774.00/7–352
No. 990
Memorandum by the Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African
Affairs (Byroade) to the Acting
Secretary of State1
Subject:
- Change of Government in Egypt
The Embassy in Cairo has now confirmed that Hussein Sirry Pasha, reported to be a “King’s man” by conviction, has formed a new government with himself as Premier, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of War and Marine. The rest of the Cabinet is composed of pro-Palace independents and technicians. The new Minister of the Interior, Mohammed Hashem Pasha, is Sirry Pasha’s son-in-law and thus control of this important post really rests with the Prime Minister. The most disturbing aspect of the new Cabinet is the appointment of Kerim Tabet Pasha as Minister of State in charge of relations between the Government and the Palace. Tabet Pasha, a Lebanese by origin, is a disreputable adventurer whom, off and on, exercises a considerable and unfortunate influence on the King. It is reported that Sirry Pasha felt he could control Tabet better in the government than outside. While the government does not include any members of the Wafd Party it is known that the Prime Minister is closely associated with those who do have strong Wafd inclinations.
Now that the smoke has cleared somewhat, it is possible to assess the reasons for this change of government. Although we had received numerous reports of behind-the-scenes activity to force Hilali Pasha out, it was not expected that matters would come to a head before the fall when elections are scheduled. However, it appears that Kerim Tabet Pasha, Ahmed Abboud Pasha (one of the wealthiest men in Egypt and the only Egyptian for whom we have approved an Ex-Im Bank loan), and Elias Androas Pasha, a member of the Palace inner clique, looked with increasing dismay on the possibility that Hilali Pasha might carry through his purge program. Since the purge would have implicated these men, they [Page 1829] did what they could to influence the King and others against Hilali. When Hilali got wind of these maneuvers, he demanded that he be allowed to carry out his purge program without regard to personalities. When it appeared that he would not receive this permission, he resigned.
Perhaps more important than the immediate reasons for his resignation is the fact that Hilali realized that his lack of progress with the British would have eventually forced him to resign. He therefore preferred to resign now with honor rather than later without. Ambassador Caffery believes that Hilali Pasha had in fact made up his mind sometime ago to resign because he could not get anywhere with the British and that he was merely awaiting a suitable moment. There is no doubt that, had Hilali been able to achieve even an illusion of progress with the British, his position would have been sufficiently strong to enable him to resist the effort of Tabet Pasha and others to dislodge him.
The significance of this Cabinet change is that no Egyptian Government can last too long without making progress, real or illusory, with the British. The uncertain state of Egyptian politics is revealed by the fact that it took Sirry Pasha four days to form a new government. It is apparent that there is a reluctance on the part of Egyptian politicians to join governments which have almost no life expectancy.
It is difficult to forecast Sirry Pasha’s program. However, it may well be that the trend will be toward the return of the Wafd to power. This will depend, of course, upon whether the King permits elections to be held in October. The King’s well-known dislike of the Wafd may cause him to postpone the elections again but on the other hand popular pressure may force the issue. In such event, it seems inevitable that the Wafd would once again return to power, although possibly chastened somewhat by its experiences of last January.
Even though Sirry Pasha is considered pro-British, there is no reason to believe that his advent to power will change the course of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Sirry Pasha did make a public statement on June 15 in which he recognized British difficulties in making concessions, but this was before he had governmental responsibility. It is probably safe to forecast that Sirry’s government will insist on “evacuation and unity of the Nile Valley” just as strongly as previous governments. If anything, the change of government may be a backward step in the negotiations in that either Sirry may not wish to renew his contacts with the Sudanese or the Sudanese will be reluctant to start all over again. The situation will then return to where it was several months ago with the Egyptians [Page 1830] insisting on recognition of the title and the British regretting they cannot do so without Sudanese approval.
If Sirry cannot make any progress with the British in the near future or if the King decides not to hold elections, he will probably go the way of Ali Maher Pasha and Hilali Pasha. While it is too early to forecast with any accuracy who the next incumbent might be, the name of Mortada el Maraghi Pasha, Minister of the Interior and of War and Marine under the last Cabinet, is frequently mentioned. Ambassador Caffery reports that Maraghi is the King’s “last ace in the hole”.
- This memorandum was drafted by Stabler.↩