Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

641.74/5–1353: Telegram

No. 1166
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Cairo, May 13, 1953—7 p.m.

2428. At Secretary’s direction I told British Ambassador and General Robertson this evening that as result of conversations with Egyptian leaders he has come to following conclusions:

1. We should continue publicly to stand with British;

2. “Case A” is unobtainable and therefore he believes a move should be made in direction of “Case B”;²

3. Egyptians did not raise question of $11 million interim arms purchase and US does not plan to give arms list to Egyptians at this time;

4. It is Secretary’s intention to discuss whole situation with President and JCS upon his return to Washington and thereafter get in touch with London and endeavor to agree on new approach;

5. Naguib indicated he will endeavor in meantime to avoid all violent activities on part of Egyptians;

6. MEDO is completely unacceptable to Egyptians.³

Caffery

1. Repeated to Amman priority for the Secretary of State as telegram 73 and to London as telegram 780.
2. Regarding “Cases A and B,” see Document 1061.
3. In telegram 2434 from Cairo, May 14, not printed, Ambassador Caffery reported that Stevenson and Robertson had little to say in reply to the contents of this telegram. He said they did not seem surprised, and he believed that their opinions regarding Case A and MEDO approximated those held by American officials. (641.74/5–1453)