Office of the Historian

780.5/10–1752: Circular telegram

No. 96
The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions in the Near East1

secret
Washington, October 17, 1952—8:26 p.m.

450. Part II of II. Dept’s tentative views on UK proposals follow:

I.

Numbering corresponds to that in Part I this message.

  • A. 1. Dept agrees probably desirable present Arabs written statement. Arab States will certainly discuss proposal among themselves and desirable for them have solid basis for purpose.

    Procedure suggested for providing Arab reaction seems appropriate. Leaves to them decision whether they wish continue discussion and does not imply inaction their part will constitute veto. Further consideration necessary as to just how possible discussions with Arab reps might best be handled. If several states favorably disposed, might possibly be desirable invite them to mtg with sponsors.

    2. Agree multilateral démarche awkward but not certain re practical effect principle proposed. Missions comments this point particularly requested.

    3. Re approach to Egypt, Dept inclined feel wld be desirable make separate and very informal approach prior to gen round with other Arab States. Realize risk this may cause injured feelings other Arab States, but desirability doing everything possible enlist Egyptian support obvious. Moreover, prior overture Egypt justifiable on ground Egypt originally invited become sponsor. Dept agrees Emb Cairo approach best made after Brit have offered some conciliatory gesture, feels perhaps agreement release jet planes wld serve. Not thought Egypt wld wish become sponsor nor that discussions wld proceed far without involving whole problem of Suez settlement. Nevertheless, appears there might be significant advantages in according Egypt priority suggested. Approaches other Arab States shld be made simultaneously some time after initial approaches to Egypt.

  • B. Re text of proposed communication, Dept feels that in gen even for limited purpose indicated, statement too sketchy and not calculated make maximum possible appeal to Arabs. Re numbered paras:
    1.
    No comment.
    2.
    Ref to Paris Declaration shld be expanded to include certain of principles calculated appeal Arabs, particularly ref to objective increasing indigenous capacities for defense permitting reduction in role of non-ME States (para 10).
    3.
    This para shld be broken up into five parts:
    a.
    Emphasize prelim nature of 7-power discussions and eliminate suggestion that ideas on point of crystallization.
    b.
    Point out essential principles of Nov Declaration maintained but command concept not element in revised proposals. Underline fact that no formal commitment will be required for participation in proposed org.
    c.
    Outline principal functions of org.: Coop study of requirements for area defense, coord of efforts of participating states to meet these requirements; remedying existing milit deficiencies; providing milit assistance in shape of arms equipment, training or advice.
    d.
    Statement as to site seems appropriate in present form.
    e.
    Perhaps fuller description of structure of org as developed in 7-power exchange, but stated as example of possible solution rather than as firm proposal.
    4.
    This para shld be redrafted to suggest Arabs may participate in formulation of decisions rather than merely offer observations for possible consideration.

Missions’ comments on UK proposals and Dept’s tentative views as outlined above urgently requested.2 In addition, wld appreciate Missions’ comments on desirability either in note or in course verbal presentation making some ref Arab Security Pact as suggested para II B Cairo’s 473 Aug 26 to Dept rpt unnum Ankara and Arab caps.3

II.

A. No fixed schedule for approach Arabs and some time may elapse before this possible. Views Aust, NZ on UK memo not yet received though UK expects shortly and anticipates no difficulty. FR being very insistent re use NATO Standing Grp in MEDO and may delay completion exchange by intransigence this point. Once exchange completed Dept considers approach Egypt shld be made earliest favorable occasion with approach other Arab States keyed to this.

[Page 296]

B. Dept continues hold that decision re proceeding with formal establishment MEDO must depend on assessment Arab reactions to initial approaches. US convinced that plans for ME defense must be developed in any event. However, Dept feels this might better be accomplished by inconspicuous and unpublicized arrangements in event Arabs demonstrate gen and strong hostility to MEDO proposals.

Bruce
  1. Sent to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, and Ankara, and repeated for information to London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Wellington, Canberra, and Pretoria. Drafted by Daspit and cleared by NE, GTI, BNA, and S/S.↩

  2. Telegram 300 from Amman, Oct. 21, not printed, agreed with most of the Department of State views, except the suggestion in paragraph A3 that it might be desirable to approach Egypt before the other Arab States. The Embassy in Amman was strongly inclined to favor simultaneous presentation to all the Arab States, saying it was “many disadvantages and no compensatory advantages in prelim presentation to Egypt.” (780.5/10–2152)

    Telegram 305 from Damascus, Oct. 23, reported that the Embassy favored an early informal approach to Egypt and it disagreed with paragraph B3 (e), saying “suggest there be no initial description structure org which of secondary importance Arabs.” (780.5/10–2352) Additional replies are in Department of State file 780.5.

    ↩
  3. Not printed, but see footnote 6, Document 98.↩