Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

684A.86/9–1554

No. 893
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Israel-Jordan Affairs (Bergus)

secret

[Washington,] September 15, 1954.

Subject:

• Israel Proposals for U.S. Measures of Reassurance.

Participants:

• The Secretary
• Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr.
• Ambassador Abba Eban of Israel
• Minister Reuven Shiloah of Israel
• NEA—Mr. Byroade
• NE—Mr. Bergus

Ambassador Eban opened the conversation by stating that he had found within the Israel Government and among the public there a sense of “isolation, vulnerability and insecurity”. The leaders of the Israel Government had felt unable to attempt to calm public fears inasmuch as they themselves shared these feelings of apprehension. The Israel Government had considered the Secretary’s remarks of August 7 and Mr. Eban was now fully authorized to say that his Government felt there were certain measures which the U.S. could take to allay this apprehension.

Total Arab resources of territory, population and natural wealth were infinitely greater than those of Israel. The Israelis had no complaint about this situation with which they would have to learn to live. Added to this, however, were Israel’s political disadvantages. Israel’s neighbors had the Arab Collective Security Pact, and other security arrangements, some with the U.K. Israel had none of these. It appeared that defense plans were being made in the Near East to the exclusion of Israel. The Israelis were not panicstricken and felt that if they were attacked by the Arabs they would win. They preferred, however, to avoid hostilities. The Egyptian Prime Minister’s recent statement laying claim to the Negev had increased feelings of insecurity. The only bright spot in the picture had been the Secretary’s August talks with Mr. Eban. Mr. Eban read an Israel press account of one of his speeches to the Israelis reporting that he was encouraged by the fact that the Secretary was personally interested in Israel’s problems. Israel’s proposals came under four headings and their general theme was “equality”.

1. Balance of Power. Israel desired equality in security relationships in the N.E. as was implied in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. Specifically, Israel was concerned at the special political and military advantages to Iraq (and potentially Egypt) flowing from the grant military aid agreement with the U.S. Iraq and Egypt would have these advantages in addition to their commitments from the U.K. Israel would have nothing. Israel would like such a relationship with the U.S. even if arms grants under any agreement reached were not of substantial significance. Mr. Eban reminded the Secretary that popular estimates of Israel’s great strength as against collective Arab strength were over-flattering. He pointed out that the Arabs, according to Israel’s best information, were spending 105 million pounds sterling this year for defense as against Israel’s expenditure of less than one-fifth of that sum. Similar ratios existed in such items as jet planes. It was hoped that through a system of U.S. grant military aid agreements with Israel and the Arab states, a rough equality between Israel and the Arab states could be maintained for a period of from one to three years. This would mean a certain abstinence on the part of the U.S. in supplying arms to the Arabs and a certain amount of American assistance to Israel in meeting her military needs.

2. Defensive Alliances. Mr. Eban stated that he had been instructed to call to the Secretary’s attention the fact that Israel was the only Near Eastern state which did not have a defensive alliance with anyone. The Israel Government saw no purpose in formally requesting a defensive alliance at this time. The possibility of such an alliance, however, should be borne in mind for consideration as the demographic factors of superiority on the Arab side come more and more into play.

3. Suez Canal Blockade. The Egyptians were now in general displaying a tendency to permit all categories of Israel-bound cargo, except petroleum products, through the Canal, but their spasmodic restrictions resulted in a total effect of discouragement. Egypt’s lifting the embargo would demonstrate her belief in freedom of commerce, and her respect for international law. Israel had been given to understand that the U.S. could not condition its economic aid on Egypt’s lifting the blockade because of a prior commitment. Israel understood and respected this U.S. commitment. Mr. Eban asked, however, that the U.S. take the line with the Egyptians that the continuation and magnitude of U.S. economic aid would be related to Egypt’s attitude on the question of the Suez blockade.

4. Recognition of Arab Collective Security Pact. Israel was making a strong protest to the U.K. for having accorded diplomatic recognition to the ACSP by mentioning it in the “Heads of Agreement” with the Egyptians on the Suez Base. There appeared to be indirect U.S. recognition of the pact as well, inasmuch as the U.S. had endorsed the Anglo-Egyptian agreement. Status and dignity were being given to a pact which was aimed against Israel. It was also made to appear that the West was indifferent to the possibility of an attack on Israel, since such an attack would not automatically reactivate the Base.

The Secretary regretted that the pressure of his time in view of his imminent departure for Europe made it impossible for him to discuss the Ambassador’s proposals in detail. He assumed that the Israel Ambassador wished to carry on the discussions and recommended that Mr. Eban continue this exchange of views with Mr. Byroade. The Secretary felt that continuation of these discussions would be useful. He mentioned that he had seen reports whereby Mr. Eban in public speeches in Israel had mentioned the possibility of carrying Israel’s case directly to the American people. Statements such as these were not conducive to progress in our efforts to assist Israel.

The Secretary also questioned whether the concept of equality could be the theme for the discussions. For demographic and other reasons already put by Mr. Eban it was obvious that there was no way in which the U.S. could create equality between Israel and the Arab states. Our policy in the area was one of impartiality which was not the same thing as equality.¹

1. This conversation was summarized in telegram 162 to Tel Aviv, Sept. 16, repeated to Cairo, London, Paris, Ankara, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, and Jerusalem. (784A.5/9–1654)