641.74/7–1253: Telegram

No. 1203
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1

top secret
priority

203. Limit distribution.

1.
At meeting July 11,2 British presented outline of Suez Base plan as follows:

“Evacuation. Withdrawal within 18 months. Not yet discussed with Egyptians, but we think they may accept it in spite their statements about shorter period. We cannot accept less.

Base. For practical reasons we cannot accept an agreement which does not retain essential features of what was described as Case ‘A’,3 namely, that technical control of main installations in Base should remain in British hands. As to how that is done, there is room for certain variety of treatment, but effective result is matter on which we feel certain that we cannot compromise.

Connected question very great importance is that of our right to get back into our Base and reactivate it when we need it. This has not yet been discussed formally with Egyptians, but is certain that they will make difficulties about giving us a sufficiently categoric and wide assurance. They will ask us to have confidence in their good intentions, but that is not good enough. It is no use to us to preserve our Middle East base in being unless we can have full access to it when we want it. We cannot accept vague verbal assurances from present rulers of Egypt as adequate guarantees of Egyptian behavior in future on such a critical matter. Formula which we propose to put forward to cover this point is as follows:

‘In the event of a major war, or aggression or threat of aggression against Egypt by an outside power, the base area shall be at the full disposal of both the contracting parties. An aggression, or threat of aggression, by an outside power against Turkey, Persia, [Page 2118] or any Arab state shall be regarded as a threat of aggression against Egypt for this purpose’.

Air Defence. Proposals upon which we agreed originally stipulated that agreement should provide for an integrated Anglo-Egyptian Air Defence Organisation, including stationing of British squadrons in Egypt. This was feature of both Case A and Case B.4 It was eminently sensible requirement; but in view of very clear Egyptian resistance to it we have decided to drop it; we shall offer Egyptians such help in air defence as they wish to accept. We think that they will be glad to have some technical advisers and to coordinate their air defence arrangements with ours in our parts of the Middle East. They will agree to British squadrons coming to Egypt occasionally to take part in joint training. We shall not press them to accept anything more.

Military Aid. Ideas previously discussed between us still hold good. There have been suggestions made recently that we try buy Egyptian agreement by offering give them large quantities of material free of charge. We do not consider such action justifiable or even wise.

MEDO. This formed the fifth article of package deal. We agree with view expressed by Mr. Dulles that there is no hope of getting the Egyptians to agree at this time to join either MEDO or any variation thereof. Yet it is very important that such an organization should come into existence at early date, and Egypt’s accession to it is essential. We feel that there will be lot of reasonable criticism among NATO countries, including our own, if we conclude an agreement with Egypt which, by withdrawal of our forces, leaves vacuum in defence of this important area without anything being proposed to fill it. With this in mind we have taken up suggestion voiced by Mr. Dulles when in Cairo5 that this Anglo-Egyptian agreement should be regarded as stage on road towards establishment of joint defence agreement. Question of period of duration of our new agreement with Egypt is obviously most important one. It was only discussed superficially at Cairo talks. It has assumed all more importance from fact that we have insisted that duration of stay our technicians shall be same as duration of agreement. We now propose to offer Egptians following formula:

‘The Agreement to remain in force until the countries’ members of the Arab Security Pact are organised (with the assistance and participation of other friendly powers) in manner to ensure their effective defence against external aggression. It shall in any case remain in force for an initial period of five years after which date either party shall be entitled to request discussion of its revision on grounds that the condition of principle referred to above has been fulfilled.’”

2.
Following British presentation above plan, Secretary Dulles gave British copies text Naguib’s letter President (Cairo 44 repeated London as Depts 200) and Eygptian proposal (Cairo 35 repeated London as Depts 201).
3.
Salisbury stated did not feel empowered to go further than proposals first made but prepared study Egyptian proposals. Agreed that further discussion would be held after study proposals.
4.
Above not to be discussed with British or Egyptian officials without specific instruction.
Dulles
  1. Also sent to Cairo as telegram 47. Drafted by Thomas Beale, Officer in Charge, United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs, and approved by Douglas MacArthur II, the Counselor of the Department.
  2. See footnote 3, Document 1195.
  3. See Document 1061.
  4. See Document 1061.
  5. See footnote 3, Document 1179.