Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

683.84A322/9–2553: Telegram

No. 674
The Chargé in Israel (Russell) to the Department of State¹

secret
NIACT

Tel Aviv, September 25, 1953—7 p.m.

362. Embassy comments on Embassy telegrams 355² and 356.³ [Here follows detailed comment on numbered points 7 (a) through (e) of Bennike’s decision of September 23 and Sharett’s reply of September 24.]

It will be seen from Tekoah’s (Embassy telegram 309)⁴ and Sharett’s (Embassy telegram 356) presentation of Israel’s position that if problem is to be settled on basis of weighting of legal claims and counterclaims, decision will be long drawn out and outcome uncertain. There are, however, two preliminary and possibly more fundamental questions: (1) Why Israel Government, contrary to its previous plans, chose to raise the question in this sudden and exacerbating form and (2) whether Israel Government is going to work with, and abide by decisions of, United Nations machinery.

While pattern of Israel Government actions is not perhaps beyond dispute, it would seem to be emerging. Since visit of Secretary to this area for purpose of determining how United States can help in bringing about relaxation of tension, there has been: (1) Israel Government resort to reprisals contrary to request of United States Government, (2) sudden week-end move of Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem contrary to request of majority of countries having missions here, (3) impatience with United States grant-in-aid objectives (Embassy telegram 1965),⁵ (4) efforts by Israel Government to thwart United States plans to remedy free world security vacuum in area, (5) action in violation demilitarized zone agreements on Egyptian border (Embassy telegram 342)⁶ and (6) sudden decision to commence construction on Banat Yaacov Dam with resulting flare-up of Arab resentment at time United States Government about to make suggestions for regional plan of development of water resources. While motives of these actions is matter for conjecture (Embassy telegrams 120,⁶ 215⁶) it is clear their result is to maintain relations between Israel and Arab neighbors in state of increased tension that renders more difficult the efforts by United States Government to help in solving area problems and to improve security of free world along this important segment of Soviet periphery.

Embassy’s analysis of effect of withholding first quarter allotment of grant-in-aid (Department telegram 226)⁷ as follows. Israel Government has funds on hand to pay debts maturing in October and probably also in November. Payments must immediately be made however, on petroleum ($3 million) and ship load of wheat scheduled for sailing week of October 5 ($1 million). Balance of allotment also urgently needed as stated in joint Embassy-TCA telegram 295.⁸ If grant-in-aid not available further borrowings will, of course, be necessary, increasing debt load early in 1954 which, under section 105, could not be paid from delayed release of first quarter allotment. Since effect of holding allotment is thus more than mere delay, it should serve to make Israel Government aware of importance of early solution to Banat Yaacov. If Israel Government should refuse cooperation in efforts bring about early relaxation of tension resulting from construction there would be increased debt pressures with resultingly greater possibility of default early in 1954.

Russell

1. Transmitted in three sections; repeated to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, London, Paris, and Jerusalem. Section 1 was to be passed to the Department of Defense.
2. Telegram 355 from Tel Aviv, Sept. 25, not printed, summarized General Bennike’s decision of Sept. 23 on the Israeli diversion of the Jordan River at Banat Yaacov. (683.84A322/9–2553) For the text of Bennike’s decision, see U.N. doc. S/3122, Annex I.
3. Telegram 356 from Tel Aviv, Sept. 25, not printed, summarized Sharett’s reply of Sept. 24 to Bennike’s decision of Sept. 23. (683.84A322/9–2553) For the text of Sharett’s letter of Sept. 24, see U.N. doc. S/3122, Annex II.
4. Document 661.
5. Document 632.
6. Not printed.
6. Not printed.
6. Not printed.
7. Document 670.
8. Not printed.