Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

780.5/4–2054: Telegram

No. 1414
The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State¹

secret

Baghdad, April 20, 1954—5 p.m.

631. Yesterday I told Nuri Pasha that it was my understanding that the Turks sometime ago had issued a clear invitation for Iraq to associate itself with the Turkish-Pakistani pact and that it was now Iraq’s move. As concerns his suggestions as made to me following his return from Pakistan, I told him that I had reported these to Washington and that it was the general feeling that such was a matter for the Iraqis to work out with Pakistanis and Turks. He replied that he would talk some more to Pakistanis and suggest that they inform our Ambassador of developments. He inquired if our Ambassador in Karachi would have the authority to “approve” what might be agreed upon between the Iraqis and Pakistanis. I told him that I felt that our Ambassador would be pleased to be informed of all developments, but, unless his intructions were very different from mine, his first action would be to report to Washington.

Nuri said that immediately after he had told me of his recent trip (mytel 590, April 5²) he had written a report for the Prime Minister. A copy of this report he had sent to King Saud and he had just received a letter from King Saud commenting upon it. The second copy he had given the Turk Ambassador yesterday, and after translating Ambassador was sending it to Ankara. He said that he still hoped to go to Ankara but at the present time he had nothing to say beyond that said in his report as given to me, King Saud and the Turk Ambassador, and so was not planning a trip until sometime next month.

He informed me that he might go to Geneva for a few days early in May where he would meet many personalities. When I asked if the local political situation would permit him to be away in early May, he replied that only time would tell. He said he desired to let the present government carry on if it did its duty as it had good men in it, mentioning particularly Deputy Prime Minister Baban and Minister Interior Qazzaz, and that they were putting pressure at appropriate times on Dr. Jamali to exert leadership necessary to carry through the government’s program. He then added that the army and police had been working so hard to save the city of Baghdad from drowning that they were incapable at the moment of handling serious demonstrations. Therefore, until the flood waters were no longer a threat and the army and police were in a position to handle demonstrations, Baban, Qazzaz and other like-minded cabinet members were not desirous of pressing the government into taking a position publicly on controversial matters. On the other hand, the elements of instability were trying to press the government into taking openly positions on controversial matters while the security forces were off balance. He commented that the next ten days would be interesting.

Berry

1. Repeated to Karachi, Ankara, and Jidda.
2. Document 202. Despatch 749 from Baghdad, Apr. 27, enclosed a translation of the formal report Nuri Said submitted to Prime Minister Jamali on his return from his trip to Pakistan and India. (780.5/4–2754)