Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

774.5/12–2952: Telegram

No. 1056
The Chargé in Egypt (McClintock) to the Department of State¹

top secret

Cairo, December 29, 1952—noon.

1524. Re Deptel 1292, December 26² and mytel 1522, December 27 to Department rptd London 515.³

Following is our working level comment on UK memo on defense negotiations with Egypt.⁴ You will recall that this is still subject to Ambassador Caffery’s approval on his return.

We are in general agreement with basic paper. However we trust that London meeting will be able to develop concrete lists under paragraph 1(c)⁵ since basis of Naguib’s original approach to US and his memo of November 10 was request for military and economic aid in return for which he was willing to consider placing Egypt on side of western allies. Meanwhile we hope Department and Defense will go ahead with plans for interim assistance.

Essence of Brit paper is to devise ways and means of maintaining Suez base in peace in manner to make it available for use in war. Thus, its premise is sound that participation of Egypt in MEDO is essential since obviously key to use of base in peace or war is acceptance by Egypt of MEDO concept. However, here it is necessary to turn to paragraph D Naguib’s memo November 10 (Embtel 1167, November 10 to Department, repeated London 394). Egyptians make their condition precedent to eventual entry into MEDO conclusion of agreement for “effective withdrawal of British Forces from Egyptian territory”. Department and Foreign Office London will, of course, recognize that unless satisfactory assurances can be given on this vital point it will be idle to expect Egyptian entry into MEDO or that essential Egyptian agreement and cooperation mentioned paragraph 8 without which base cannot function.⁶

We welcome paragraph 11⁷ which indicates that alternatives A, B and C set forth in appendix C⁸ are not inflexible. In our view some elements of alternatives A and B might be made acceptable to Egyptians provided evacuation commences and progress is made on program of military and economic assistance. For example, second paragraph of section D Naguib’s memo of November 10 states Egyptian Government would be prepared to take over and maintain canal zone base “with whatever technical assistance as will be agreed upon in light of the immediate requirements and of time necessary for training Egyptian personnel to supersede British technicians.” Acceptance of this principle goes far to meet requirement in paragraph 4 of case A cited in appendix C. In this regard we trust that US and UK authorities will give consideration to possibility (a) of giving some assurances regarding training of Egyptian personnel and (b) possibility of US participation in supplying at least a portion of “technicians” left on base. As Embassy Despatch 1002, November 26⁹ indicated present Egyptian Charge London has given strong hint that participation of other than British technical personnel might be palatable to Egyptians.

Similarly re para 5 in case A and 11 in case B might it not be possible if only to win Egypt acquiescence that some of integrated base air def might be given to USA? We assume of course that “integrated Anglo-Egypt air defense. contemplates maximum use of Egyptian squadrons.

Likewise on question of air def we feel that one of strongest selling points from psychological pt of view wld be at once to assure Egyptians that anti-aircraft gun defense would forthwith be placed in Egyptian hands. Comdr. of ack-ack is prominent member of mil high comite and such a move wld strongly appeal to professional pride of comite.

In all three alternatives it is reiterated that Royal Navy cld maintain equip for def of Egyptian ports and have access to commercial bunkers. In view of cordial relations between Egypt and Brit navies, this statement which is so obvious might in fact be deleted and could be replaced with assurance of intent of allied powers to rely on Egypt naval forces for minesweeping and harbor defense purposes.

Alternatives A and B require allied-manned “staging post” in Egypt. We question necessity of such a field in light of (a) facilities Libya, Cyprus and elsewhere in ME and (b) numbers of personnel such operation would require (alternative cited para 18 under case C wld seem adequate).

In light of paras B and D Naguib memo Nov 10 Egyptians will most certainly not accept paras 1 and 2 of case A but we feel they might buy remainder of case A and most of B (with modifications suggested above. provided they have feeling they were being treated as equal partners. In this regard we revert to suggestions previously made that language of Arab Security pact which was copied almost directly from NATO might assuage feelings of amour propre and provide us with language formula for use of Suez base both in peace and in war.

Foregoing comment in pursuance of reftel is directed solely to Brit def paper. We do however wish strongly to emphasize that manner in which this negotiation is posed to Egyptians is almost as important as substance of the negot if there is to be any chance of success. We recommend accordingly that question of tactics be given important place on agenda of forthcoming London discussions.

McClintock

1. Transmitted in two sections. Sent priority to London for Byroade as telegram 516 and repeated to the Department.

   From Dec. 31, 1952, until Jan. 7, 1953, an American delegation of experts headed by Assistant Secretary of State Byroade was in London for a series of talks on Egypt with their British counterparts drawn from the Foreign Office, the Treasury, and the military. Seven meetings were held during this time and the participants kept minutes of them, calling them an “Agreed Record.” Appended to this record were six appendixes, which consisted of American and British working papers. The participants also considered and approved ad referendum five policy papers containing various annexes and appendixes. Record copies of the five official papers and the agreed record of the sessions plus the appendixes are in Department of State file 774.5/1–1453. Neither the verbatim texts of these minutes nor the documents are printed.

2. Supra.
3. In telegram 1522 from Cairo, Dec. 27, not printed, Chargé McClintock reported to Byroade that Ambassador Caffery agreed that Embassy officials should discuss the British defense paper with the British Embassy and prepare working-level comments on it, subject to the Ambassador’s approval upon his return to Cairo from Baghdad on Dec. 31. McClintock also said that he had already had two conferences with British officials and that the Embassy’s preliminary comments on the defense document would be sent on Dec. 29 to Byroade in London. (774.5/12–2752)
4. According to the “Agreed Record” of the United States–United Kingdom Talks on Egypt, the document under reference became Paper No. 1 and was entitled “United Kingdom Memorandum on Defence Negotiations with Egypt”. (774.5/1–1453)

5. Paragraph 1 of the “United Kingdom Memorandum on Defence Negotiations with Egypt” reads as follows:

   “1. The United Kingdom is proposing to negotiate with Egypt a settlement that would involve:—

   • “(a) Agreement over the Suez Canal base and an evacuation formula.
   • “(b) The participation of Egypt in a Middle East Defence Organisation.
   • “(c) A programme of military and economic assistance to Egypt.” (774.5/1–1453)

6. Paragraph 8 of the “United Kingdom Memorandum on Defence Negotiations with Egypt” reads as follows:

   “8. A working base in Egypt is essential to the Allies in war, and it cannot function except with Egyptian agreement and co-operation. In order to obtain this, and also the naval facilities that will be required, considerable concessions will have to be made so as to secure Egyptian goodwill and promise of assistance in war.” (774.4/1–1453)

7. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the “United Kingdom Memorandum on Defence Negotiations with Egypt” read as follows:

   • “10. It is clear that negotiations with Egypt will have little chance of success unless requirements are kept to the minimum essential for the defence of the Middle East. Appendix D lists three different cases illustrating the concessions that may have to be made and their implications. Case ‘A,’ the optimum requirements, is militarily and financially by far the best, but Egyptian agreement is believed to be unlikely. Case ‘B’ is worse, both militarily and financially. Should the Egyptians prove completely intransigent Case ‘C’ might have to be accepted although this involves the abandonment of any effective control over the facilities which are essential to the Allies in war and which the Egyptians are considered incapable of maintaining. Acceptance of Case ‘B’ would therefore involve risks and delay before the Allied base could be made operational in war. The implications of Case ‘C’ would be very much more serious in that the Allies would not have a working base for at least 90 days after the outbreak of war.
   • “11. The above Cases are not meant to be inflexible. It may be that the Egyptians will be prepared to accept some compromise between these, and we think that we should stand fast where we can, and give way where we must, without necessarily attempting to obtain the requirements all at the same level.” (774.5/1–1453)

8. In the final agreed version of the “United Kingdom Memorandum on Defence Negotiations with Egypt”, alternatives “A”, “B”, and “C” were set forth in Appendix D. For text, see Document 1061.
9. Not printed.