Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

774.00/4–554: Telegram

No. 1319
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State¹

secret

Cairo, April 5, 1954—6 p.m.

1258. At the urgent suggestion of the British Ambassador, he and I have reviewed our joint appreciation of February 4,² in the light of subsequent events and are agreed on the following conclusions:

Begin Verbatim.

1. Events of March severely shook the RCC. Nevertheless, the regime’s immediate prospects appear to be fairly good. Although situation has not yet returned to normal and university students have still to be brought to heel, chances are that RCC, with army behind it, will be able to bring situation under control, possibly in matter of days, provided there is not an outbreak of assassinations or terrorist activities.

2. The outlook in the longer term also is not unpromising. Internal unity both of RCC and of armed forces as a whole is likely to be maintained at least for some time and RCC may be able to reach some modus vivendi with Muslim Brotherhood. RCC continuation in power, however, will depend very largely on prospects of an Anglo-Egyptian settlement. If negotiations are reopened, confidence will gradually return and the regime will be strengthened. If, on other hand, negotiations are not resumed within a reasonable time, the regime’s position will again become precarious. In that case, with every month that passes, the risk of further dissension within RCC and in army increases, as does possibility of Naguib refusing to accept role of figurehead. There is also risk that in attempt to achieve popularity the regime might embark on violently anti-British and anti-Western courses.

3. In long term there is good chance that provided an AngloEgyptian agreement is reached and material and moral support is forthcoming from the West, the regime will survive in some form, possibly until end of “transition period” in January 1956, and also that it will be more zealous than any other Egyptian Government in prospect in carrying out its obligations. The regime has, however, proved itself to be one beset by recurrent crises, and, although an Anglo-Egyptian agreement would represent a major contribution to its stability, crises of one sort of another will almost certainly arise. Anti-British and anti-Western agitation will inevitably continue to some extent but with the removal of main irritant—the presence of British troops in Canal Zone—its intensity is likely to be far less.

4. Philosophy of RCC has not been altered by events. It is still anti-Communist and relatively pro-Western. RCC appears to be as anxious as ever to reach an agreement with UK provided it is compatible with its idea of Egyptian sovereignty.

5. There is no alternative government in sight which would be as satisfactory from point of view of the West.

6. As long as RCC (or any successor government created by it) is in power, it can be expected to carry out any commitments it has freely undertaken at least as faithfully as any government now in sight.

7. Skillful handling of public opinion during last stages of crisis suggests that RCC will be able to deal successfully with danger period immediately following announcement of an Anglo-Egyptian settlement. The strike weapon is double edged but RCC appears to be confident that it can exercise requisite control.

Caffery

1. Repeated to London as telegram 417.
2. See telegram 871 from Cairo, Document 1277.