Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

684A.86/5–554

No. 815
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Hart)

secret

[Washington,] May 5, 1954.

Subject:

• Israel Protest Against Certain Passages of Mr. Byroade’s Address of May 1;¹ Inquiry regarding Istanbul Conference of American NEA Chiefs of Mission; Inquiry Concerning Possible U.S. Arms Aid to Arab States other than Iraq; Inquiry Concerning U.S. Official Representation in Jerusalem at President Ben Zvie’s Reception on National Day.

Participants:

• Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
• Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister of Israel
• Mr. Henry A. Byroade, Asst. Secretary, NEA
• Mr. Parker T. Hart, Director, NE

1. Ambassador Eban stated that on instructions of his government, he wished to express to Mr. Byroade, and later to express to the Secretary of State, the deep concern with which Israel had reacted to Mr. Byroade’s May 1 speech [entitled “Facing Realities in Arab-Israel Dispute”].² The speech had, in fact, created “a storm of feeling” according to a telegram which the Ambassador had just received from Prime Minister Sharett. The Cabinet had met on the subject of this speech on Sunday and had concluded that it must be regarded as an official statement of United States policy. During the course of the coming week it appeared inevitable that there would be a parliamentary debate on the implications of this and other recent utterances by high officials of the U.S. Government on the subject of U.S.–Israel relations.

Ambassador Eban stated that his government considered the passage on immigration to have the most fundamental and far-reaching implications since it struck at the very basis of Israel’s philosophy of existence. Furthermore, the fact that such an intimate discussion of Israel-American relations should have been delivered before a body such as the American Council for Judaism was considered to be particularly unfortunate since the Ambassador knew of no other organization in the United States which dedicated itself against Israel’s existence. The main points which concerned Israel so deeply centered around the implication that Israel should change its philosophy and Statutes from the concept that its doors were always open to immigration of Jews from anywhere in the world. This concept could never be changed by any Israel Government and an attack upon it could never accomplish a useful purpose but, on the contrary, was bound to create not only the deepest concern in Israel but also intransigence based on increasing sense of triumph throughout the Arab world. Israel did not believe that Arab fear of her expansion was a basic cause of tension, since there was no early prospect for any large-scale immigration from the Iron Curtain area or elsewhere. Therefore raising this question at this time seemed completely unnecessary since it was based upon an unlikely hypothesis. Israel could hardly understand U.S. objections to her immigration policy since both Israel and the U.S. were countries which had come into existence entirely through a process of immigration. Israel had always felt that it had the blessing of the American people for its immigration policy. As for emigration from the Soviet Union, Israel would continue to hope and pray for such a movement although it realized that the prospects for it were not bright. Should such a movement occur it would have the most profound effects, creating a messianic, irresistible fervor among World Jewry; Israel could not believe that the resulting increase in her population from between one and two million to between three and four million to be a valid cause of alarm by Arab countries.

Israel was also disturbed at the implications of Mr. Byroade’s Dayton, Ohio speech of April 9th,³ now confirmed by his May 1 address, which seemed to question the right of Israel to appeal to World Jewry in all countries for assistance and support.

The Ambassador expressed concern over the fact that during the past year high officials of the U.S. Government had seen fit to criticize almost every important phase of Israel’s actions in the public forum. If the purpose of these statements was to create a better feeling toward America by the Arabs, he felt obliged to express the view that the actual result would be to increase Arab determination to press forward in its intrasigent attitude toward Israel. In this connection, Israel felt that the passage in Mr. Byroade’s speech asserting there was no early possibility for peace between Israel and the Arab states was unfortunate since it would vindicate Arab insistence on a policy of “no peace”. It would be better not to discard publicly the principle of final peace even though it was clear—and Israel concurred in the U.S. estimate on this point—that early conclusion of peace was not foreseeable.

Israel also regretted the passage on compensation since it implied that the Israel Government intended no action in this regard. Minister Shiloah entered the conversation to state that Mr. Byroade’s speech implied that the U.S. Government had sought through diplomatic channels over a long period of time to obtain constructive steps by Israel and had been met with persistent refusal, with the result that finally it felt constrained to air the matter in public. Actually, Israel had initiated dozens of moves of a conciliatory nature toward the Arabs. It had for instance, suggested non-aggression pacts and these had been rejected. Ambassador Eban pointed out that the Israel Government had taken a policy decision to pay compensation before the German Restitution Agreement was concluded.

Mr. Byroade replied that he regretted very much that the Israel Government seemed to have ignored the principal point in the passage of his speech to which it took strongest exception, namely that there was a real fear of Israeli expansion. He disagreed with Ambassador Eban’s statement that this was not fundamental in the generation of tensions between Israel and her neighbors. Mr. Byroade was convinced, on the basis of unanimous advice from Chiefs of Mission in the Near East over a long period of time and from his own observations, that this fear was real and dangerous. He regretted that the Israel Government had mistakenly interpreted his speech as proposing a specific line of action to remedy this fear, such as changing Israel’s statutes. He had proposed no specific line of action and would not presume to do so. He had posed the problem and stated that wise statesmanship could find a way to relieve it. The American people had a right to be informed of the fundamental causes of tension in the Middle East which affected their security, and this was certainly one of them. He could not understand how the Israel Government could regard discussion of it as an “unjustified interference in the internal affairs of Israel, which are her own concern, and hers only, and a matter of her own sovereign judgment”. At present, the U.S. Government with Britain and France, with greatly extended commitments elsewhere, were facing this problem alone. They needed the help of Israel itself.

Ambassador Eban insisted that the implications of the speech to most readers would be that Israel should change her laws and her basic concept of return. Since the matter had been aired publicly in this fashion, Israel would be forced to give her own public reply which could only be that the principle of return was unchangeable.

Mr. Byroade replied that he would regret seeing this done since it might well increase in America an impression of cleavage between American and Israeli viewpoints regarding the nature of tensions in the Near East and their possible remedies. He had regretted being obliged to use the American Council for Judaism as a forum for this speech for one reason: that as a result, Israel might not take his views seriously. However, he had been forced to make certain points as the result of Israeli criticism of his Dayton speech. Now he was disappointed to see that the Israeli press made no mention of such balancing provisions of his latest address as that which warned the Arabs that they may as well know now that the United States cannot accept as a price for their friendship the abandonment of pursuit of better relations between them and Israel. Nor had the Israeli press or Government mentioned his remarks on Arab negativism concerning which sharp criticism had already been noted in the Arab press. Ambassador Eban responded that the strong emotion aroused in Israel by the already discussed passage of Mr. Byroade’s speech had apparently obscured these items.

2. Ambassador Eban inquired whether any matters of policy regarding Israel would be considered at the forthcoming Istanbul Conference.⁴ Mr. Byroade replied that this conference was supposed to be an annual affair of our Middle East Ambassadors but had been omitted last year due to the Secretary’s and Mr. Byroade’s tour in the area. Its purpose was to permit intimate discussion of U.S. problems with the objective of sharing opinions and impressions on policy matters.

3. Ambassador Eban inquired whether there was any truth in the unpleasant rumor that the U.S. Government might be considering the extension of arms aid to Arab states other than Iraq. Mr. Byroade replied that while he could give no assurances regarding the future there were no policy discussions on the point proceeding at this time. This was one matter that might be considered at Istanbul.

4. Ambassador Eban indicated that most Chiefs of Mission at Tel Aviv were apparently planning to attend the President’s reception at Jerusalem on Israel’s National Day. The Israel Government had the impression that the U.S. would send representatives but not the Acting Chief of Mission. If this was so, he regretted that the U.S. Government should take a position conspicuously behind others in this aspect of the Jerusalem problem. Mr. Byroade replied that he would have to consult his staff on this matter, since he was not fully informed on the status of our plans.

1. The text of Byroade’s address of May 1 before the American Council for Judaism at Philadelphia is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 10, 1954, p. 708.
2. Brackets in the source text.
3. For the text of Byroade’s speech before the Dayton World Affairs Council on Apr. 9, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 26, 1954, p. 628.
4. The Conference of the U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the Near East area was held at Istanbul on May 11–14, 1954; for the agreed conclusions of the Conference on the Arab-Israeli situation, see Document 824.