641.74/7–753: Telegram
No. 1199
The Secretary of
State to the Embassy in
Egypt1
niact
24. Limit distribution. For Caffery from the Secretary. Our bilateral talks with Salisbury on Egypt begin July 11.2 General climate surrounding these talks is not one which leaves me hopeful.
It is becoming increasingly clear that Salisbury will present Churchill’s stand on this problem. It appears that he and Robertson will advance their adherence to Case A3 as a duty which Britain owes Western world. It is probable that Robertson, as indicated by a recent memo he sent Churchill,4 will state his belief that Case A can be obtained with some slight modifications in form. We will thus not only be faced with Churchill argument but with an estimate that their position can in fact be obtained. When we refute British position that Case A cannot in fact be obtained we shall probably conclude with different estimates of situation and thus end in impasse.
On other hand Egyptians are sitting back waiting for US to produce a miracle. They broke off discussions in Cairo and have since that date had no suggestions of their own. A review of British minutes Cairo talks indicates Egyptians were most unreasonable on several points. In my conversations in Cairo and in informal contacts since that time their position has seemed more reasonable but hardly in form that we can use to advantage with British.
In light above it is difficult see how matters can be greatly advanced in Washington talks. If we strive for agreement with British on a specific formula we run risk that agreement would be possible [Page 2112] only on formula which Egyptians would not accept and that we would be locked with British henceforth on that position. If on other hand we choose general discussions we shall probably get into discussion of Case A versus Case B etc. It seems to us that continuation of classification of Cases A, B or C is in itself unproductive.5 The implications of Cases A, B and C as given in London papers was that Base could be made available for full wartime use either immediately, or in 60 or 90 days respectively. This mechanical formula becomes unrealistic in that it ignores the degree of Egyptian cooperation that might be expected. Case A for instance might never produce a workable Base in wartime if there were a total lack of Egyptian cooperation. Case C might even give a Base fully usable prior to 60 days with full Egyptian cooperation. We therefore conclude it better address ourselves to main points disagreement between UK and Egypt and ignore as much as possible use of these arbitrary classifications.
I hope Egyptians realize extent of desire of President and myself to see their problem solved with British. I also hope they realize difficulties of US producing an agreement in above situation. I fear if some new element is not added that I shall have little chance of obtaining agreement here next week that can solve their problem. It occurs to me that such an element might be provided by a specific proposal from Naguib prior to my talks with British. If Naguib were to send message to me just prior to our talks we would have something on which to work. Message should not be made public. Such a proposal should cover key points disagreement, i.e. number and duration of technicians, channels to technicians, and availability of Base. Formula transmitted Deptel 17 to Cairo might be of use to them in forming their proposals. I personally feel that any agreement should avoid possibility future disagreements and I would suggest that Egyptians agree to arbitrary number British technicians for a fixed period of years. As a suggestion, agreement might last 5 years and number technicians be limited to 4,000. As regards availability Base, I would be willing try obtain acceptance formula which I think is close to their position, i.e. that Base should be available to Egypt’s allies and allies of Egypt’s allies in event of attack or threat of attack upon any Arab State.
Use your own judgment in approaching Egyptians on this message. If you feel they can be induced to provide a formula upon which US can agree, I believe it would aid us greatly in discussions here. If on other hand you believe Egyptians would misunderstand our motives or your approach I should not wish you discuss matter with them.
[Page 2113]This message not being rptd London.
- Drafted and approved by Byroade after being cleared in draft with the Secretary of State.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 1196.↩
- See Document 1061.↩
- Not printed.↩
- See Document 1061.↩