611.83A/8–3154
No. 880
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Officer in Charge of Israel-Jordan Affairs (Bergus)
Subject:
- Review of U.S.-Lebanon Relations
Participants:
- Dr. Charles Malik, Ambassador of Lebanon
- NEA—Mr. Jernegan
- NE-Mr. Bergus
Ambassador Malik stated that he was returning to Beirut for consultations on September 2 and planned to remain for about two weeks. He wished to review the current situation before returning so that he would be in a position to discuss matters fully with the Lebanese Government. Firstly, he wondered whether there was anything useful which he might tell President Chamoun with regard to the prospects of an official visit to the United States by the President of Lebanon. The Ambassador hoped that such a visit might be possible for the spring of 1955.
Mr. Jernegan replied that he had no information for the Ambassador at this time on the subject. The matter was still under consideration at the White House and so far as was known the definitive schedule of official visitors for next year had not been drawn up. Mr. Jernegan would look into the matter but he doubted whether he would have any information on the subject prior to the Ambassador’s departure.
The Ambassador inquired as to the prospect of FY 1955 special economic aid for Lebanon. Mr. Jernegan reviewed the situation, pointing out the cut which the appropriation for development assistance in the Near East had sustained in the Congress, and outlining the needs in other countries of the area. We had made a start in Lebanon in FY 1954 and the program there would continue. We could not predict the magnitude or character of our FY 1955 program in Lebanon. We understood that the Lebanese Government and the U.S. Operations Mission in Beirut were presently working out projects for presentation to Washington. Once these were presented, a decision would be made as to the nature of our program for the current fiscal year. In all probability, our program for Lebanon would be small for this year. Funds were short and it would take time to build up the programs resulting from the allocations given Lebanon at the close of FY 1954. We wished also to avoid going back to Congress next year with large unobligated balances.
[Page 1638]The Ambassador asked for the Department’s views on the development of the Litani River. Mr. Malik added that he felt that his government should exhaust all possibilities of raising local capital and obtaining bank loans before approaching any government, U.S., French, or other, for a government loan for this development.
Mr. Jernegan stated that we were encouraged that substantial progress had been made in the Litani survey. It was felt that the initiative was now in Lebanese hands. Lebanon should study the survey report with great care and formulate without undue haste a firm program for development. It was believed that the possibility of obtaining loan capital from the IBRD should be thoroughly examined. In view of the bankability of the project, it was doubtful whether loans from U.S. Government sources could be justified. We would, however, consider sympathetically further requests for technical assistance.
The Ambassador asked as to the prospects for military aid to Lebanon. Mr. Jernegan reviewed the current situation in the light of the concept of the “northern tier” and Egypt’s desire to play a more active part in the defense of the Suez Canal. In this field also there was a shortage of funds and it was difficult to finance existing commitments. It appeared that hit or miss programs on an individual country basis were not a good way to utilize funds. It might well be, for example, that Lebanon would attain greater protection against aggression through aid to the “northern tier” than through a small program of U.S. military aid granted directly to Lebanon. There was not much prospect of military aid to Lebanon in FY 1955. We were however giving thought to President Chamoun’s suggestion that something in the nature of an infrastructure project—roads, port development, or airport construction—be taken up in Lebanon.
The Ambassador asked about aid to Israel. Mr. Jernegan replied that no firm allocation had been decided upon but the total figure would be less than last year’s. Mr. Jernegan, in reply to a question, stated that the Tripartite proposals to Israel and Jordan for measures looking toward a tranquilization of the border had temporarily been halted over the question of whether our proposals would require amendments to the General Armistice Agreement. We believed that practically all of the suggestions did not require such amendment. We were considering with the British and French the next steps to be taken on these proposals. Meanwhile we were working with the parties in an attempt to re-establish the local commanders’ meetings along the Jordan and Gaza borders with Israel. The first reaction to these steps had been somewhat encouraging. We had also had occasion recently to restate to the Israel Government our position regarding their resuming work in the demilitarized [Page 1639] zone on Banat Ya’qub diversion canal. We had told the Israelis that they were estopped from resuming such activity without permission of the Chief of Staff of the UNTSO. We had also pointed out that the psychological impact of such a resumption would be extremely unfortunate and might well seriously lessen the chances for the acceptance by the riparian states of proposals for an equitable division of the waters of the Jordan Valley.
Ambassador Malik inquired as to the present thinking about the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. Was there a prospect that Turkey would adhere to it? Was the United States considering making a strong restatement of the Declaration?
Mr. Jernegan replied that we had been giving thought to the Declaration but there were no developments worth mentioning. It seemed clear that the Arab states would oppose Turkish adherence to the Pact. A mere restatement of the Declaration seemed to offer little advantage. Both the Secretary and Mr. Eden had taken occasion to reaffirm our support for the Declaration. We were presently considering ways and means of giving greater assurance to both the Arab states and Israel against the possibility of local aggression.