Office of the Historian

741.56374/4–3053: Telegram

No. 1149
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State1

secret
London, April 30, 1953—8 p.m.

5875. Foreign Office today expressed concern at what it regards as Egyptian efforts to establish and gain British acceptance at this stage of negotiations of matters of principle. It says Stevenson and other members UK delegation have made synthesis Egyptian views, which emerged in clearest form at yesterday’s meeting, and which Foreign Office outlined as follows:

1.
Egyptians insisting on arrangements for maintenance base which approximate case C, with perhaps some modification (as yet unclearly defined) along lines paragraph 9, case B.2 Thus, while Egyptians show willingness accept some technicians, they insist they be under complete Egyptian control. Any release of stores or maintenance of facilities which British might require would have to be requested on governmental level by British and, if approved by Egyptians, latter would order technicians to perform work.
2.
Egyptians refuse recognize any right of British access in event of war and, even if such access should be granted, insist on Egyptian right of veto re use to which base is put and even re withdrawal of stores.
[Page 2053]

Foreign Office says Stevenson has been told any such principles as these totally unacceptable. Embassy officer expressed hope that each side could avoid at this crucial stage of proceedings either demanding acceptance its set of principles or rejecting those of other side. Greatest hope seemed to be to try agree on activating subcommittees, with neutral terms of reference, in which problems could be explored in effort reach common ground.

Foreign Office officials said difficulty is that Egyptians attempting reflect unsatisfactory principles in terms of reference. This may, of course, be initial try-on from which Egyptians will retreat. Although Stevenson has been told Egyptian principles unacceptable, manner and form in which he conveys this to Egyptians is (except in unlikely event his instructions changed) still in his discretion. Foreign Office thought he would, therefore, try get Egyptians agree put questions of principle aside for present and get on with subcommittees.

Aldrich
  1. Repeated to Cairo as telegram 310 and unnumbered to Paris for Reinhardt, to Rome for Unger, to Ankara, and to the Arab capitals.↩
  2. Regarding “Cases B and C”, see Document 1061.↩