Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

774.5 MSP/1–353: Telegram

No. 1066
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State¹

secret
niact

London, January 3, 1953—6 p.m.

3640. From Byroade. Greatly concerned at implication in Deptel 4374 (repeated Cairo 1318)² that United States official proceeding with Egyptian officers on list of military equipment totaling approximately $30,000,000 and that list and cost thereof may already be in hands of Egyptians.

I had assumed one of primary objectives in talks here on Egypt was to make certain that talks ended with United States free to proceed immediately and prior to UK–Egyptian negotiations in Egypt with an interim program of military assistance totaling approximately $10,000,000 to $11,000,000. I explained our position to British yesterday and found them greatly disturbed that we would propose proceed with any commitment to Egyptians prior to United Kingdom-Egyptian negotiations. They have asked for a paper outlining our intentions in this regard which I will send by separate message.³ Although I presented matter in such a way that I did not specifically ask their agreement, I believe it is doubtful that on this level I can conclude Egyptian talks without an express objection on their part to our proposal.

Problem may well be considered at cabinet level and I would not be surprised that an appeal will be made to the Secretary asking that we not proceed with plans for interim military aid. I do not propose to change position I have presented (see Embassy telegram 3635) unless instructed to contrary.

In face of above, if we are now engaged in actual conversations with Egyptians on either $30,000,000 or $11,000,000 program, we shall have placed ourselves in position to be accused of bad faith by British. I had understood before leaving Washington that no discussions would be held with Nikbawy and Sadry on arms aid except re “police equipment” and regarding general technical questions arising from Naguib’s list of November 10 until talks here completed and green light could be given for interim arms aid program. I consider it most important that no discussions on interim arms aid program be held with Egyptian officers until firm decision re such program has been taken.

Please clarify urgently as I am committed to present paper to British no later than Monday morning on proceeding with an immediate interim program in order magnitude of $11,000,000.

British Joint Chiefs of Staff give every indication of moving quickly upon military supplies to Egypt once base problem and defensive arrangements are well under way. They indicate they are prepared to give sufficiently high priority to Egyptians to make equipment roll rapidly.

They feel that Britain should be the primary source of military equipment for Egypt but do not seem averse to some assistance from United States providing matter properly coordinated. I also believe they are not as averse to $11,000,000 project as their Foreign Office officials.

There is one point here that must be borne in mind as we consider the composition of any list of United States equipment. British feel strongly about type of weapons being given to Egypt at this time which can readily be used in guerrilla warfare by Egyptians against them. I believe, even if we can secure agreement here in principle that we proceed without delay upon $11,000,000 program, that we should reconsider our list in this regard after my return.⁴

Gifford

1. Repeated to Cairo as telegram 185.
2. See footnote 2, supra.
3. See telegram 3642 from London, Document 1068.
4. In telegram 4409 to London, Jan. 4, not printed, the Department expressed the hope to Byroade that telegram 4399, which had crossed London’s 3640, made the thinking in Washington regarding the interim arms program reasonably clear. (774.5 MSP/1–453)