Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

Secretary’s Letters, lot 56 D 459, “DE”

No. 991
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State

secret

Washington, July 14, 1952.

Subject:

• Anglo-Egyptian Question: Proposed Reply to the British Message of July 7

Background:

On June 29, the Government of Hilali Pasha resigned—ostensibly because of the activities of certain unsavory Palace intriguers but more probably because of Hilali’s failure to make progress with the British. In this connection, the British assessment of the reasons for Hilali’s downfall differ from ours in that they consider failure to make progress on the Anglo-Egyptian problem was purely secondary.

As a result of Hilali’s fall the British Government suddenly became greatly exercised and besought our intervention in an attempt to retain Hilali. Both the Department and Ambassador Caffery did not favor such intervention in the belief that it would be dangerous as well as ineffective. The question was settled, however, when Sirry Pasha came into power and no reply to the British was necessary.

On July 7 the British Embassy handed the Department a paper (Tab A)¹ outlining Mr. Eden’s deep concern over the situation in Egypt and requesting the United States to tell the King that “his present insistence on the question of the title can only lead to disaster for him and for Egypt.” The United Kingdom has also asked us to endeavor to bring about the installation of a government willing to accept the kind of settlement which the British are prepared to offer. This paper emphasizes that the only alternative to such a settlement is the maintenance by the United Kingdom of “its position at whatever cost and if necessary by force.”

In commenting on this paper (Tab B)² the British Embassy said the Foreign Office was deeply concerned by what it believed were “chinks of light” in the Anglo-American front with regard to Egypt. The British Embassy said the Foreign Office felt that the road to deterioration in Egypt would eventually lead to disaster if the United Kingdom and the United States did not stand firm.

The British paper additionally stated that the Foreign Office is continuing to give study to the proposals for an International Commission and for the regularization of Egyptian relationships with the Sudan which were mentioned to the Secretary in London. The British regard these proposals as the farthest they can go. Mr. Caffery, on the other hand, thinks that they would be rejected out of hand.³

The Embassy in London in its comments on the British paper (Tab C)⁴ believes that British concern is genuine but feels that the British will not move from their present position with respect to the title. The Embassy recommends that we tell the Egyptians “frankly and forcibly” that they would have to move from their extreme position and move further toward middle ground. At the same time the Embassy believes that we should insist on knowing as precisely as possible the best plan the British are able to put forward on both the Sudan and defense questions. Mr. Caffery believes, on the other hand, that to carry out the British proposal would be “a folly of tragedy” (Tab D).⁵ Mr. Caffery indicates, however, that he will urge Sirry Pasha to reach agreement with the Mahdi.

Discussion:

The British have for the first time stated the Egyptian issue in the black and white terms of a settlement along British lines (which does not involve recognition of Farouk’s title unless the Sudanese so desire) or, if necessary, the use of force to maintain the British position in Egypt.

It is apparent that the various suggestions which have been made by the United States over the past months with respect to the Sudan do not find favor with the British. It is obvious that we have failed in our attempts to move the British on the title and that they will not take unilateral action on the matter. It is also clear that they intend to wait until a Sudanese Parliament has been established in order that that body can consider the question.

Although it is a most unreal situation, the fact remains that the Sudan has so occupied the stage of the Anglo-Egyptian problem that until we can break the log jam, we cannot move forward on defense problems.

On the basis of the British paper, the point seems to have been reached where there are four possible courses of action: (1) A deal with Egypt involving recognition by the United Kingdom of the symbolic dynastic union between Egypt and the Sudan and replacement of British forces by technicians; (2) continuance of the present stalemate; (3) evacuation of British forces and possibly abandonment of the base or (4) use of force to maintain the British position.

In regard to the first alternative, it is our belief that so long as a settlement is theoretically possible no idea, suggestion or action which might contribute to the settlement should be overlooked. The British will not recognize Farouk’s title without consultation with the Sudanese and apparently are unwilling to consult Sudanese until after self-government has become a fact. The Egyptians on the other hand insist on recognition now and do not consider that consultation is necessary. Notwithstanding this bleak picture, it may still be possible for the British to develop an approach which would be acceptable to the Egyptians. In this connection, it must be emphasized that acceptability to the Egyptians is about the only criterion by which we can judge the usefulness of any idea, proposal or action. This is primarily true because of the fact that the Egyptians have strong legal grounds for their present position and we consider it unlikely that any Egyptian government could recede substantially from this position.

With regard to continuing the present stalemate and abandoning any attempt to reach a settlement, this course of action would seem to lead to growing public frustration and possibly a return to the situation of October to January. In this event the British would then be faced with a choice between evacuation or the use of force.

With regard to evacuation, the Defense Department considers it most important that the British maintain base facilities in Egypt for use in time of war, but it has declined to give any indication as to the number of personnel which might be necessary for this purpose. On the other hand, if no deal with Egypt is possible, we may find it more in our long run interest if the British evacuate the base completely. This move might be likened to British action in India and Pakistan. While such evacuation is not perfect from the military point of view, it must be recalled that the invitation to Egypt to join the Middle East Command was based on the calculated risk of Egypt’s good faith and intentions and not on the presence of large numbers of foreign forces.

With respect to the use of force to maintain the British position, the implications of this course of action in terms of the British as well as the entire Western position in the Middle East are so serious that the British should be left in no doubt that we cannot in any way accept this as the alternative to failure to find a settlement. It is true that use of force may be necessary under certain conditions but to select it a priori as a course of action would be contrary to United States principles, objectives and interests.

Recommendation:

That you speak to the British Ambassador along the lines of the attached paper (Tab E)⁶ which you may wish to hand him as a record of your statement.

1. Not printed; Tab A is telegram 41 to Cairo, July 8. (641.74/7–852)
2. Not printed; Tab B is telegram 40 to Cairo, July 8. (641.74/7–852) See footnote 3, infra.
3. Ambassador Caffery informed the Department of State of his opinion in telegram 29, July 4, not printed. (645W.74/7–452)
4. Not printed; Tab C is telegram 185 from London, July 11. (745W.00/7–1152)
5. Not printed; Tab D is telegram 64 from Cairo, July 11. (641.74/7–1152)
6. Not printed.