Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

680.84A/3–2454

No. 781
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria Affairs (Allen)

confidential

[Washington,] March 24, 1954.

Subject:

• Israeli-Arab Tension and U.S. “Support” of Israel

Participants:

• Seven Arab Chiefs of Mission:
• Ambassador Malik—Lebanon
• Ambassador Shabandar—Iraq
• Ambassador Al-Faqih—Saudi Arabia
• Chargé d’Affaires Zabarah—Yemen
• Ambassador Zeineddine—Syria
• Ambassador Rifai—Jordan
• Chargé d’Affaires Labban—Egypt
• The Secretary
• NEA—Mr. Byroade
• NE—Mr. Allen

Ambassador Malik acted as spokesman for the Arab group. He said all were calling on instructions of their governments to call to the attention of the Secretary the mounting tension in the Near East “caused by Israel”; to express their belief that underlying Israel’s “aggressive actions” over the past few months was the intention to provoke one or another of the Arab countries to react in such a way as to give Israel an excuse for a large-scale military attack; and to inform the U.S. Government that in the event of an Israeli attack on any Arab country, all would instantaneously give full military support to the attacked country, as they were bound to do under the Arab Collective Security Pact.

Ambassador Malik listed as examples of Israel’s aggressiveness the Qibya incident; the al-Auja incident (on the Israel-Egyptian border last fall); Israel’s attempt to divert the Jordan at Banat Ya’qub; Israel’s attempt to “force” Jordan to attend a “peace conference” with Israel (under Article 12 of the Armistice Agreement); the constant pressure exerted by Israel to prevent economic and military aid going to the Arab countries; recent Israeli troop movements; recent belligerent speeches of the Israel Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff; and the violent Israel reaction to the regrettable “bus” incident in the Negev. He stated that these Israeli actions have created a most dangerous atmosphere of tension.

Ambassador Malik said that the Arab representatives were approaching the United States for two reasons: because of the interest they know the United States, as a member of the UN, has in maintaining peace and security in the Near East; and because of the special position of Israel in relation to the United States. Without the U.S. there would be no Israel. The U.S., which has for years given large-scale aid and support to Israel is indirectly responsible for putting Israel in a “moral and material” position to follow aggressive policies against the Arabs. U.S. support and aid, both governmental and private, has the effect of enabling Israel to flout the decisions of the UN; and to strengthen its position in the border area which the UN did not assign to Israel. U.S. aid, despite the known intention of the present Administration to be impartial, encourages Israel aggressiveness against the Arabs.

The Secretary replied that our view of Israel’s actions and estimate of Israel’s intention is not as alarming as that presented by Ambassador Malik. He said there have been disturbing incidents of course, but as we see it they do not add up to as ominous a picture as Ambassador Malik portrayed. Our estimate is that responsible Israelis, including the Government, want peace and security and normal relations with the Arabs. Although we do give economic support to Israel, we do not feel we can use our aid as a lever to force the recipients to do everything we want. In the case of Israel as in that of other countries, we do not assume that we can dictate policy merely because there is a degree of economic dependence on us.

Referring to the disparity in economic aid as between Israelis and Arabs, the Secretary explained that this is in no sense due to partiality on our part. Mr. Byroade emphasized that this was the first year we had embarked on an economic aid program for the Arab countries, and a slow start in the first year was inevitable, as had also been the case in Greece and Turkey, for example.

Referring to the present tension in the Near East and the Arabs’ fear that Israel might take aggressive action, the Secretary stressed his hope that both parties would be patient and calm in the present period of tension and that neither would allow any incident to develop into something serious.

Mr. Byroade emphasized that according to our information the Israelis appeared to be just as worried as the Arabs. They are nervous about what they regard as the provocative attacks of the Arabs, and are very worried about the U.S. program of making arms available to certain Arab states. The Secretary stated that if Israel did, as the Arabs fear, attack one of the Arab states, the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950 would come into play and the United States, along with the U.K. and France, would take appropriate action.¹

1. This conversation was summarized in telegram 374 to Amman, Mar. 24, repeated to Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, Tel Aviv, and New York. The Department authorized the Missions to the Arab states to take the same line, at their discretion, with the governments to which they were accredited. (684A.86/3–2454)