774.5/12–2952: Telegram
No. 1057
The Chargé in Egypt (McClintock) to the Department of State1
1528. Last night I told three members of the Military High Committee of my contemplated departure for London. They were Colonel Gama abd Al Nasir, number two man to Naguib, Colonel Amin, and Major Hakim Amer. I said that Byroade’s visit to London and desire of British Government to discuss overall defense problem was additional proof of serious intent on part of United States and United Kingdom to achieve positive results which would be mutually beneficial to Egypt as well as to the western powers.
On Sudan, Egyptian officers were most skeptical as to British motives. They have pathological distrust of British administration in Sudan and said quite frankly that reason they attached such importance to question of south was their fear that, even in brief three-year period of liquidation of present Sudan Government, British would so excite southerners that they would opt for secession from Sudan and possible annexation to adjoining British colonies.
We explained that British were not as Machiavellian as Egyptians supposed and that British Government had made concession after concession in sincere endeavor to reach meeting of the minds on Sudan. We urged that Egyptians were within striking distance of achieving their strategical objective, which was ultimate British withdrawal from Sudan and that it would be folly for them to break off negotiations on the three “sticking points” on which British Cabinet had taken its decision. On discussing these points we found that the colonels regarded question of Governor General’s emergency powers as one of [on?] which agreement could be reached, and that they felt issue of “Sudanization” could be met by [Page 1924] some formula. However, on south, they said that no public statement could be made which would imply that south was any different from rest of Sudan. We pointed out that British had already evidenced their willingness to include formal assurances as to unity of Sudan in agreement which would be reached with Egypt. We likewise suggested that possibly secret protocol to published accord or perhaps even a letter from British Prime Minister to Egyptian Prime Minister allaying Egyptian fears that south would be encouraged to secede might be a way out of present dilemma.
I called this morning on British Ambassador and gave him substance of above. He said that last night Naguib had telephoned for him and later he had called on Fawzi who said that reports had reached Egyptian Government suggesting that there might be demonstrations or even bodily attack on Major Salah Salem and Minister of Works, Bakhouri, during their present tour of south. Stevenson had sent urgent telegram to Khartoum reporting this démarche and calling attention of Governor General to deplorable effect such an incident would have on negotiations. First Secretary Burroughs of the British Embassy is now in Khartoum assisting Governor General in preparation of latter’s comments on London’s draft of proposed agreement. Once these have been considered by London, Stevenson expects to present final draft to Naguib.
- Repeated to London as telegram 518 and to Khartoum as telegram 36.↩