684A.85/12–1953
No. 755
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and
African Affairs (Byroade)
Subject:
- Banat Ya’qub Resolution
Participants:
- The Secretary
- Dr. Charles Malik—Lebanese Ambassador
- Mr. Byroade-NEA
Dr. Charles Malik of Lebanon called upon the Secretary at 10:00 A. M. December 19th to discuss the situation in the United Nations re the Banat Ya’qub case.1
Dr. Malik in his presentation stressed the depressed and discouraged state of mind of Arab Delegations over the manner in which the Resolution on the above subject had been handled. He felt that the Arab reaction was that their work had been in vain and that their suggested amendments had not been seriously considered. There was a feeling that in any issue involving Israel justice or truth did not prevail but that the Three Powers tried to come up with solutions which would take a political balance between the views of the Israeli and the Arabs. He made the case that all the Three Powers had to do was to support the Bennike position, which in his opinion made quite clear that Syrian agreement must be obtained for the project in question. He stated that issues greater than the Canal project were involved and this was a fight by the Arab world to insure that the status of the Demilitarized Zone, as defined under the Armistice Agreements, could not be altered without Syrian consent.
Malik stated that the most disturbing factor to him was that he believed Russia might veto the present Three Power Resolution. He could not prove this but it seemed to him so logical that the Russians would capitalize upon Arab unhappiness with this Resolution to cast a veto and thus enhance their prestige in the Middle East. He felt this extremely dangerous and hoped we could make sufficient changes in our Resolution to forestall such a possibility.
The Secretary replied that he had come to the conclusion it was impossible to win the friendship of either side in matters of dispute between Israel and the Arab States. We are bound by a policy in which we endeavor to do what we think is just and right in such [Page 1462] cases. This only incurs the wrath of both sides. He reluctantly concluded that we could only win the friendship of either side if we deliberately devised policies to “hurt” the other side.
The Secretary stated that he had spent considerable time on this matter and that our draft had not been devised on a political basis. He stated that he had asked Mr. Phleger, who had great experience in legal matters involving riparian rights, to advise him on this matter. Mr. Phleger had taken the thesis, in which the Secretary concurred, that corresponds to American procedures on matters of this type. We do not believe in this country that one riparian interest can veto the use of water but that water should be useable to all in a just and fair way. When one considers the question of an Arab veto, in view of the past history in the area, he was afraid we would have to conclude that that veto would not be used in a constructive manner but used simply to hurt Israel if opportunities afforded.
The Secretary concluded that a far easier course for him to take would be bow to political pressures in this country and to agree with the segment of our people who thought that Arab friendship is impossible and therefore we might as well at least have the friendship of Israel. He had no idea of following such a course but would continue to do what he thought was right regardless of the pressures involved.
- Lebanon submitted a draft resolution (U.N. doc. S/3152) in the Security Council on Dec. 17 as an alternative to the tripartite draft resolution (S/PV.649).↩