Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

780.5/12–754: Despatch

No. 1425
The Ambassador in Iraq (Gallman) to the Department of State¹

secret
No. 261

Baghdad, December 7, 1954.

Ref:

• Ankara’s telegram no. 541 to Department, November 21, 1954²

• Subject:
• Forthcoming Visit of Turkish Prime Minister

Within the past week in the course of conversations I had with the Turkish Ambassador, Muzaffer Goksenin, the Egyptian Ambassador, Tawfik I. Katamish, and Prime Minister Nuri, the forthcoming visit of the Turkish Prime Minister Menderes was touched on.

The Turkish Ambassador, Muzaffer Goksenin, is a new arrival. My talk with him, referred to above, took place on November 30 when I returned his initial call on me. The talk with Ambassador Katamish took place at the Embassy here on December 2 when Katamish, who only recently returned from leave in Cairo, made a return call on me. I had the talk with Prime Minister Nuri on December 3 when he was my guest at luncheon at the Embassy.

This is Ambassador Goksenin’s first diplomatic post. He is, as the Department will recall, a retired army and air force officer. Since retiring from the army a little over a year ago, he has been Governor of the Province of Izmir. He admitted to me that he has not had any serious talk as yet with Nuri on the subject of a defense pact. I gather that as Prime Minister Menderes himself will soon be here he is prudently keeping in the background. He did say, though, that he was present at the October talks in Istanbul and feels fully informed about the preliminaries leading to Menderes’ decision to visit Baghdad. He has volunteered to clear up for me any questions I might at any time have about the Istanbul talks. He tells me that, according to present plans, Menderes will come here before visiting Cairo. Ambassador Goksenin says he is happy that he and Nuri have in common, service in the Turkish Army, and that Nuri is so thoroughly conversant in Turkish. He anticipates later close collaboration with Nuri.

The Egyptian Ambassador, Tawfik I. Katamish, when I first met him on November 23, brought up the subject of the Menderes visit and the general problem of the defense of the Middle East. Two matters seemed to preoccupy him, whether Menderes would come here before Cairo, which he hoped he would not do, and whether Nuri had already given any definite commitment to sign a pact with either Turkey or Pakistan, or both. When he called on me on December 3 he talked on these subjects at quite some length.

He talked as though it had been definitely arranged for Menderes to go to Cairo first. It was good, he said, that Turkey was beginning to show a real interest in the Arab States. Egypt, for her part, now that an agreement had been reached with Britain on the Suez, was freer to give thought and to act on matters affecting the Arab world. Before Iraq commits herself in any way on the defense of the area, there should be an exchange in Cairo between the Turkish and Egyptian Governments. He was wondering whether Nuri had committed himself. He hoped not. For Nuri to bind Iraq to the northern and western countries, ignoring his Arab neighbors, would be a serious mistake to his way of thinking. Should it come to war with the Soviet Union and a breakthrough in the Middle East, the Western powers would be too preoccupied in defending the West. What Iraq needed was defense in depth and that could come only through the closest association with her Arab neighbors.

Ambassador Katamish is most genial and a glib talker. I got the impression from listening to him that he is primarily airing his own views and fishing for bits of information to fill in some pressing gaps.

In my talk with Nuri, having in mind the possible signing of a pact with Turkey, I asked Nuri what the effect might be on Iraq’s relations with the Arab States of the signing of a bilateral pact with a non-Arab country. He promptly replied that he would have no hesitancy in signing such a pact and that there could be no ill effect of consequence on relations with other Arab States, because these states, notably Jordan and Saudi Arabia, already have such bilateral pacts of their own. When I said he must find the Turks very satisfactory to deal with, he said he certainly did, and then with an apparent show of impartiality, added immediately: “But that applies to working with the Pakistanis, too.” Menderes, he said, was definitely coming here first before Cairo. He was happy about that, but he very much wanted to see the visit here followed up by a visit by Menderes to Cairo. “The Egyptians,” he said, “need a push.” Menderes could give them one, and then he hoped to see that visit followed up by a visit by King Faisal to Egypt. “That,” he said, “would be the second push.”

During our conversation Nuri made one general observation of interest on the defense problem. His Government, while wanting to see the Iraqi Army equipped with the best materiel available, wanted it understood that its force was not, however, big enough for Iraq to take on commitments to fight beyond its frontiers.

I was very much interested in reading in the memorandum of conversation of November 4 between the Secretary and Dr. Jamali, the Secretary’s statement that Iraq’s joining the Turkish-Pakistan pact would make it easier for the United States to provide Iraq with the type of military equipment Dr. Jamali had mentioned. It will be recalled that, as reported in my telegram no. 332³ of November 18, Nuri emphasized that it was essential to assure a steady, uniform supply of armament with assured maintenance and replacement throughout the area extending from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf. In view of what passed between the Secretary and Dr. Jamali and this comment of Nuri, I would like at some time before too long to follow up the Secretary’s statement to Jamali with a statement to Nuri that the way best to assure Iraq arms and replacements in keeping with the Turkish-Pakistan pattern would be for Iraq to adhere to the Turkish-Pakistan pact. To make such a statement to him prior to the Menderes visit might not be desirable as it might interfere with present plans for consummating a Turkish-Iraq agreement as a first step. The best time to make such a statement to Nuri would probably be immediately after the Menderes visit, whether or not a bilateral pact has been signed.

The Department’s observations on the timing and feasibility of my making such a statement to Nuri would be appreciated.

W. J. Gallman

1. This despatch was repeated to Ankara, Cairo, Beirut, Amman, Jidda, Tehran, Karachi, Damascus, Tel Aviv, London, and Paris.
2. Not printed.
3. Not printed; it reported on a meeting the Ambassador and a military attaché had had that morning with Prime Minister Nuri Said. (787.5 MSP/11–1854)