Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

774.00/7–252: Telegram

No. 989
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

secret
niact

Washington, July 2, 1952—11:05 a.m.

8. 1. Brit Emb last night gave Dept substance msg from FonOff to Brit Charge Alexandria instructing him consult with you re possible action by US and UK to salvage situation brought about by Hilali resignation and apparent confusion resulting from inability Sirry or Barakat form new Govt.² Possible courses action suggested were:

a. Warning to Sirry or Barakat that they shld have nothing to do with formation new Govt;

b. Reinforcing Maraghi’s refusal to join new Govt;

c. Approach to Afifi to persuade him convince King that his (Afifi’s) inevitable resignation under present circumstances together with new Govt as presently proposed wld “reduce the chances of successful negots with UK to vanishing pt.”

2. In addition above Brit Chargé Alexandria was instructed sound you out on possibility your approaching King and “without mincing words. telling King some “home truths”, particularly re hopeless situation if Andraos and Tabet remain in palace.

3. Brit Emb Wash said FonOff most anxious appropriate instrs be sent you (presumably to see King) and quoted FonOff as fol: “It is essential that we shld work together at this critical juncture in doing everything we can to prevent the elimination of the only sound elements in Egypt polit life by this change of Govt and particularly elimination of Hafez Afifi from the Palace.”

4. Emb London also reported last night that Eden had sent Strang to see Gifford and that Strang expressed Eden’s deep concern and genuine apprehension re situation which might develop with return to power of corrupt palace elements and Wafd. Eden hoped we might be able assist.

5. Dept has informed Brit Emb here that we wld consult urgently with you re what action if any might be taken.

6. Dept deeply concerned by turn events and by possible return to power of corruption and vested interest. We believe King has acted most unwisely in paying heed to venal trio of Abboud, Tabet and Andraos and that as long as they hold present power, little progress in Egypt can be expected. While it is possible Hilali might never have carried out reform and purge program, we think King shld have given him fuller support and encouragement, particularly vis-à-vis palace intriguers.

7. At same time we recognize that had Brit during four months of conversations been able produce something which Hilali cld have accepted, his position wld have been far stronger and he wld have been able resist pressures from Abboud and his ilk.

8. While Dept shares UK concern and its hope that corrupt elements will in fact not again assume power, we do not believe that US shld involve itself in Egypt domestic polit crisis as UK suggests. Not only might our intervention be deeply resented by King and others with whom we may have to deal but in view history this change wld probably prove ineffective. Another important factor is that in intervening we wld for all practical purposes be assuming responsibility for definite and immed progress in A-E negots, i.e. recognition of Farouk’s title as King of Sudan. Under present circumstances this seems most unlikely as recent tels reporting Secy’s conversations with Eden wld indicate.

9. Dept wld appreciate your urgent views re above and your recommendations as to what if anything might be done at this juncture to help Egypt remain on balance. We recall numerous times you have singlehandedly salvaged Brit position and fact there is limit. However view your highly respected position with King and Egypt polit leaders, there may be some move which we cld make which wld assist situation but which wld avoid pitfalls intervention.

10. Only suggestion we can make for possible action here is that ActSecy might request Hassan Youssef Pasha in New York until July 3 or 4 to convey directly to King our concern and apprehension re present developments. Re this ActSecy saw Youssef July 1 but situation not sufficiently clear for anything but gen discussion on change of Govt.³

Bruce

1. Repeated to London as telegram 34. Drafted by Stabler and approved by Byroade.

2. Ambassador Caffery on June 28 reported in telegram 2303, not printed, that Prime Minister Neguib Hilali Pasha had unequivocally resigned and refused King Farouk’s request to reconsider his action. (774.13/6–2852)

   In subsequent telegrams, the Ambassador reported extensively upon the confusion and intrigue surrounding the efforts of Farouk and Egypt’s politicians to create a new Cabinet. As of the evening of July 1, Caffery informed the Department in telegram 12 from Cairo, not printed, the King’s choice for Prime Minister, Hussein Sirry Pasha, had abandoned his efforts to form a Cabinet and Farouk had called upon Barakat Pasha to make such an effort. (774.13/7–152)

   Documentation regarding the Embassy’s coverage of this crisis is in Department of State files 774.00, 774.02, and 774.13.

3. Ambassador Caffery responded in telegram 26, July 3, not printed. He expressed his wholehearted agreement with the Department of State position. He counseled against the Acting Secretary seeing Hassan Youssef Pasha in New York, as events in Cairo were developing too rapidly to allow for a fruitful conversation. And Caffery struck a note of optimism about the last minute appointment of Sirry Pasha as Prime Minister, saying that although the Cabinet was filled with second-rate politicians and technicians, Sirry Pasha was capable and that Caffery’s personal relations with him were such that he thought he could probably exercise a beneficial influence over Sirry’s actions. (774.00/7–352)