Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

641.74/7–1552: Telegram

No. 992
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

secret

Washington, July 15, 1952—7:07 p.m.

83. Secy saw Brit Amb Jul 14 at latter’s request. Amb said he had been instructed reinforce Eden’s request contained Deptel 41 Jul 8 to Cairo.² Amb also showed Secy tel from FonOff replying to views expressed by Dept Reps on Jul 7 (Deptel 40 Jul 8 to Cairo).³ FonOff considered that Brit consultation with Sudanese undesirable and believed it preferable await creation Sudanese legislative bodies.

Secy said he was concerned by strong implications in Eden’s msg that (a) because UK unable make progress with Egypts, responsibility now rests with US to persuade King throw out Sirry Govt and put title question into “cold storage” and (b) that if US is not successful, full consequences for lack of success wld fall on US. Secy emphasized US does not accept these implications. We are not willing be put in such situation. Secy stated that we are bothered by rapid shifts in Brit attitude. When in London Secy was told all well in Egypt, then Hilali resigns and UK rushes to US with idea that either US persuade Egypt accept UK-proposed settlement or force must be used maintain position. US cannot take responsibility for these alternatives.

Secy then went on to analyze request contained in Eden’s msg. Re change of Govt Secy said Caffery’s view which more often right than FonOff is that it not possible bring about change of Govt through intervention, that new Govt wld probably not be better and that Sirry not doing too badly. We wld not consider advice to King to change Govt good advice.

Re telling King put title question in “cold storage” Secy said that we had tried this before but it has not worked. We are faced with real dilemma which we try to get around by denying one of premises which appears to be accepted by all i.e. it not possible achieve settlement Canal Base without something on King’s title which wld satisfy Egypts. In our view it is difficult if not impossible try to persuade Egypts re putting title in cold storage when they regard title as a matter of right and when they have no real desire for anything except to get Brit out of Egypt and Sudan.

Secy said that we wld be delighted assist in any way possible to create better atmosphere and that we wld gladly ask Caffery go to King if there was some new element, real and concrete, which cld be used. Secy added that he fully understood FonOff concern re possible Egypt moves in Sudan and fact one cld not rule out possibility Egypt “skulduggery”. However he thought something might be done which wld not run appreciable risk.

Byroade expressed great US concern over implications of use of force and effect such course of action wld have on world opinion and Western position in ME.

Brit Amb indicated that he wld inform London that US unable to do what had been requested. He added that he wld report general tenor Secy’s remarks and fact Dept unable to offer any new ideas this stage. Speaking personally, Franks said he imagined FonOff thinking tended toward view that UK shld make no move at this time unless Egypt requested talks and that next action wld be in December when Sudan Parliament installed and cld consider sovereignty question.

Secy expressed belief that if establishment Sudanese Parliament awaited, Sudanese wld be so strongly headed toward policy of no Egypt sovereignty that favorable response to title cld not be expected. It wld then be necessary to deal with Canal Base question in bad atmosphere and this in itself might lead to more rioting. This in turn wld raise use of force to protect base and possibly UK and Fon nationals. Secy emphasized that once one gets started on this road it is most difficult to stop.

Secy ended discussion by saying that we wld continue, in consultation with Caffery, to see if there was any way we cld help do impossible i.e. separate Sudan and Canal Base issues so that somehow Base question which is heart of matter cld be dealt with.

Acheson

1. Also sent to London as telegram 321. Drafted and approved by Stabler.
2. See footnote 1, supra.
3. In telegram 40 to Cairo, July 8, not printed, the Department of State informed Ambassador Caffery not only of the British Embassy’s comments which accompanied the delivery of Eden’s request as reported in Department telegram 41 but also provided Caffery with a summary of the views expressed to British Embassy officials by the Department’s representatives. The Department’s analysis was that Hilali fell due to his lack of progress with the British; the Department’s representatives again urged the British to consult with the Sudanese; they said that the United States strongly hoped to avoid a situation whereby the British could maintain their position in Egypt only by using force; and they declared that the Department seriously questioned the wisdom of intervening in Egypt in the fashion suggested by Foreign Secretary Eden. (641.74/7–852)