774.5 MSP/12–2952
No. 1058
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African
Affairs (Jernegan) to the Secretary of
State1
Subject:
- Israel and Grant Arms Assistance for Egypt
Discussion
The Department has written the Department of Defense proposing that a joint recommendation be made to the President that Egypt be found eligible for grant military assistance under Section 202 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, and that $5 to $10 million dollars be allotted for this purpose for fiscal 1953. The JCS have approved these recommendations and we have received a formal notification to that effect from the Secretary of Defense [Page 1925] dated December 29.2 Defense is presently preparing an interim military aid program for Egypt in the amount of $10 million dollars, of which a portion would be grant, provided Egypt is found eligible. This program is based on the list of requirements of the Egyptian Armed Forces which was attached to General Naguib’s communication of November 10 (Tab A).2
In preparation for the submission of the joint recommendation to the President, Mr. Byroade had a conversation with Mr. Tannenwald of the Office of DMS several days ago.2 He was informed that the President is under heavy pressure from American Jewish groups and from Israel to find Israel eligible for grant military assistance.3 Failing that, these groups and Israel do not wish that any Arab state be found eligible unless it has agreed before hand to sign a peace agreement with Israel. Mr. Tannenwald believed that the White House would find it difficult to agree to Egypt’s eligibility unless Israel is similarly treated.
This situation raises many serious implications because we understand that the Department of Defense is strongly opposed to grant assistance to Israel. This opposition is based on the consideration that Israel’s armed strength is already out of proportion to the defense and security needs of the Near East. NEA also considers that under existing circumstances it would be prejudicial to the security of the Near East and to our attempts to “direct sunshine” on Egypt, to recommend that Israel be found eligible at this time for grant assistance. There exists then the danger that the grant assistance programs for Egypt would be undermined if it should be insisted that Israel be accorded similar treatment at this time.
There may be some suggestion that all the Near Eastern states be found eligible for grant military assistance. NEA would find no difficulty in such a finding as a matter of administrative convenience, but not necessarily for active use at this time. We have been informed by the JCS that it would not favor grant military assistance to any Near Eastern state without justifiable overriding political considerations. In the case of Egypt, we have expressed the view that there are such considerations and the JCS have concurred. It may also be determined that Saudi Arabia should be made eligible. NEA does not believe, however, that there are such considerations at the present time in the case of Israel, and we are concerned lest the difficulties foreseen by Mr. Tannenwald frustrate our efforts in connection with Egypt.
[Page 1926]Attached is a proposed letter to Mr. Harriman asking him to seek a presidential determination of eligibility for grant military assistance to Egypt.4
Recommendations
It is recommended that you discuss this question urgently with the President and Mr. Harriman with a view to clearing the way for expeditious action on the Egyptian matter.
The following points may be useful to you:
- 1.
- We are convinced that Egypt is the key to the establishment of a Middle East Defense Organization and to a new relationship between the West and the Arab states.
- 2.
- We believe that in order to achieve Egyptian participation in MEDO, it will be necessary to initiate a military and economic aid program (in which grant assistance will play an important part) and to reach a settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian question.
- 3.
- General Naguib has shown himself both reasonable and skillful and we believe that he represents our best chance to establish a relationship of confidence between his country and the West. We must support him if he is to overcome opposition which will undoubtedly increase unless he has something to show for his present reasonable and courageous attitude.
- 4.
- A cash reimbursable military program alone would not be practical in the light of the Egyptian foreign exchange situation. Consequently, we shall have to supplement it with grant assistance. In all events, we shall carefully measure our assistance against Egyptian performance.
- 5.
- Amongst our principal objectives vis-à-vis Egypt, is a settlement between Israel and Egypt. We believe if we can bring Egypt into MEDO and establish this new relationship, such a settlement can be achieved. In fact, Ambassador Caffery has been told that peace with Israel is an objective of General Naguib’s regime. However, premature action on this matter might destroy what we are now trying to do.
- 6.
- We have not overlooked or in any way forgotten Israel’s situation, but consider that to deny Egypt grant military aid or military aid in any form until peace is signed is impractical and not in accord with the realities of the present situation.
- 7.
- We consider the development of a military aid program for Egypt a matter of great urgency and believe the next few months will be particularly sensitive insofar as the stability of General Naguib is concerned.
- 8.
- A simultaneous finding of eligibility for both Egypt and Israel (which would probably become public knowledge) would greatly lessen the psychological impact of a finding in favor of Egypt alone at this time.
It is recommended that you sign the attached letter.