Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

780.022/6–1154: Telegram

No. 1567
The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Department of State¹

secret

Jidda, June 11, 1954—9 a.m.

506. Re Deptel 347, June 7.²

1. Since question of Aramco resuming exploration in disputed eastern area was first raised by SAG in conversations with Ohliger last March I have sensed Aramco’s policy attitudes increasingly determined by following three primary considerations:

a. Desire avoid involvement in boundary dispute between governments. (A policy enunciated in writing to British following 1949 Stobart incident.) This led to Aramco taking basic position which it still holds as matter of principle that British companies should cease operation the disputed area during arbitration.

b. Desire maintain best possible relations with SAG. This led Aramco (when later it became clear that British Government would not receive from position that British companies must continue operations) to concur in SAG view that British and Saudi positions might be equalized by resumption Aramco explorations suspended in 1949 at SAG request.

c. Desire protect its own interests in valuable oil reserves disputed area a consideration rendered more acute by suspected Saudi intrigue designed make deal with British whereby SAG would gain sovereignty over disputed area in return for oil concession therein to British companies. This led Aramco to implement specific Saudi request by resuming operations in western part of area where it had earlier sent exploration parties first in 1937–1938 and again 1948–1949.

4. Aramco states categorically “not taking more initiative than previously indicated”.

Wadsworth

1. Repeated to London and Dhahran.
2. Not printed, but see footnote 2, supra.