Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

774.5/1–353: Telegram

No. 1068
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State¹

secret
niact

London, January 3, 1953—7 p.m.

3642. Following is text of paper entitled “United States position on immediate extension of military aid to Egypt” which we propose to give Britain Monday² in response to their request:

• “1. The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States are in agreement that the Government of General Naguib in Egypt affords the West Powers their best opportunity of working out satisfactory arrangements for the common defense of the area, not only with Egypt but eventually with the other Middle East States.
• “2. The United Kingdom Government has concurred in the answer which the United States made to General Naguib on October 6, 1952, in response to his inquiry of September 18, indicating that it was ready to examine the possibility of extending material aid to Egypt, if Egypt for its part was ready to examine the possibility of entering into arrangements with the West Powers for mutual aid.
• “3. General Naguib in a memorandum to the American Ambassador at Cairo dated November 10, 1952, indicated the willingness of his government to consider the eventual entry of Egypt into a system of Middle East defense with the West Powers, provided some solution could be found to the problem of British evacuation from the Canal Zone. With this communication he made formal request for military and economic assistance from the United States.
• “4. The United Kingdom and the United States Governments are in agreement that it is in their best interests to maintain the Naguib regime in power. General Naguib has on numerous occasions indicated to the United States and United Kingdom Ambassadors in Cairo that, if he is to remain in power, he urgently needs aid from the West. He has made specific requests of the United States for military and economic aid which have thus far met with no response.
• “5. The United States is convinced that an immediate interim response to General Naguib’s request for aid is essential not only to maintain the General’s confidence in the West, but also to set the stage for the forthcoming negotiations between Egypt, the United Kingdom and the United States for settlement of the defense problem. Since it does not appear possible to formulate a program of economic assistance which could be carried out with any effect in the next few months, it is the belief of the United States that an interim military aid program is required. The military character of the present regime would seem to underscore the importance of such a program.
• “6. In light of these circumstances the United States Government proposes therefore to make available to Egypt arms and military equipment to the approximate value of $10 million, some of which might be furnished as grant aid.
• “7. Arms and equipment in the $10 million interim program of military aid would be selected from the list submitted in Annex I of the Egypt memorandum of November 10, 1952, and would so far as possible comprise arms and equipment which could not be used by the Egyptian armed forces in guerrilla or other armed attack on British troops stationed in the Canal Zone.
• “8. In informing General Naguib of the readiness of the United States immediately to make available the $10 million shipment of military equipment in addition to the million dollar order of so called ‘police equipment’ the furnishing of which has already been agreed to by the United Kingdom Government, the American Ambassador at Cairo would inform General Naguib that this step was taken as earnest of the friendly attitude of the United States and its desire to bring to a successful conclusion negotiations with Egypt which would place that country on the side of the free West Powers in some system for mutual defense of the Middle East.
• “9. The position of the United States Government with respect to any future programs for military assistance for Egypt is that such programs will have to be carefully coordinated with the progress made in obtaining Egyptian adherence to any participation in a system of common defense planning. The scope and nature of United States assistance will therefore depend in the future in large measure on Egyptian performance.
• “10. While the United States will continue as a matter of policy to impress upon General Naguib and his government that the United States will expect Egypt to look to habitual sources of arms supply, the United States cannot agree that such a policy should exclude Egyptian purchases from the United States. The United States would also be prepared to consider the possibility that its military assistance to Egypt might in part take the form of material of British type purchased by the United States in the United Kingdom for transfer to Egypt. The United States will, of course, undertake to maintain close consultation and coordination with the United Kingdom in the formulation of any arms program.”³

Gifford

1. Repeated to Cairo as telegram 187.
2. This U.S. paper appears in its original form as Appendix E of the “Agreed Record” of the United States–United Kingdom Talks on Egypt (774.5/1–1453), and it eventually became Annex A to Paper No. 4 of the United States–United Kingdom Talks with the following title: “United States Position on Extension of Military Aid to Egypt”. (774.5/1–1453) For further information regarding its adoption as Annex A to Paper No. 4, see telegram 3691 from London, Document 1071.

3. In telegram 4408 to London, Jan. 4, not printed, the Department advised the Embassy that it approved the text of this paper, subject to suggestions. With regard to paragraph 5, the Department suggested that it might be helpful to point out to the British that immediate military aid would improve morale in the Egyptian armed forces and help bolster Naguib’s position vis-à-vis them. Concerning paragraph 10, the Department suggested that the following words be inserted in the final sentence after the phrase “formulation of any arms program”: “insofar as possible”. The rationale for this additional phrasing was to avoid being too tightly bound by the British arms aid program. (774.5/1–353)

   In telegram 3660 from London, Jan. 5, not printed, the Embassy reported that the following textual changes had been made in the United States paper on arms aid which had been handed to the British that day:

   “Word ‘immediate’ omitted from title.

   “Following two sentences inserted between second and third sentences in numbered paragraph 4: “The only foreseeable force able to overun General Naguib would appear to be dissatisfied elements in the Egyptian armed services. The morale of the Egyptian services therefore is an important element in the [garble].’

   “In numbered paragraph 6 after words ‘United States Government’ substitute ‘considers it most desirable’ in place of ‘proposes therefore’.

   “Following final sentence added to numbered paragraph 8: ‘The Ambassador would make it clear that the United States would not make any additional shipment of equipment to Egypt unless definite progress had been made in the negotiation.’

   “Final clause reading ‘and on the general question of area relationships’ added to last sentence numbered paragraph 9.

   “First sentence paragraph 10 amended as follows: ‘While the United States cannot agree that such a policy should exclude Egyptian procurement from the United States, the United States will continue as a matter of policy to impress upon General Naguib and his government that the United States will expect Egypt to look to its habitual sources of arms supply.’

   “Final sentence numbered paragraph 10 amended as follows: ‘The United States will, of course, undertake to maintain close consultation and coordination with the United Kingdom also far as possible in the formulation of any arms program.’” (774.5/1–553)