741.56374/2–454: Telegram
No. 1277
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the
Department of State1
871. Joint estimate completed today following outline Department’s 817 January 212 except for transposition paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section II. Following summary of answers is being telegraphed by both Embassies (verbatim text) in view of urgency indicated Berlin’s Secto 79 February 3.
Begin Verbatim:
I. Internal Stability and Capabilities RCC:
- (a)
-
Prospects maintaining power:
Very good at present provided key members not assassinated and there is no grave deterioration in economic situation.
- (b)
-
Main sources support and opposition and their effectiveness:
Main sources of support are armed forces, national guard and liberation rally. Peasantry and urban proletariat generally in sympathy. Opposition comes mainly from old political parties, upper classes, some dissatisfied elements in army, police and civil servants, some business and labor organizations and Communists. RCC forces are sufficient at present to keep opposition elements in check.
- (c)
-
Trends toward authoritarian or representative government:
Regime is at present authoritarian but majority of RCC genuinely believe in some form of democracy and the trend appears to be towards a form of representative government possibly one based on trade and occupation “corporation”.
- (d)
-
Capabilities achieving announced goals in economic and social fields:
RCC is sincere in aiming at economic and social improvements in Egypt.
Achievement will depend on whether RCC can inspire sufficient confidence to attract foreign aid and investment which will also encourage internal investment and make best use of both local and foreign technical talent. Though more determined than any of their predecessors Egyptian characteristic lack of perseverance will probably prove a handicap.
- (e)
-
Evidences of long-range planning and guiding doctrines as opposed to improvisation:
RCC realizes necessity for long-range planning and has established authoritative bodies for this purpose. Plans are, however, handicapped by lack of assured finance. Consequently immediate problems have at present to be dealt with by improvisation.
II. Foreign Policy Intentions:
- (a)
-
Basic readiness to sign Suez Base Agreement recognizing special UK position:
The main object of RCC is to achieve what they call full sovereignty by putting an end to what they regard as British military occupation of Egypt. They are at present ready to sign an agreement according UK a special position in the base for the period of that agreement but this attitude is unlikely to persist much longer.
- (b)
-
Acceptability of principles incorporated in heads of agreement:
(This reply long and impossible to summarize. British Embassy air pouching text tonight; we are pouching tomorrow).3
- (c)
-
If agreement signed prospects genuine cooperative effort carry it out as opposed to renewal agitation:
So long as position of RCC is as good as at present, it is likely to cooperate in the execution of an agreement. To support them, however, they will need positive and prompt moral and material aid from UK and USA.
- (d)
- In event of agreement extent of eventual cooperation with
West on:
- (1)
- East-West matters;
- (2)
- Area problems.
- (1)
- RCC professes with apparent sincerity that their natural attraction is towards the West rather than the East, and that one of their reasons for wanting an agreement is to make it possible for them to adopt a more overtly pro-Western policy. This would require a reversal of the whole propaganda trend of years but it can probably be done if encouraged by a generous and sympathetic attitude on the part of Western Powers.
- (2)
-
Although Egyptian attitude to Israel is less intransigent than that of some Arab States, Egypt would probably be reluctant to abandon her pretensions to hegemony in Arab League by making a separate settlement with Israel.
Re treaties with Iraq, Jordan and Libya, while after an agreement the causes for Egyptian hostility towards these treaties will have largely disappeared, force of habit may continue to be strong. A change of Egyptian attitude is likely to depend principally on the degree to which genuine cooperation can be developed both between Egypt and the West over general issues and among Arab countries themselves on defense matters.
Egyptian attitude of “anti-colonialism” towards British interests in Persian Gulf Sheikdoms and Africa is unlikely to be greatly changed but they may be less vocal about it.
- (e)
-
Practical measures Egypt likely to adopt in event definite break in negotiations:
Though several other courses are open to them they are most likely to start by increasing all forms of pressure on the British forces in the Canal Zone and on British subjects in the Delta while [Page 2212] maintaining a facade correct relations. The measures taken are likely to be progressively increased in severity. Whatever other course they may adopt, RCC would almost certainly launch an anti-British political propaganda campaign through the UNO and Arab League States.
End Verbatim Text.
Full text joint estimate will be pouched Washington, London, Berlin tomorrow.