Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

780.5/10–2152: Telegram

No. 98
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State¹

secret

Cairo, October 21, 1952—4 p.m.

1007. Before noting specific content Depcirtels 449 and 450,² Oct 17, and in full concurrence with Dept’s view that Egypt is key to Arab acceptance or rejection MEDO concept I desire submit fol observations re sitn here:

1. Egypt will not participate as partner with Britain in any MEDO concept unless British announce acceptance principle of evacuation Canal Zone and actually begin evacuation troops (having in mind that final withdrawal troops will be simultaneous with entry of Egypt into eventual defense organizations leaving on base only troops disguised as technicians). This wld not preclude Egypt in meantime entering into discussions on MEDO planning group.

Accordingly, it is essential that assurances be given by British on this point if any Egypt acceptance of MEDO is to be expected. A mere agreement to release jet planes 80 percent paid for by Egypt under legal contract wld not suffice to win Egypt entrance into MEDO planning group.³

2. Dept’s 450 while taking cognizance of factors set forth above is silent on fact that conversations are currently in progress between US and Egyptian Govts on possible military and economic assistance to Naguib regime. As indicated final para Embtel 886, Oct 8,⁴ members of military high comite are increasingly anxious that something tangible [to] be done quickly to convince army that western powers and especially US are friendly to Naguib regime and willing to help it. I anticipate that reply to Dept’s message (Deptel 678, Sept 30)⁵ will be made by Naguib this week since officers preparing reply have indicated that their lists of equipment necessary to bring Egypt’s armed forces up to present planned strength are about ready for submission.

3. In my opinion prompt affirmative action in providing Egyptian army with even token shipment of some equipment wld do more than anything else to bring Naguib govt to point of agreeing at least to consider with us and other sponsoring powers outline of MEDO.

Taking Dept’s 450 with enumeration established therein I have fol comments:

I. A. 1. Agree.

2. I likewise feel multilateral approach not desirable and on whole favor British suggestion in para A2 Dept’s 449. In this connection recall second para section 2B Embtel 473, Aug. 26,⁶ which I now desire amplify by saying that my British colleague indicates his govt aware that UK cannot present proposals here and that it desires me to undertake this task.

3. My overall views this para covered in sections 1 and 2 above. At same time we shld agree to make available to Egyptian army certain items of military equipment. Egypt quid pro quo wld be private agreement to consult on MEDO concept.

B. 1. No comments.

2. Concur and desire revert to suggestion para Roman [apparent omission] B my ref tel re utility or more explicit ref to possibilities of economic cooperation in this area. Both Arab security pact and third para Paris principles Nov 10 contain useful language in this regard.

3. and 4. I concur.

II. A. and B. I concur.

Caffery

1. Repeated to London, Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Jidda, Damascus, Paris, Rome, Tel Aviv, and Ankara.
2. Documents 95 and 96.
3. For details, see Documents 947 ff.
4. Not printed. (611.74/10–852)
5. Not printed. It reported that the Departments of State and Defense and the Director of Mutual Security agreed that material as well as moral support toward the Egyptian regime was the policy best calculated to lead toward the attainment of United States objectives in Egypt, specifically: “a.) Egypt participation in common def planning, b.) settlement Anglo-Egypt controversy and c.) peace with Israel.” This telegram was also sent to London as telegram 2293, Sept. 30. (744.00/9–1852)
6. Not printed. Paragraph 2B suggested that the Department of State take a close look at the Arab security pact which went into effect on Aug. 23, since it contained some useful language. “Its first four parts are, in fact, but a paraphrase of treaties we ourselves have evolved from act of Chapultepec thru Rio Treaty, Western Union and NATO Treaty to pres time. There are also points of similarity in this instrument to proposals in MEDO papers.” (780.5/8–2652)