AF files, lot 58 D 459, “Miscellaneous”

The Consul at Lourenço Marques (Lamm) to the Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East Africa Affairs (Feld)

confidential
official–informal

Dear Mr. Feld: This is to acknowledge your letter of February 27,1 with its interesting enclosure of a memorandum of conversation2 on the Pafuri route. Your letter arrived here today, the pouch service is abominable.

Several comments of possible interest might be made in connection with the conversation. I should mention, first of all, that I am strongly in favor of the Pafuri route, which, long term, seems to be the only way out of the existing impasse. The question of strategic minerals seems to me rather more important than Stott admits. In a recent conversation with a South African engineer who is connected with [Page 305] the African Chrome Mines, he stated definitely that his company plans to send its chrome out by Pafuri. Whether his statement is true or not I do not know, Sam Sims doubtless has the answer to this, and Union Carbide can certainly throw light on the subject. This, of course, presupposes that we are still interested in Rhodesian chrome when the railway is finished.

It seems to me that MSA, and other agencies, as well as the Department, are putting unwarranted faith in the port of Beira. I am no engineer, railroad or otherwise, but I have heard the comments of many competent men on the subject of the Beira-Umtali railroad. In this connection, I suggest that, if you have not already done so, you should secure a copy of the report made by the railroad survey team which went over the three routes. I don’t know what they wrote, but their private comments were anything but favorable as far as improving that line is concerned. George Clemens (MSA, Paris) also knows the situation. The point is, and this aspect has always been emphasized by the Portuguese engineers, that no matter how many docks you build, the railway is capable of only very limited improvement. The completion of the minerals wharf, late this year, will not prevent goods from piling up on the wharves in Beira because of rail difficulties.

Tied to this point is the fact that, down here, we have been led to believe that foreign trade to and from the Rhodesias is going to increase considerably over the coming years. Beira may be able to limp along, suffering periodic congestions, and handle a bit more traffic than at present. Never in this wide world, however, can that port handle anything like the volume of traffic that the Rhodesians I have met talk about. Here, of course, Sam Sims will know the answer as to whether there is a real prospect of rapid development of foreign trade.

Another aspect of the Pafuri route, which is of direct interest to us, is the shipping side. Every time Beira gets congested (and this will certainly happen again) American ships either have to skip the port, spend up to two months waiting for a berth, or try to get special treatment. Usually they do a little of all three, but it is a makeshift system at best. Moreover, as has often been pointed out, one ship sunk at the proper point in the Beira harbor by enemy action, and all traffic would stop.

The above comments should not be taken to mean that I don’t think the Portuguese are doing the best they can with Beira. But privately (they will never admit it officially) they have little belief in its future. As to whether we should help finance the Pafuri route or not is a question on which I am not competent to express an opinion. There are too many factors about which I know nothing. My remarks, therefore, are only intended for background.

Yours sincerely,

Donald W. Lamm
  1. Not found in Department of State files, but presumably similar to the letter printed supra.
  2. Presumably the memorandum of conversation of Feb. 20, p. 300.