Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

780.5/10–2052: Telegram

No. 97
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State¹

secret

London, October 20, 1952—9 p.m.

2304. Re Embtel 2280, October 19.²FonOff today took initiative in informing us tht convs with Turk Prime and FonMin’s re MEDO had been most satis. Within next few days, FonOff will be informing Dept more formally re convs thru Brit Emb Wash and Turks thru US Emb Ankara.³ Prior doing so, however, FonOff instructing Brit Emb Ankara clear minutes with Turks in order assure no misunderstandings re gen lines of talks as result possible faulty translation. Meanwhile, FonOff wished give us its understanding. FonOff said Menderes had expressed great appreciation for urgent need org ME def and reiterated Turkey’s willingness participate. He felt there was urgent need for setting up MEDO. It wld be much better if Arabs wld participate, but sponsors must go ahead and org MEDO even if Arabs will not play.

Brit showed Turks copy of draft contained section B Depcirtel 449 Oct 17⁴ and explained Brit views re consulting Arab states as set forth section A. Menderes indicated that he thought it wld be desirable if all Arab states cld be brought into org, but he did not think this cld be accomplished by simultaneous démarches to all states concerned. He felt some are more interested than others. For example, he had recently talked to Regent here in London and he felt there was good possibility of persuading Iraqis to join org. If Arab bloc cld be split up on this question and one or more Arab states brought in, then others might fol. He thought that it was desirable to sound out Iraqis first and, in view his conv with Regent, suggested Turks undertake do so. If Iraqi agrmt can be obtained, then either Iraq or UK might attempt bring in Jordan. Next step might then be to try bring in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon.

FonOff indicated Menderes felt present moment propitious for splitting Arab states on this question. Arab League not at present effective org and there are increasing indications that monarchial states beginning look askance at republican tendencies in Egypt.

Re Egypt, Menderes thought it wld be best not to raise question MEDO participation at this time, but to let matter rest until progress cld be shown in Anglo-Egyptian prob.

FonOff added that all Brit reps in the field who have been consulted re proposals set forth Brit memo contained Depcirtel 449 have been unanimous in viewpoint that these are wrong tactics to pursue with Arab states.

Emb off recalled that gen tactics which Menderes suggested re approach Arab states were essentially those suggested by Brit some months ago. He recalled that we had felt strongly at time that they were open grave difficulties. He expressed appreciation for info and anticipated Dept might have some observations when Dept formally informed of talks by Brit and Turks.

FonOff also indicated that no points of any importance had been discussed re organizational aspects of MEDO, discussions having been mainly restricted question tactical approach to Arabs.

Gifford

1. Repeated to Ankara, Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, Amman, and Beirut.
2. Not printed; it reported on a newspaper article concerning the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. (780.5/10–1952)
3. See telegram 911 to Cairo, Document 104.
4. Document 95.