611.87/11–654
No. 1424
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula-Iraq Affairs (Fritzlan)
Subject:
- Discussion with Dr. Jamali on U.S.-Iraqi Relations
Participants:
- Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Head of Iraqi Delegation to U.N. General Assembly
- NEA—Mr. Byroade
- NE—Mr. Fritzlan
Pursuing the question of military assistance for Iraq, which was raised with the Secretary on November 4,1 Dr. Jamali reiterated to Mr. Byroade the importance of a few tanks and planes for training purposes. This equipment would be symbolic in nature and appear as a token of what might be expected in the years to come. Dr. Jamali said Iraq had definitely committed itself to cooperate with the United States in defense matters and would like to be considered a full partner with the United States in defense planning. If assistance was to be effective it would have to consist of considerably more than vehicles, signalling equipment, etc. Otherwise Iraqis would reluctantly conclude that Zionist pressures had been effective in restraining the Department and the Pentagon.
Mr. Byroade said that Iraq should definitley consider itself a partner with the United States in defense planning. He outlined the reasons for elaborating the present assistance program. He pointed out that in building up an army it was necessary first to bring to full strength existing units. It was our purpose to do this insofar as the two divisions of Iraqi army were concerned. This necessitated the supply of a number of items which had little “glamour. attached to them but were nevertheless indespensable. It would be inadvisable to ship items such as tanks which would necessitate the creation of whole new units and the construction of new facilities such as bridges, etc. Mr. Byroade then mentioned the shortage of money available to the United States Government for military assistance throughout the world, emphasizing the heavy demands for assistance in other quarters. He said this whole question would be carefully reviewed with the Secretary before a final decision was made. However, he could not be encouraging to Dr. Jamali as to the result.
The discussion then shifted to the general subject of U.S. relations with Israel and the Arab states. Mr. Byroade explained at length the difficult position in which the United States Government finds itself. He said that the great majority of the American people, quite apart from the Zionists, found it difficult to understand why we were giving military assistance to Iraq while denying such help to Israel. People could not understand why this was being done in view of the technical existence of a state of war between Israel and the Arab states and belligerent statements made from time to time against Israel by Arab leaders. Dr. Jamali reiterated the non-aggressive intentions of Iraq, and Mr. Byroade said he personally accepted such assurances and believed our policy was on [Page 2397] sound ground. However, real problems arose in explaining such matters convincingly to the public and this question was not essentially a political one. We had good arguments and presented them but there was a need for the Arab states to help us in this matter.
Dr. Jamali repeated his well-known views about the Arab rights in Palestine and his position that it was up to Israel to take steps to reduce tension. He added that Palestine should be left aside in considering the United States military assistance program for Iraq. The Department was well aware of lack of Iraqi intentions to attack Israel. During the negotiations for military assistance the question of Iraq modifying its policy on the Palestine question had never arisen. It should not now therefore be considered that the assistance program should in any way be dependent upon Iraq modifying its position. Iraq could not change its attitude as long as Arab rights in Palestine were ignored. Iraq had a long standing anti-communist record both at home and in world affairs and the Iraqi record in the United Nations on important matters relating to world communism would bear a favorable comparison with that of Israel. He stated that if the present anti-communist measures of the Iraqi Government, undertaken by leaders who were completely pro-Western in sympathy, should fail it was highly likely leftist and neutralist groups would gain power. It was therefore important to do everything possible to uphold the position of these leaders.
Mr. Byroade expressed general agreement over this objective. Reverting to the question of Israel he said he thought it unrealistic of the Arabs to insist upon the implementation of the 1947 United Nations General Assembly resolution on Palestine. Enforcement of this resolution would radically change the territorial boundary of Israel and this could be accomplished only by force since no Israeli government could accede to changes of such a magnitude. He wished to assure Dr. Jamali that the United States could never contemplate using its forces to achieve this purpose.
As a possible means of alleviating the situation Mr. Byroade suggested that the United States might consider giving Israel some military assistance. Dr. Jamali’s immediate reaction was that this might not be a bad idea, providing, of course, that such assistance were considered in a regional context and that Israel was not given an amount of aid equal to that received by all the Arab states. Subsequently, he said he would like to think over this matter more carefully before expressing his view as to its merits. He agreed to think over the whole problem and try to find some feasible way of reducing tension and thereby assist the Department in carrying out its program for the Near East.
[Page 2398]At the conclusion of his visit Dr. Jamali asked briefly about our relations with other Arab states. Mr. Byroade said matters in Saudi Arabia were proceeding in a happier atmosphere than had been the case several months ago. We believed we could be reasonably hopeful regarding future development in Egypt. As regards Syria, there had been little development in our relations on account of the absence in Syria of a government which could do business. There was no time left to discuss our relations with other Arab states and, having expressed pleasure over the opportunity to spend a full hour with Mr. Byroade, Dr. Jamali took his departure.
Subsequently, Dr. Jamali told Mr. Fritzlan he had meant to inform Mr. Byroade that, should the United States Government agree to provide military assistance to Egypt without conclusion of an agreement similar to that which Iraq had signed, the reaction in Iraq would be most unfortunate. He wished to emphasize this point. Mr. Fritzlan agreed to convey this message to Mr. Byroade.