683.84A322/12–653: Telegram

No. 749
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State

confidential
priority

283. For the Secretary from Lodge. Re: Palestine in Security Council. Following is revised version of Department’s resolution (Department telegram 261, November 27) on Banat Yaacov which I have worked out on the basis of careful study of all relevant papers, including Israeli, Syrian, UK and French drafts:

“The Security Council,

1.
Recalling its previous resolutions on the Palestine question and in particular that of 11 August 1949, endorsing the general armistice agreements concluded between Israel and the neighboring Arab states which the Council considered as superseding the truce provided for in the resolutions of 29 May and 15 July 1948; and those of 17 November 1950, 8 May 1951, and 1 May 1951 concerning methods of maintaining the armistice and resolving disputes through the Mixed Armistice Commission;
2.
Taking into consideration the statements of the representatives of Syria and Israel and the reports of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization on the Syrian complaint (S/3108/rev. 1);
3.
Notes that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organizations requested the Government of Israel on 23 September 1953 to ensure that the authority which started work in the demilitarized zone on 2 September 1953 be instructed to cease working so long as an agreement was not arranged;
4.
Endorses this request;
5.
Recalls its resolution of October 27, 1953 taking note of the statement by the representative of the Government of Israel that the work started by Israel in the demilitarized zone would be suspended pending urgent examination of the question by the Council;
6.
Declares that in order to promote the return of permanent peace in Palestine, it is essential that the general armistice agreement of July 20, 1949 between Syria and Israel be strictly and faithfully observed by the parties;
7.
Reminds the parties that under Article 7, paragraph 8 of the armistice agreement where the interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of the agreement other than the preamble and Articles 1 and 2 is at issue, the Mixed Armistice Commission’s interpretation shall prevail;
8.
Notes that Article 5 of the general armistice agreement between Syria and Israel gives to the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, as chairman of the Syrian-Israeli MAC, responsibility for the general supervision of the demilitarized zone;
9.
Calls upon the Chief of Staff to ensure the demilitarized character of the zone;
10.
Calls upon the parties to comply with all his decisions and requests, in the exercise of his authority under the armistice agreement;
11.
Requests and authorizes the Chief of Staff to explore possibilities of reconciling the interests involved in this dispute including established rights in the demilitarized zone and full satisfaction at all seasons of existing irrigation rights, and to take such steps as he may deem appropriate to effect a reconciliation, having in view the development of the natural resources of the area in a just and orderly manner for the general welfare;
12.
Considers that neither party has the right of veto over such reconciliation or development;
13.
Directs the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to report to the Security Council within 90 days on the effect given to this resolution;
14.
Requests the Secretary General to place at the disposal of the Chief of Staff of the TSO a sufficient number of experts, in particular hydraulic engineers to supply him on the technical level with the necessary data for a complete appreciation of the project in question and of its effect upon the demilitarized zone.”

  • Paragraph 1 above has been redrafted to include each of the Security Council Resolutions referred to in the Israeli draft (see Usun 243, November 6) and the Syrian draft (see Usun 277, November 30), as well as reference to the fact that the armistice agreements supersede the truce as suggested in the Israeli draft.
  • Paragraph 2 is the Department’s draft unchanged.
  • Paragraph 3 has been redrafted to take account of British suggestion that the Chief of Staff’s request be quoted more fully.
  • Paragraph 4 was suggested by UK delegation and appears to be desirable.
  • Paragraph 5 eliminates the last clause of the Department’s draft as suggested by UK delegation. It seems unnecessary and has not been suggested by Israel.
  • Paragraph 6 is taken from the Syrian draft.
  • Paragraph 7 is the Department’s draft unchanged.
  • Paragraph 8 is likewise.
  • Paragraph 9 is taken from the Israeli draft and in my opinion covers adequately the Israeli argument on the question of “military advantage.”
  • Paragraph 10 is the Department’s draft with the addition of the word “all” before “his decisions” and deletion of “past and future” after “requests.” “Past and future” seems superfluous and may, as the British think, raise unnecessary apprehensions in the minds of the Syrians.
  • Paragraph 11 is redrafted to emphasize the principle of a larger development of the resources of the area for the general welfare and at the same time includes the Israeli point concerning guarantees [Page 1452] for land rights and water rights. I feel that in this way it can be made clear that if the Banat Yaacov project should be resumed it must be within the context of larger objectives for the area.
  • Paragraph 12 is a new paragraph which has been added to cover the Israeli argument that Bennike must understand explicitly our view on Syria’s right of veto. It is equally applicable to Israeli veto over larger development schemes.
  • Paragraph 13 is the Department’s draft unchanged.
  • Paragraph 14 is the revised French draft which seems to be useful way of providing Bennike with necessary help to avoid his prejudicing Johnston’s plans. The French seem insistent upon it, and Eban appears not to object to it.

It would be desirable to have early meetings with the UK and French delegations. I would appreciate Department’s comments.

Lodge