611.41/1–253
No. 1060
The Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs (Perkins)
to the Secretary of State-designate (Dulles)
top secret
Washington, December 31, 1952.
Dear Foster: Attached are notes on various items
in which Mr. Churchill or the
British Government have shown interest in the past1 and which it is possible Mr. Churchill may bring into the
conversations with General Eisenhower.2 We
have attempted to make these comments as brief as possible and in
some cases we have condensed the original papers to the best of our
ability. Some of them, such as atomic energy, are not susceptible of
condensation. On the others we have attached the original comments
in case you want to refer to them for more ample statements than the
brief notes for the General.
In preparing this list of subjects we have no idea that General
Eisenhower will want to
take any of these subjects up with the Prime Minister but simply
that he may want to be informed of the present status of the
problems in case the Prime Minister raises them. If the information
is not adequate we will be ready to supply promptly anything further
which you want.
As some of the items are Top Secret, I am sending this data to the
UN Delegation in New York, asking
them to bring it to you at your convenience and to wait for it so
that they can return it for safe keeping. They will bring it to you
at any time or times that you wish the material.
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Since the above was dictated we have received a wire from Walter Gifford as follows:
“Personal for the Secretary
“I lunched with Churchill at Checquers on December 27 and
from all I could find out I do not think Churchill has any specific
matters which he is to take up with either Eisenhower or President.
In conversation with Eden, yesterday, he confirmed my
understanding. However, I should remind you that Prime
Minister’s unpredictability has not decreased with the
years. Eden also said
he did not expect Churchill would go to US when he and
Butler plan their
trip, but my impression is they will want to go as soon
after inauguration as may be acceptable to new
administration. Gifford”3
I also enclose for your information the communication from the
Foreign Office about the coronation. We have told Walter Gifford that we thought it
was unlikely that the Special Mission could be named until after
January 20 or that we could give the names of people occupying the
seats allocated to us before that time. We have, of course, been
careful to avoid any commitments regarding seats.
Sincerely yours,
[Attachment]
Egypt
Egypt is the key to the Arab States and therefore to the problem
of area defense and solution of the Arab-Israeli quarrel. The
assumption of power by General Naguib has created perhaps the first real
opportunity for a reasonable settlement of the problems which
threaten stability in the Near East. However, a satisfactory
understanding with Egypt requires solution of the Anglo-Egyptian
disputes over the Sudan and over maintenance of British military
bases in the Suez Canal area. It will also require provision of
a certain amount of military and economic aid to Egypt.
1. The Sudan:
Anglo-Egyptian negotiations for an agreement on self-government
and self-determination for the Sudan are in their final stages.
There is danger, however, that they will break down over certain
points connected with powers to be retained temporarily by the
Governor-General and, especially, his power to protect the . . .
peoples
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of the
Southern Sudan against possibly harmful actions of the northern
Sudanese majority.
The United States is not directly involved but is deeply
concerned lest failure of these negotiations should make
impossible a resolution of the over-all Egyptian question. We do
not believe that vague fears for the future welfare of a
relatively small number of . . . Sudanese should be allowed to
stand in the way of a settlement deeply affecting, not only the
security and other interests of the Western Powers, but also the
security and welfare of many millions of Near Easterners.
British rigidity on this issue could be disastrous.
2. The Suez Canal
Bases:
British military installations in the Canal area are by far the
largest anywhere in the Middle East and are the only ones
presently in the area, outside of Turkey, capable of supporting
a substantial military force. Britain presently has stationed in
the Canal region about 81,000 troops, despite the fact that the
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 allows her only 10,000. There are
indications that morale among the troops is low and that
financial and practical difficulties in maintaining the bases at
their present level make the British anxious for an early
settlement.
The Egyptian Government denounced the Treaty of 1936 in October,
1951 and demanded that all British forces be evacuated from
Egypt. However, General Naguib, present head of the Egyptian Government,
has indicated that he would permit a certain number of
“technicians” to remain in the Canal Zone to maintain the
installations if the bulk of the British forces were withdrawn
and other conditions met. The British Government has recently
intimated to us that it would be prepared to withdraw all of its
forces by the end of 1954 if satisfactory arrangements could be
worked out for the participation of Egypt in a Middle East
defense organization and for the maintenance of the base
installations in such a way that they would be available to
Allied Forces immediately after the outbreak of war.
Assistant Secretary of State Henry A.
Byroade is this week in London at the head of a
team to discuss possible proposals to Egypt regarding the Suez
base question. These proposals would be combined with offers of
military and economic aid from the United States and Great
Britain in return for satisfactory political and military
commitments on the part of the Egyptian Government.
3. Aid to Egypt:
The United States Government is planning to offer Egypt a small
military aid program, to a value of about $10,000,000, the
greater proportion of which will be on a cash-reimbursable
basis, as an evidence
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of friendship and good faith without awaiting the conclusion
of formal negotiations or commitments. However, we intend to
withhold any large-scale or continuing program of military aid
until the Canal question and Egyptian participation in Middle
East defense are settled, at least in principle.
Our main divergence with the British over the question of aid to
Egypt is with respect to timing. In general, they are inclined
to be more cautious and demand more in return from the Egyptians
for such assistance.
Our plans for economic aid to meet the pressing social and
economic problems which face Egypt are still in the exploratory
stage. However, the Point Four Program is now expanding its
operations in Egypt and is becoming a widely accepted indication
of United States interest in Egyptian problems.
4. Background:
Mr. Churchill has a great
personal interest in the Egyptian question, particularly the
Sudan problem, which has nostalgic connotations for him. On his
last trip to the United States, in his speech to the Congress,
the Prime Minister asked for a “token” number of American troops
in the Suez Canal Zone, although he did not specify whether or
not these troops would be there under Middle East Defense
Organization auspices.
