Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

684A.86/5–1054: Despatch

No. 820
The Chargé in Jordan (Geren) to the Department of State

secret
No. 385

Amman, May 10, 1954.

Ref:

• CA–6175 of April 28, 1954

Subject:

• Comment on Measures to Improve Arab-Israeli Border Situation

The following comments, numbered to correspond with the suggested measures listed under Section III B, are submitted in response to the communication cited above which was received on May 8.

1. The Embassy believes it would not be wise to appoint a new chief of staff at the present time. Any American who held this position would have the disadvantage among the Arabs of their recollection of what they considered as General Riley’s favoritism to the Israelis. Furthermore, reputations earned in the US or in the West generally are not automatically recognized in the Near East. The fact that a general is world famous does not “force” an Arab to respect him. While the relationship between the officer and the effectiveness of the office is not denied, the Embassy believes it more important to reassert rights and powers of the UNTSO machinery than it is to replace the present incumbent.

There is no objection to the appointment of higher ranking officers to the MAC and observer corps but a comment affecting chairmen is included in 6. below.

2. The Embassy believes that the period of service of observers should not be reduced. Inexperience in an observer is even more dangerous than localitis.

3. Assignment of experts from the US–Mexico border service does not impress the Embassy as a good idea. The border situation between Israel and the Arab states presents few parallels with the US-Mexican border. Specialization to the Arab-Israeli border troubles comes only with on-the-job training.

4. The Embassy approves the assignment of translators and political legal advisers.

5. The recognition in practice between parties that the observers have freedom of movement and investigation is fundamental to the effectiveness of the UNTSO. The most flagrant violations of this right seem to arise in the DZ’s and on Mount Scopus. The Embassy impression is that Israel more frequently violates this right than do the Arab states.

6. The adoption of new rules of procedure in the MAC’s is also fundamental. The chairman should have the right to introduce resolutions and to initiate investigation. In addition, the Embassy suggests the following changed constitution of the MAC’s in keeping with suggestions made by Commander Hutchinson: Instead of the several Mixed Armistice Commissions, each with a chairman, it is proposed that there be named a senior UN observer for each of the combinations, Israeli-Lebanon, Israeli-Syrian, Israeli-Jordan, and Israeli-Egypt. This senior observer, together with the observers assigned to him and the principal delegates from the two parties, would constitute a committee to deal with all but the major complaints. The Embassy appreciates the necessity of defining what is a “major” complaint but believes this can be done realistically. This group would save the log jam of little complaints which now collect and would also prevent the parties, principally the Israelis, from piling up their complaints for their statistical effect. The major complaints would be heard by a supreme Mixed Armistice Commission which would, like the present commissions, be composed of representatives of the two parties and a chairman from the UNTSO as the presiding officer. This chairman would be either the Chief of Staff of UNTSO or any one of the senior observers. Together these five would constitute a kind of supreme court bench from which a chairman might be drawn. The chairman in any major case would not be announced in advance. The effects of such an arrangement would be that the parties could not bring pressures to bear on a committee chairman prior to his hearing of a major case. This would eliminate some of the victimizing by pressure to which Colonel De Ridder and more recently Commander Hutchinson have been subject. Moreover, the group of five possible chairmen would be stronger than any one of them alone. The chairman would be selected only after a group discussion including the five in which they consulted specifically on the case in hand. The combined wisdom of the group could save mistakes of the kind made by the present chairmen acting singly. An example of such a mistake has been submitted by Embassy Damascus in the case of the right of Syrians to water their herds on the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias.

7. Prompt and continuing publicity is desirable. Releases should be fuller in background than those now made and should emanate officially from the UN so that newspapers all over the world may have the official story. In particular, releases should not be confined to MAC decision but should include the findings as they are made.

8. Increased equipment for observers seems indicated. Helicopters may be useful but identification, which is often the core of the problem, will not always be facilitated by helicopters.

9. The parties should accept their obligation to attend MAC and other meetings considered appropriate by UN officers and this should begin at the bottom and go up. That is, the local commanders meetings should be faithfully attended, Israel should rejoin the Jordan-Israeli MAC and from there the pressure should be exerted on Jordan to attend any other meetings which may be necessary. In fact, the Mixed Armistice Commissions when reconstituted along the lines advocated in 6. above may well be the long-sought device to bring Israel and Jordan together for higher level talks than they have yet experienced in the MAC. With the Chief of Staff, UNTSO, as the chairman in the most important cases, then the level of Jordanian-Israeli representation could be raised. This raising of the level of representation together with the right of the chairman to introduce resolutions and embark on investigations might well result in bringing the parties together at a high level to discuss the reduction of border tension.

10. The demarcation line should be delineated and this should be the work of UN engineers throughout, never the work of the parties. As noted in the airgram cited as reference, the Jordanians will need to be assured and reassured that final boundary determinations will come only with a peace settlement.

11. The Embassy sees no realistic means of making sure that the parties actually punish infiltrators even though they were persuaded to indicate that they planned to punish them. Furthermore, it would seem that Israel could hardly punish its armed forces for raids carried out presumably under orders from senior commanders. Jordan has offered evidence of its efforts to stop infiltration. General Glubb recently told Ambassador Mallory that the jails in Jordan hold a large number of infiltrators and would-be infiltrators who have been apprehended, and that the present effort represents the limit of Jordan capabilities in this regard.

12. The issuance of passes for the movement of Arabs from the Gaza strip to Jordan and as proposed in Cairo’s 2613 of May 4 land transit between Egypt and Jordan is definitely desirable.

13. The Embassy heartily advocates reinstitution of local commanders agreements.

A basic weakness of the MAC, as in any UN machinery, is the lack of teeth to enforce decisions. If the Tripartite powers would follow up every MAC decision by bringing immediate pressure to bear on the offending state, there would be greater respect for such decisions. The Tripartite démarches and in particular the suspension of aid to Israel by the US in the Baanat Yacov case is an illustration of the effectiveness—and difficulty—of Tripartite teeth for UNTSO’s decisions. Perhaps nothing so dramatic as the suspension of aid could be found for all of the “major” cases. Nevertheless, it is imperative to bring such pressures as will compel respect for the decisions.³

Paul Geren

3. Similarly detailed replies to CA–6175 of Apr. 28 were subsequently sent by Baghdad (despatch 821, May 28; 684A.86/5–2854) and Dasmascus (despatch 673, June 10; 684A.86/6–1054), neither printed.