The Secretary of
State to the Embassy in
1694. On highest level Brit have given assent to those plans summarized on Page 11, Paragraph one, and in A in the Appendix on Page 7 of the agreed papers on the London talks.2 In addition, in view of fact that Field Marshal Slim will be associated with Ambassador Stevenson in negotiations, Brit ask the U.S. to consider sending a high-ranking military figure to assist Ambassador Caffery.
Reply has been made that decision on the question of U.S. military representation for the Suez discussions will be deferred until there has been opportunity to discuss entire question with Mr. Eden in Washington.
Your comments are requested on:
- Advisability U.S. military representation for defense negotiations.
- Extent we should participate in the military negotiations, bearing in mind the tortuous road which lies ahead.3
- Repeated to London as telegram 5660. Drafted by Ortiz and Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State, and approved by Under Secretary Smith.↩
- References are to Paper No. 3 and Case A in Appendix D to Paper No. 1 of the United States–United Kingdom Talks on Egypt. See, respectively, footnotes 2 and 3, Document 1082, and Document 1061.↩
- Ambassador Caffery replied in telegram 1959, Feb. 28, not printed, that there was no chance of the Egyptians accepting in toto the plans summarized in Case A. He thought it possible that the Egyptians might be persuaded to accept something approximating Cases B and C. He also recommended caution in having the United States participate in the military negotiations at all, and he opposed any U.S. military representation during the initial negotiating stages. (774.5/2–2853)↩