774.56/1–2853: Telegram
No. 1087
The Secretary of
State to the Embassy in the United
Kingdom1
priority
5001. British Ambassador day before yesterday received message from Eden instructing him to urge upon Secretary that no final decision be reached as regards interim arms assistance to Egypt prior to direct Dulles–Eden talks in London,2 and that in any event such assistance from US be delayed until after agreement on Sudan. We were informed of this development subsequent to decisions made [Page 1972] here resulting in dispatch of Deptel 4894 to London, rptd 1486 to Cairo and Deptel 1493 to Cairo, rptd 4907 to London.3
Secretary’s schedule has been such that appointment with Makins this subject prior to his departure impossible. After consultation with Secretary, Byroade discussed subject with Makins this afternoon.
Byroade explained Secretary hoped to avoid specific problems such as this upon his brief trip to Europe. Department felt for reasons outlined in recent London discussions that we should not with-hold support of this nature from Naguib until after defense and base negotiations with Egyptians were completed or had progressed to a certain point. We were not however retaining our initial position that a portion at least of this interim program be in the form of grant.
Byroade told Makins however that he believed a new factor had arisen since conclusion of London talks on Egypt in that tensions over Sudan had become more acute and Naguib had made several statements which appeared to be threatening against British troops. We realized if this situation should grow steadily worse that we should not offer Naguib military equipment. The staff work necessary before commitment could be made to Egyptians would take several days and it would be our hope that notification to the Egyptians would coincide with a better atmosphere resulting from agreement on the Sudan, or at least sufficient progress to alleviate present tensions. We did not however feel that we could commit ourselves to wait until agreement had been reached upon all aspects of the Sudan situation. He also said that if by the time we are ready to proceed, the Egyptians on their side are being quite unreasonable in the Sudan negotiations and the British position, as represented by their latest three alternatives,4 appeared reasonable, we could consider notifying Naguib that we were ready to proceed but that obviously we could not be in a position of giving him weapons at same time he was taking unreasonable positions on the Sudan and continuing to make statements about the possibility of Egyptian moves against British forces.
At the conclusion of conversation it was agreed (a) that the British would screen the list of equipment already in their hands in London without delay and that all staff work would be completed as quickly as possible, and (b) that prior to notification to Naguib we would contact the British in London to discuss with them the situation at that time in Egypt as regards the tenseness of the atmosphere, the status of Sudanese negotiations and the internal security [Page 1973] situation. It was clear in the conversation that this commitment did not imply a British veto if after such discussions we felt we should proceed. Makins seemed satisfied with this arrangement.
- Repeated priority to Cairo as telegram 1530. It was drafted and approved by Byroade.↩
- Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Mutual Security Agency Director Harold E. Stassen were in Europe from Jan. 31 until Feb. 8, 1953, to conduct a series of meetings. While in London, Dulles spoke with Eden about Egyptian policy on Feb. 4. For information regarding this conversation, see telegram 4308 from London, and telegram 1583 to Cairo, Documents 1091 and 1092. For further documentation regarding the Dulles–Stassen trip to Western Europe, see vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1548 ff.↩
- Not printed.↩
- See telegram 3927 from London, Document 1079.↩