Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

684A.86/5–1054: Telegram

No. 819
The Acting Consul at Jerusalem (Williams) to the Department of State¹

secret

Jerusalem, May 10, 1954—8 p.m.

170. Re Department’s CA–6175 April 28 discussions with UK about Israel-Jordan border situation, Consulate General desires make following comment on points listed under Section III (B):

a. Points 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, and 13 are believed to be important, feasible and should prove very useful. No comment.

b. With reference to point 1, it is believed that the removal of General Bennike (who only arrived in August 1953) at any time in the near future, no matter how explained, would be considered by Arabs as evidence of Jewish (Zionist) pressure and by Israelis as diplomatic victory. Consulate General questions whether automatic respect for UNTSO Chief of Staff could be expected, even for figure of world renown. Past prestige hardly sufficient to forestall attacks on individual’s impartiality when one side or other takes exception to an unfavorable decision. There is advantage to US in not having chief of staff a national due to tendency both aids blame adverse decisions on great power interference. Appointment higher-ranking officers as chairmen MACs need be no higher than ranking observer; character, ability, last training (especially legal or judicial), courage and stamina are important attributes. A tour of duty as an observer is useful to any MAC chairman.

c. Consulate General believes both Israelis and Jordanians might resent being advised how to control infiltration and crimes on administrative level by foreigners unfamiliar with area, language, or problem. (Item 3) Both sides consider themselves adept at police investigation. Integration at local commander level seems more important. Jordanian police are part of Arab Legion and police commanders are primarily legion officers some of whom already have British police training. British technicians might prove unacceptable to Israelis view Jordan–UK treaty relationship.

d. Under Item 6 chairman should also have authority to refuse to entertain complaints he feels are appropriate concern local commanders thus elevating importance local commander meetings and stopping MAC agency from becoming clogged.

e. If the problems involved in obtaining Jordan acceptance to a delineation of implication attaching that it is a permanent frontier with Israel could be solved, the British proposal that “minor rectifications of the armistice line to reunite villages and farms with their lands and water supplies” should be made an integral part of Item 10.

f. As much of the traffic mentioned in Item 12 is contraband Consulate General doubts the real effectiveness of the convoys proposed and questions the statement that this illegal traffic “generally may be innocent in motive”. On other hand, such convoys, if established, would be impressive evidence of UN interest.

Pouched Tel Aviv, Arab Capitals.

Williams

1. Repeated to London and Paris.