empire-Builder Cecil Rhodes’ exploits and vision, individual Americans helped Rhodes in his projects from 1889 onwards. Almost immediately thereafter, American missionary groups began moving into the area, and American mining engineers (notably John Hays Hammond) were recruited to help in the development of Southern Rhodesia’s mines. American capital and technicians played a primary role in the modern development of Northern Rhodesia’s rich “Copperbelt.” In recent years, Johns-Manville Corporation has invested substantially in asbestos production, and the Vanadium Corporation of America and Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation have increased investment and activity with respect to chrome. American technicians and specialists have provided technical knowledge and guidance required in the development of the important tobacco industry. An American missionary laid the foundation of the present native agricultural policy of Southern Rhodesia.³

Official acts of the United States since World War II have included loans and grants by Government agencies for the development of minerals production and the improvement of transportation, and United States support in the International Bank for loans for similar purposes.⁴

The most positive expression of United States official interest in Central Africa was the opening of this Consulate General in May 1950.

The already large and rapidly growing number of Americans visiting Central Africa is evidence of a growing interest in this area on the part of private individuals and Government. These travelers include the following principal classes: (1) Government officials, (2) businessmen—mining engineers and executives, tobacco technicians and traders, (3) missionary personnel, and (4) influential tourists. If Latin America may be considered a precedent, the continued flow of such visitors may be expected to result eventually in increased private investment interest.

C. [D.] Objectives of United States Policy. It is believed that the overall objectives of United States policy toward Central Africa might be stated to be the following:

1. To obtain a continued and increased supply of needed minerals and other materials for the United States and the Free World.

2. To help in the achievement of political, economic and social stability as a basis for further growth and development.

3. To maintain and increase opportunities for American participation in Central Africa’s trade and economic development.

4. To make sure that the peoples and governments of Central Africa continue friendly and cooperative with the United States, support the international actions and policies of the United States and become increasingly responsive to United States leadership in world affairs.

IV. Policy Recommendations

A. General Recommendations Regarding Central Africa. The following policy actions and lines of policy are recommended with respect to Central Africa:

1. Through United States Government loans (and grants to a mimimum extent if they are determined to be in our self-interest) and through loans by international agencies, or through providing technical assistance, support acceptable projects for increasing production of:

(a) minerals and other materials needed by the United States or the Free World, and

(b) agricultural, principally food, products.

2. Encourage the development of mineral and agricultural production, the development of secondary industries and the improvement of distribution and merchandising through United States private investment.

3. Encourage and, where possible, assist in the strengthening of political, economic and social stability within Central Africa itself and thereby, by example, elsewhere in the continent.

4. Encourage and, where possible, assist in the accelerated political, economic and social development of the African peoples.

5. View benevolently and encourage the realization of sound schemes for broader political and/or economic association among African territories south of the Sahara, provided such schemes are based on principles which, in the view of the United States, are conducive to the development of a harmonious multi-racial society and are acceptable to the American conscience.

6. Continually seek to develop more intimate relations with the inhabitants of Central Africa through information and cultural exchange programs, directed at both the white and African populations, for the purposes of increasing knowledge and understanding of the United States and what our country stands for, and winning thereby enlightened support for our policies.

B. Specific Recommendations for United States Official Action in Recognition of the Creation of a Central African Federation. 1. Immediate Actions. It is the recommendation of the Consulate General that the United States take the following actions, which would be regarded as evidence of United States interest in the development of Central Africa:

(a) Increase the weight and prestige of United States representation by appointing a Minister to the new Federal Government.

This action is considered desirable in order to place American representation on a par with the representation of the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa, American interests in Central Africa being as great, if not greater, than the material interests of either of these countries. Whether it is considered appropriate to send a Minister to a country which is not fully sovereign, it is pointed out that both the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa have already established this precedent. By appointing High Commissioners (the equivalent of Ambassadors or Ministers), a type of intra-Commonwealth representation reserved for Dominions, they have recognized the self-governing Colony of Southern Rhodesia as already having the status of a Dominion. If not strictly a Dominion de jure, Southern Rhodesia is a Dominion de facto. The new Federation will be even closer to full Dominion status than Southern Rhodesia is now. The suggested timing for the appointment of a Minister is immediately following the appointment of a Governor-General by the Crown, probably in July or August.

Prior to the appointment of a Minister, or if the Department should be unwilling to appoint a Minister, a similar effect could be achieved by giving the Consul General at Salisbury the personal rank of Minister, as provided in the Foreign Service Manual, Vol. I, Part IV, Subchapter 610, Section 613.2. It is recommended that this be done as soon as enabling legislation, already approved by the House of Commons, has received the approval of the Crown.

(b) Provide the Mission, or Consulate General, with a staff commensurate with the work opportunities in this area. Specifically, the following are recommended:

(i) Open a vice-consulate at Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia.

(ii) Intiate a IIA program.

(iii) Add the following positions to the complement at Salisbury:

• 1 agricultural reporting officer,
• 1 minerals reporting officer and
• 1 Defense (air) Attaché.

The above recommendations reflect no desire to build up a local bureaucracy. It is known that in this area, which as far as the United States is concerned is virtually “unexplored”, there would be more than enough useful work for all to do. These recommendations are made in spite of known policy for personnel reduction (which the writer heartily approves). It might be, however, that a world-wide reappraisal of Foreign Service personnel needs and a redistribution of personnel resources would make additional staff available for duty here. The development of Central Africa, though remarkable to date, is really only just beginning.

(c) Invite the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia (who will certainly be the first Prime Minister of the Federation)⁵ to the United States on an official visit. It is known that such an invitation would be pleasing to him and the appropriate time for the visit would be early in 1954.

2. Longer-term Actions. It is recommended that the following actions be considered for carrying out as soon as the new Federal Government is sufficiently well organized to enter into negotiations and cooperative arrangements. At the earliest, this time will probably not be prior to late 1954 or early 1955.

(a) Invite the Federal Government to enter into negotiations for an Agreement of Commerce and Economic Development, adapted from the pattern of post-war treaties of that type entered into by the United States. The signature of such an Agreement would not only set forth the conditions under which private investment would be stimulated, but would serve as an important means of publicizing the private investment opportunities in Central Africa.

(b) Offer to organize, in cooperation with the new Federal Government, and working through MSA, TCA, or international agencies, a survey of the technical and financial assistance requirements of Central Africa.

3. Other Actions. During the next few years, give sympathetic consideration to assisting, technically and financially, the following development projects, which fall within the framework of the present policy recommendations:

(a) Construction of the Sinoia–Kafue railway link, which would expedite traffic from the Copperbelt by shortening rail distance to the port of Beira by 527 miles.

(b) Construction of the Kariba Gorge hydroelectric project (not the Kafue Scheme) to provide an important source of cheap power for the further expansion of minerals production and industrial development in both Rhodesias.

(c) Development of the Sabi Valley to provide a major new source of agricultural production from an irrigated area of 250,000 acres, and a further source of important minerals such as coal, iron, limestone, phosphates, copper, tungsten, tin and chromite. Within a few years, results from present crop tests in an experimental irrigation area should make judgment possible regarding the practicability of the long-range scheme.

(d) Road construction in the three territories to supplement and compete with the railways. Much of the difficulty with transport in Central Africa has been the reluctance of governments to encourage the development of road transport because of their financial interest in the railroads.

(e) Specific mining properties which from time to time emerge as important sources of strategic minerals.

(f) Development of an over-all program of technical cooperation.

Consideration should be given in this connection to the possibility of encouraging certain types of technical assistance through private philanthropic foundations or through missionary organizations. (Whether government-church cooperation is possible is an idea which might usefully be explored. Perhaps the Federal Council of Churches, the American Friends Service Committee, etc., might have some suggestions.)

There being nothing in this despatch which, in the view of the writer, could not bear public examination either here or in the United States, it has been given a low security classification. It is submitted in an effort to contribute to the formulation of United States policy toward Central Africa. This area, it is proposed, is a highly strategic place in which to develop and carry out a constructive United States policy, fulfilling our responsibility of leadership and contributing, in our own national interest, to the solution of problems in Africa South of the Sahara.

John P. Hoover

V. Addendum

A draft of this despatch (Assumption, Sections I, II,⁶ III and IV–A only) have been read by and discussed with the following persons in Southern Rhodesia, all of whom expressed agreement with the contents. All agreed that it was a “fair statement of the position” in Central Africa. It will be observed that these men occupy positions of responsibility and represent different segments of political and religious opinion.

• Major General Sir John Kennedy, Governor of Southern Rhodesia.
• Sir Godfrey Huggins, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia.
• Mr. R. O. Stockil, Leader of the Opposition.
• Sir Ernest Lucas Guest, prominent non-partisan public figure.
• Rt. Reverend E. F. Paget, Bishop of the Church of England.
• Rt. Reverend A. I. Chichester, Roman Catholic Bishop.
• Rev. J. Kennedy Grant, Church of Scotland.

A draft of Sections I and II of this despatch was read to Apa B. Pant, Commissioner of the Government of India, and formerly, it is understood, a spokesman for India in the United Nations. Mr. Pant also expressed full agreement. He added that there was no conflict here between the interests of the United States (or Western Civilization) and India. He remarked that Civilization, whether Western or Asiatic, could not be indifferent to a state of backwardness or turmoil in Central Africa. He said that Civilization is distinguished by its acceptance of a supernatural source of Authority and makes common cause against Communism, which recognizes no supernatural Authority.

It was emphasized to all that the despatch in no way represented official United States policy, but that it contained only the writer’s personal ideas and recommendations. Care was taken, moreover, to avoid raising any false hopes. However, discussion of these matters with the above has unquestionably made the relations of the Consulate General and the local authorities more open and intimate.

In the drafting of this despatch, valuable critical and analytical assistance has been received from Consul Frank R. LaMacchia, who was primarily responsible for the drafting of specific projects listed in Section IV–B–3 (a through f).

1. Not printed; it analyzed the vote approving the Central African Federation. (745C.00/4–1553)
2. Congress withheld ratification of the General Act of Berlin.
3. Emory Delmont Alvord was an agricultural missionary who later entered into the service of the Southern Rhodesian Government.
4. For further documentation on this subject, see pp. 1 ff.
5. Godfrey Huggins did, in fact, become the first Federal Prime Minister.
6. Only Sections III and IV are printed.