Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

683.84A322/9–2653: Telegram

No. 675
The Chargé in Israel (Russell) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Tel Aviv, September 26, 1953—6 p.m.

366. Called this afternoon on Foreign Minister at his invitation his residence Tel Aviv. He made following points:

(1) Whereas in past with reference to drainage scheme United Nations at no time expressed opposition to scheme itself, Bennike decision does.

(2) In past requests to interrupt work had always been for definite period rather than indefinitely as in present instance.

(3) While Bennike’s letter does not explicitly refer to agreement with Syria it is implied. Decisions of chairman UNTSO with regard to stoppage or commencement of work have never been contingent in past on obtaining Syrian agreement. Inasmuch as Syrians continue to pursue policy of economic warfare, compliance means agreeing to “death warrant for any development in demilitarized zone”. As analogy Sharett referred to request by mandatory power in 1936 for temporary suspension of immigration. It was even harder in that case for Jews to refuse request as it meant loss of lives, he said, but they felt it essential do so because compliance would have destroyed position in international law.

Foreign Minister went on to say that fortunately there were features in both letters (Embassy telegrams 355, 356)² which mitigated seriousness of situation. Referred specifically to fact that Bennike’s text does not explicitly state “agreement with Syria”; to Israel’s position that request cease work was not ultimatum since no date given; and to fact that while his own letter asserts request unjustified, it does not say Israel will not comply. Suggested that if it were possible make clear that United Nations not questioning legitimacy of work as such, that stoppage is not for indefinite period, and that work agreement means Israel Government agreement with Bennike or Arab owners of land rather than with Syrians, compromise would be possible. Otherwise he said, Israel Government sees no alternative to submission matter to Security Council.

Foreign Minister said matter was not ordinary difference of opinion over technical aspect of armistice agreement. It involved project which was link in chain of operations vital to Israel’s future and agreement to Bennike request in present form would give Syria strangle hold over good part of Israel’s economic future. Said further he hoped Syria would not start firing; that Israel feels in matter as if it is fighting for its life. Concluded that any friendly influence which could be brought to bear for constructive compromise would be welcome.

I replied that much thought had been given by United States Government in recent months to ways in which it could use its friendly influence to promote rational plan for water development in region and unfortunate that effort to exercise this influence has to be against background of controversy resulting from sudden beginning of construction. I asked Foreign Minister if he could tell me when decision had been made to commence construction since we had been informed project had not been included in the current year’s budget. He said he had been under impression construction scheduled for a date even earlier but he would ask Minister of Agriculture “who may have had his budget difficulties”.

I said 2 things clear:

(1) United States interested in promoting most equitable use of area’s water and

(2) It will be most difficult for United States to lend friendly influence to this end while one of nations not complying with UN request. With regard to immediate problem arising from Bennike’s decision, I suggested possibility of compliance by Israel with Bennike’s request with accompanying statement safeguarding Israel’s legitimate interest.

When I mentioned Secretary’s conversation with Eban (Department telegram 238)³ as indication problems likely to arise in event non-compliance, Sharett said he had only received telephoned report of Eban cable but said he wished to stress advisability of “not precipitating crisis or semblance of crisis in United States–Israel relations because it can only raise new problems associated with national pride and self esteem. World has learned that national pride often stronger than economic sanctions.”

While Foreign Minister appeared interested in possibility of compliance with accompanying statement he saw no possibility now of taking further steps until there is reply from Bennike, but added he would discuss matter with Cabinet tomorrow.

During discussion Foreign Minister took position Syria had no status in matter and present question in demilitarized zone one between Israel Government and UNTSO. He expressed opinion that problem had been complicated by fact that in a matter between Israel Government and Bennike, latter, unlike Riley, had given his decision to Israel and Syria simultaneously making it impossible for Israel Government to work out solution with Bennike before it became final. I indicated Bennike bound treat both sides to dispute equally and special treatment of one side would have been improper.

British Ambassador told me Sharett had made above points to him earlier in day; that he emphasized importance which British Government attaches to compliance with United Nations machinery.

Russell

1. Repeated to Damascus, London, Paris, Jerusalem, Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, and Jidda.
2. Not printed, but see footnotes 2 and 3, supra.
3. Not printed, but see footnote 2, Document 673.