680.84A/3–2554
No. 782
Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert L. Burns of the Office of
Near Eastern Affairs
Subject:
- Israel Requests U.S. Action to Reduce Israel-Arab Tension
Participants:
- Ambassador Eban of Israel
- Mr. Shiloah, Minister of Israel
- Secretary Dulles
- NEA—Mr. Byroade
- NE—Mr. Burns
The Secretary expressed his personal regret over the Negev bus attack which the Ambassador acknowledged with appreciation.
The Ambassador said his government feels the present state of Israel-Arab relations warrants the attention of the Western powers. He referred to his January 15 call on the Secretary when he had described indications that the Arabs were not interested in maintaining the armistice. The symptoms have since been intensified: the Egyptian UN delegate’s statement that regardless of SC action Egypt will continue the blockade; the 3rd Jordan refusal to attend an Article 12 meeting; Syria’s “dead hand” on the Banat Ya’qub project; Iraq’s detention of three Israelis.
Against this background is the Scorpion Pass incident and Israel’s belief that Jordanians committed the crime. The Jordan Government is guilty since the attack originated from its territory. Israel had expected the MAC to say something about the incident; the prolonged MAC discussions had merely increased tension. The MAC can exist and function without Israel attendance; Israel does not wish to attend as things stand now. Since neither the MAC nor the SC has anything to say and the UNSYG has said he can pursue Article 12 no further, the SC should review the armistice and its state of disrepair at the request of the three Western powers. The Israel Government therefore formally requests that the U.S. join in bringing the matter before the SC. The discussions should not [Page 1498] dwell upon the past but the future; reaffirm that Article 12 is part of the General Armistice Agreement; seek better measures to prevent infiltration; see if the armistice machinery is not too legalistic. In addition, in view of the critical state of affairs, Israel formally requests that the U.S. abstain from arming the Arab states; such action would be explosive and have a maddening effect on Israel opinion.
The Ambassador said Israel had never been sure how to fit the Tripartite Declaration into its security picture. In contrast to most countries Israel has no alliances, only recourse to the SC. What does the Declaration mean? Israel does not think U.S. troops will come in the event of an attack. Forceful changes of borders are forbidden, but what about blockades, boycotts, etc.? The three powers should express opposition to such hostility.
Regarding the bus tragedy the Secretary said while he was quite able to understand the Israel people’s assumption that Jordan was responsible, he was unable to understand the Israel Government’s readiness to hold Jordan at fault in the absence of a formal finding of guilt. There was no justification for criticism against the MAC Chairman. He hoped Israel would not withdraw from the MAC; the machinery has value which would be diminished by Israel’s non-participation.
The Secretary referred to the recent call of the Arab Ambassadors, who had alleged Israel preparations for expansion and asked for U.S. restraining influence. He had tried to persuade the representatives that their fears were unjustified.
The Secretary said he was perplexed over what to do about the tense situation; events could snowball; the armistice could collapse. He felt the situation was worse now than a year ago. He did not know whether the measures the Israel Government suggested would help. He was certain Israel’s withdrawal from the MAC would not. He understood Jordan’s refusal to attend meetings under Article 12 was based on a suspicion of Israel’s motives. The Ambassador said his government had specified no conditions. Mr. Byroade said we feel the UNSYG will still try for a meeting if it can be disassociated from the bus incident. The Ambassador and Mr. Shiloah stated their understanding that the UNSYG had given up his mission.
The Secretary said the first step in regard to Israel’s request for three power action would be a discussion between the powers and not SC consideration. In the absence of an evidentiary report from the MAC he could not see how the Council could deal with this matter except in a very general way. It could deplore the incident and call on all concerned to try and apprehend the culprits. He did [Page 1499] not see how the SC could take action against individuals or states without further evidence in the matter.
Mr. Byroade said public statements and the bus incident have increased fears but we do not have information indicating a general deterioration in the area. The Ambassador then listed infiltration, murders and robberies in Israel since last October. Mr. Byroade said our records indicate the only increased activity is in Israel patrol forays and the loss of Jordanian lives.
The Secretary said we would give the entire question our serious consideration but could not contemplate SC action until we had talked with the U.K. and France.1
- This conversation was summarized in circular telegram 331, Mar. 25, 9:41 p.m., the last paragraph of which noted that “Secretary made no comment re (1) formal Israel request US refrain from providing military assistance Iraq in present ‘critical state affairs’ or (2) Israel suggestion signatories Tripartite Declaration express opposition hostile acts such as boycott, blockade, etc. to supplement Declaration’s references to forceful border changes.” (684A.86/3–2654)↩