Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

683.84A322/12–653: Telegram

No. 750
The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

confidential

Washington, December 8, 1953—5:26 p.m.

281. Re Palestine in SC. Your draft resolution in urtel 283, December 6 is quite acceptable to us except provisions of paragraphs 1, 11 and 12. We assume that you will find no basic conflict between your draft and our suggestions re UK and French amendments contained in Deptel 278 of December 5.¹ With specific reference to paragraphs indicated the following are our comments:

• Paragraph 1: We prefer our first preambular paragraph which does not raise matter of General Armistice Agreements “superseding the truce”. Resolution cited does have this language but objective of Israelis in desiring this wording is, in our opinion, that of having Council appear to endorse position which Eban has given before Council in attempting to refute Bennike’s decision on military advantage to Israel in diversion project. It is of course Israel’s right to attempt to persuade Bennike to revise his decision on this point but if Council recalls this particular provision to notable exclusion of a number of other provisions in other resolutions cited, undue weight is given to this point and will probably be persuasive to Bennike as to what is Council’s intent. Proper procedure for Israel in challenging Bennike’s decision on military advantage question is to resort to MAC and to obtain an interpretation from MAC as to whether or not Bennike in fact has the authority make decision on matter of military advantage. It is precisely the question this authority which Israelis are raising before Council and which Council should not attempt influence. We would prefer see reference to November 17, 1950 resolution omitted since it does not relate to Syria.

• Paragraph 11: If the objective of this paragraph is the same as was ours in paragraph 7, namely to move the Chief of Staff forward toward reconciliation of the rights and interests without necessarily precipitating an early decision on recommencement of the Israeli diversion operation, we feel that our language which is less specific provides basis for slower action on Bennike’s part. If, however, you feel that it is essential to be as specific as you propose, we urge you delete word “established” before words “rights in Demilitarized Zone”. If “established” is left in Israelis will be quick to allege to Bennike that only established rights in Demilitarized Zone are Israel’s as a result of grant given to Palestine Electric Corporation. It is undoubtedly difficult for Arab residents in Demilitarized Zone to document and establish their rights as effectively as Israelis. We believe that in interests of tranquillity in Zone every opportunity should be given to these Arab residents to present their cases as to their rights. Further we strongly urge that phrase “having in view the development of the natural resources of the area in a just and orderly manner for the general welfare” should be deleted.

  We understand your objective to avoid any actions which would prejudice chances of success of Unified Plan for Jordan Valley Development. We concur in this objective but fear such a broad directive would create more difficulties than it avoided. It would ask Bennike to take into consideration factors and a project which are outside his presently conceived authority and would make him a further party to be dealt with in any future negotiations on the Unified Plan. It would probably also cause both Israel and the Arab States to believe that we are using this resolution as a means of imposing the Unified Plan. Both Johnston and our field posts have recommended against such a tactic as likely to be counter productive. As we see it, the essential thing at this stage is to get parties immediately concerned (Syria and Israel) back into proper channels for settling their specific differences and to reaffirm Bennike’s existing authority, particularly in the Demilitarized Zone.

  We are unhappy enough over suggested wording of French amendment but that wording limits Bennike’s technical advice to the effect of the diversion project in the Demilitarized Zone itself. As we read your wording, Bennike would have to take into consideration the political, economic and hydrological problems of the entire Jordan Valley area. While we do not question that the Council has the authority to direct him to consider these matters if it so desires, we believe in balance it is undesirable for him be asked to take step now.

• Paragraph 12: We urge the deletion of this paragraph. It is fact, and is proper to hold, that neither party has a right of veto over actions in Demilitarized Zone or in matters of interpretation of the General Armistice Agreement. Since in any of these matters Bennike has the deciding vote it can not be held that either party has a veto. We believe it unwise and unnecessary for Council take cognizance of alleged voting rights which in fact do not exist. Our draft clearly indicates Bennike is deciding factor in Syria-Israeli disputes. This particularly evident if we accept UK wording on Israel’s containing suspension of project unless authorized to contrary by COS. Further advantage of deletion would be that it avoids taking flat position against Syrian claim their consent is essential. If we must have Council take cognizance of this Israeli allegation wouldn’t it be better to discuss it in our statement before Council?

Smith

1. Not printed.