Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

684A.85322/12–2353

No. 756
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Hart)

secret

[Washington,] December 23, 1953.

Subject:

1.

The Banat Ya’qub Project.

2.

The Secretary General’s Summons to Jordan to meet with Israel under Article 12 of the General Armistic Agreement.

3.

Egyptian Suez Canal Blockade Against Israel.

Participants:

• Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
• Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister of Israel
• Mr. Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary, NEA
• Mr. Parker T. Hart, Director, NE

1. Ambassador Eban expressed his appreciation for the helpful attitude shown by Ambassador Lodge and USUN in connection with the Tripartite Resolution. While Israel had not gained all she hoped for under that resolution, she recognized that the resolution constituted an appropriate position for the three powers to take and hoped that they would now stand firm and resist pressures for changes of substance. Postponement of a vote at the next meeting of the Security Council seemed desirable in view of the unlikelihood of passage during 1953. Eban felt that such postponement could not validly be considered as an improper maneuver since the current composition of the Security Council gave a lop-sided weight to the Syrian position by insuring Syria of two sure votes (Lebanon’s and Pakistan’s) in addition to the Russians’. Pakistan’s attitude was hardly representative of a British Commonwealth viewpoint on Arab-Israel problems. As for the position of the Soviet Union, he had discussed the question of a possible Soviet veto with Mr. Tsarapkin, who seemed astonished that Israel should believe that the USSR would exercise a veto on such a matter as this. He had been assured by Tsarapkin that the Soviet practice was to exercise the veto only where direct Soviet interests were in play. Eban therefore discounted the probability of a Soviet veto.

Mr. Byroade commented that the Department might have to give some further consideration to the phraseology of paragraph 11 of the Tripartite Resolution¹ which had evoked dissatisfaction on both sides at various times and the drafting of which could bear improvement.

2. Ambassador Eban raised the question of Jordan’s obligation to respond favorably to the summons of the Secretary General of the UN to a meeting with Israel under Article 12 of the Israel-Jordan General Armistice Agreement. He hoped that the U.S. Government would support the Secretary General in these summons. Mr. Byroade replied that the U.S. Government had already indicated to Jordan and to other Arab states its belief that Jordan was obligated legally to accept the summons and that she would place herself in a most unfortunate position if she refused.

3. Ambassador Eban referred to the recent extension of Egyptian regulations calling for blockade of Israel. Israel was not so much concerned over the extension itself which now covered foodstuffs and virtually every other category of supplies to Israel, as over the fact that the blockade existed at all. Egyptian blockade practices had been condemned by the Acting Mediator in 1949; by the UN Chief of Staff in 1951; by the Mixed Armistice Commission in 1951; and by the Security Council itself in September 1951. Israel now seeks international action against this long-standing abuse of law and hopes for U.S. Government support Contrary to statements which had been bruited about Washington, Israel was not working against an Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. Israel favored such an agreement but felt that she had a right to assure herself that if it did occur, Israel’s vital interests would not be adversely affected by a shift of power following British withdrawal of troops and that Israel would be protected from further Egyptian blockade in violation of the International Convention of 1888 respecting freedom of transit of the Suez Canal. Mr. Byroade replied that the Department was concerned over stories which had issued from London concerning British Zionist pressure on Parliament against an Anglo-Egyptian base agreement and the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt. Mr. Byroade did not imply that Israel was implicated in this effort but he had it direct from a British Zionist source that British Zionists had actively sought to have the UK withdraw from the negotiations with Egypt. Minister Shiloah deprecated the validity of this information. He felt sure that British Zionists had not made an effort to defeat the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Mr. Byroade reiterated his belief which he had previously expressed that this was a poor time to summon Egypt before the bar of world opinion. The U.S. had made repeated diplomatic representations to Egypt regarding the blockade and we would continue to do so. We felt, however, that tactically, a UN debate on this subject would injure the chances for an Anglo-Egyptian agreement and he hoped Israel would see the problem in this light.

1. The eleventh paragraph (numbered paragraph 9) of the joint draft resolution introduced on Dec. 16 reads as follows:

   “Requests and authorizes the Chief of Staff to explore possibilities of reconciling the interests involved in this dispute including rights in the demilitarized zone and full satisfaction of existing irrigation rights at all seasons, and to take such steps as he may deem appropriate to effect a reconciliation, having in view the development of the natural resources affected in a just and orderly manner for the general welfare.” (U.N. doc. S/3151)