Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

974.5301/4–853

No. 592
Memorandum of Conversation by the Officer in Charge of Palestine–Israel–Jordan Affairs (Waller)

secret

[Washington,] April 8, 1953.

Subject:

1.

Future status of the Suez Canal

2.

Military aid to Israel

3.

Prospects for Peace in the Near East

4.

Transfer of Israel Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem

Participants:

• NEA-Mr. Byroade
• Israel Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett
• Israel Ambassador Abba Eban
• NE—Mr. Waller

After an exchange of courtesies Foreign Minister Sharett said that his Government would shortly send to the Department a written communication regarding the Suez Canal problem which would make two main points. These would concern Israel’s interest in (1) the Suez Canal as an international waterway and (2) defense arrangements. The Foreign Minister said that Israel is an interested party since any changes in the present status of the Canal would directly affect Israel. He pointed out that it is one thing to have an important Western power exercising a moderating influence on Egypt’s control in the Canal Zone but quite another matter to give the Egyptians control without any precautionary measures being taken to satisfy the rights of other states. He said that the removal of Egyptian restrictions and prohibitions on Canal traffic to and from Israel is no longer considered by the Israel Government as an act of grace on the part of Egypt but a matter of right.

Mr. Byroade said that on this matter he could reassure the Foreign Minister because we also are of the opinion that the restrictions and prohibitions should be removed. He said that for us the Suez question is one of defense of the area and of the assurance to be obtained from Egypt to guarantee that the waterway will remain international. Mr. Byroade said that we are fully aware that the Suez Canal affects not only the United States but also the French position in Indo-China, the British, Israel and other states. However, we believe it preferable for the Egyptians and British to reach an agreement before we go to work to get the boycott lifted against Israel. Both the British and French have asked us to participate formally in tripartite talks on the Canal question but we have thus far refused because of the possibility of a leak. It would not help the negotiations with Egypt if Egypt should learn that representatives of the United States, Britain and France were sitting in Washington discussing the future status of the Suez Canal. Nevertheless we want to sit down with the British and French and have secret low level talks with them about the problem.

Mr. Byroade referred to the Constantinople Convention of 1888 pertaining to the Suez Canal and pointed out that the Soviet Union is a signatory but that the United States is not. One of the facets of the problem is the suggestion recently made to the French by the Egyptian Ambassador in Paris that Israel become a signatory to the Convention. He was unable to say whether the Egyptian Ambassador was speaking officially or unofficially but since the suggestion was being made to the French Government the French assumed it was an official approach. Mr. Byroade said that from our point of view the Suez Canal must remain international but that in any event Israel’s interest would be kept in mind.

Mr. Sharett endeavored to point out the great gain which would fall to Egypt if the British evacuate the Canal Zone but Mr. Byroade said that he was not at all sure what, if anything, Egypt would gain. He continued by saying that although our position is not very far from the British position we do disagree with the British on tactics. The British want written commitments from Egypt before evacuating the Canal Zone; the Egyptians say that the British must evacuate the Canal Zone as a matter of right and that they will not buy British evacuation. Each side has stated its position publicly and it is therefore difficult to reconcile the two points of view. Perhaps a little secret diplomacy is needed. As matters stand at the moment the Egyptians have offered to talk with the British without an agenda and without any signed commitments; to talk with the British informally to see whether an agreement would be possible on a formal basis. Mr. Byroade said that he felt sure that the Egyptians would be sensible and agree to talk of other items but that in the meantime there is danger that the recently concluded Sudan Agreement might come unstuck.

Ambassador Eban said that Mr. Byroade’s remarks raise the question whether General Naguib is preparing to identify Egypt with the West. He said that there had been nothing in the Egyptian press to prepare the Egyptian public for such a policy. Mr. Byroade replied that since it would take perhaps a year and a half for the British to evacuate some 80,000 troops from the Canal Zone there appeared to be time to prepare the Egyptian public for any change in policy that might be decided. Foreign Minister Sharett suggested that the United States could be more flexible in pursuing its objectives with Egypt as Turkey would undoubtedly support the United States. Mr. Byroade replied that he is more interested in seeing the atmosphere prepared for regional defense rather than to obtain formal signatures to a particular document.

2. The Foreign Minister said that the second part of Israel’s concern pertains to military aid. He said he understood that grant military aid had not been forthcoming because the United States has been hamstrung by “an elusive 10 percent”. (The statement referred to a provision in the Mutual Security Act to the effect that the President could under certain circumstances divert to other countries of the Middle East 10 percent of the funds authorized for military aid to Greece, Turkey and Iran.) Mr. Byroade said that the Department is attempting to correct that situation by asking Congress to authorize funds without the 10 percent provision. The Foreign Minister said he was glad to have this information and continued by suggesting that the United States take the lead now in starting preparations for the defense of the Middle East. Mr. Byroade expressed the view that the defense of Israel and the Near East was in the mountains north and east of Israel rather than in the Galilee area of Israel and asked whether the Foreign Minister believed that open coordination of defense plans with Turkey and Israel would inspire the other Near East states to cooperate. Ambassador Eban stated that in his opinion open United States support of Israel in defense arrangements would stimulate the Arab states to ask the United States for a similar arrangement with them. He pointed out that this has already happened in the economic field. The Foreign Minister took up the point by saying that intelligence reports show an alarming increase in the military strength of the Arab world. Whether the Arabs could combine was a matter of opinion but the Arab states continue to attack Israel and although the Arabs were defeated they have probably learned by their experiences and in any event have continued to proclaim the inevitability of a “second round”. Thus it appears to be very difficult to change their hearts so far as Israel is concerned.

3. Mr. Byroade said that peace is the question uppermost in the Secretary’s mind and the problem was how to achieve it. The Foreign Minister said that for Israel the question was vital.

Mr. Byroade recalled that several weeks ago he had asked Ambassador Eban to think about the maximum price that Israel would be willing to pay for peace and was repeating the question to the Foreign Minister—not that he wished to be informed of the conditions himself but so that the Israel Government would have its thoughts clarified and ready when the time to negotiate arrives. The Foreign Minister replied that if there is to be peace it must be between the Arab states as they now are and Israel as she now is. Mr. Byroade asked whether this reply meant that Israel would make no territorial concessions and the Foreign Minister replied that Israel would be willing to make certain adjustments in the Latrun and perhaps another border area or so, but asked to whom territorial concessions should be made and why. He said that Jordan has grabbed Arab Palestine and none of the Arab states has suffered any loss of territory. To make territorial concessions to the Arabs would not bring about peace but would on the contrary whet the Arabs’ appetite for more territory. Mr. Byroade pointed out that some of Israel’s present territory was acquired by force of arms but the Foreign Minister explained that the territory Israel now holds beyond what was contemplated in the United Nations Partition Resolution of 1947 was obtained because the Arab states refused to accept the partition plan and invaded Palestine to attack the Jews. Territory can only be taken away from Israel by force of arms, the Foreign Minister added.

Mr. Byroade suggested that since neither Israel nor the Arab states appeared willing to devise a plan for peace the United States might have to make its own plan—and it was probable that neither side would like it. Foreign Minister Sharett said that he wished to warn anyone devising a plan which included depriving Israel of territory that the plan would have to include the sending of a military force to support it. Ambassador Eban dwelt at some length on the large areas already held by the Arab states and the comparatively small area of the State of Israel. The Foreign Minister then added that considering territorial changes in the concept being discussed would mean that Israel must immediately stake out claims to land in the Arab states in order to be in a bargaining position if for no other reason.

The Foreign Minister referred to the refugees and asked where they should be settled and who would pay for it. He said that the ability of the Israel Government to pay was dependent on the lifting of the Arab boycott.

Mr. Byroade asked whether his understanding of Israel’s position as enunciated by the Foreign Minister means Israel would make no territorial concessions and that the refugees must all be settled elsewhere than in Israel. The Foreign Minister replied “definitely”. Mr. Byroade then asked whether the Foreign Minister would suggest that the United States put in troops to enforce Israel’s decisions and the Foreign Minister replied that in the event of a conflict Israel could undoubtedly hold out as long as the Arab states. Mr. Byroade next asked whether it was the Foreign Minister’s opinion that the United States should pay for everything. The Foreign Minister recalled that he had already said that if the boycott were lifted it would enable Israel to earmark funds to pay compensation to the refugees, or, should a special loan be raised for this purpose, Israel would with funds derived from the lifting of the boycott repay the loan over a period of time. Mr. Byroade said he does not see how peace can be achieved unless Israel makes some gesture to Arab public opinion and that he had hoped the Foreign Minister would be able to suggest something. The Foreign Minister said that he had one thing which was being held very confidentially, namely, that the Israel Government would be willing to provide an arrangement for a free passage across southern Israel to connect Egypt with Jordan. Mr. Byroade asked whether Israel would agree to accept a certain number of refugees but the Foreign Minister replied that to do so would only open up the whole refugee question and would encourage in the refugees a hope which could not materialize. Mr. Byroade said that he understood that very few refugees would wish to return to Israel. What he was really looking for, he said, was a gesture on the part of Israel which would make the next move up to the Arabs. He asked what suggestion the Foreign Minister had that the United States could use to promote peace. Mr. Sharett replied that the United States could point out to the Arabs that they are pursuing a suicidal policy. Mr. Byroade wondered how to get the Arabs away from such a policy and suggested that even the use of United States troops would not accomplish it. The Foreign Minister said that Israel would put up with her present boundaries, would grant facilities for passage between Egypt and Jordan so as to eliminate the isolation of one part of the Arab world from the other, would grant free port facilities at Haifa for the use of Jordan and other Arab states, and would agree to an international water system under international control.

The Foreign Minister stated that the Arabs had made a serious error in not accepting the United Nations Partition Resolution of 1947. Had they done so the present difficulties would not be with us. However, it is not possible to take a sponge and wipe out history, we must go on from here. He said that Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi recently told Dr. Ralph Bunche that some accommodation with Israel must inevitably come. Fawzi mentioned the question of compensation, resettlement of refugees (note: not repatriation), territorial contiguity of the Arab states to be provided by a passage between Egypt and Jordan, and some arrangement for Jerusalem. Dr. Bunche pointed out to Foreign Minister Fawzi that Jordan would object to any territorial internationalization of Jerusalem and Fawzi then dropped this point. Foreign Minister Sharett said that on learning the foregoing he had asked Dr. Bunche to tell Foreign Minister Fawzi that Israel is agreeable to the agenda and that the question of passage could be brought up to Egypt at the time of any discussion between Egyptians and Israel representatives. The Israel Government believes that if an agreement can be reached with Egypt agreements with other Arab states will follow.

Mr. Byroade emphasized that the Administration at the present time has no plan for peace in the Middle East and that his talk with the Foreign Minister today was just an exchange of ideas. Rumors to the effect that the Secretary has a plan which he hopes to sell to the Near East states are simply not true, he added. It may be necessary for the United States to formulate a plan because it is in our interest that peaceful conditions return to the Near East and with us that is a primary objective. However, it is unlikely that our policies will be formalized until after the Secretary returns from his trip.

4. The Foreign Minister said his Government is interested in the question of Jerusalem—not the internationalization of the city but in the transfer of Israel’s Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem. He said that the United States and Israel had in the past supported the same plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem and he hoped we would work together in the future. In any event this is not a present problem. He said that as Foreign Minister, he was greatly concerned by our recent representations to the effect that the Foreign Ministry must not be moved to Jerusalem. He said that the Foreign Ministry being separated from the other ministries of the government, which are all in Jerusalem, results in the Foreign Ministry losing its grip on the conduct of foreign relations and his office loses contact with other ministries also interested in foreign relations. He pointed out that Israel has always held that Jerusalem is its capital and, following representations made by the United States and other governments to the Government of Israel last July, delayed moving the Foreign Ministry in order to permit the United Nations General Assembly to have another opportunity to determine the status of Jerusalem. That opportunity was not taken and so the Israel Government has been proceeding with plans to transfer to Jerusalem the Foreign Ministry where all other parts of the Government are already assembled including the President, the Knesset and the other ministries. He said, in addition, that the diplomatic corps, being in Tel Aviv, loses contact with the Government, which is in Jerusalem. Since it appears that the United Nations does not contemplate any action and, according to his information, the Vatican is not interested, plans were made to move the Foreign Ministry the end of May or early June of this year. The Foreign Minister said that if he were faced with a clear-cut choice of choosing between being near his Government or being near the diplomatic missions his choice of necessity would have to be the former. He said he was not urging the United States to move its diplomatic mission to Jerusalem, although he hoped it would be done, but what the Israel Government did want was for the United States to discontinue urging Israel not to move its Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem. Mr. Byroade replied that he realized the Israel Government has a real problem; that many years from now Sharett would agree with him that the Jews had made a mistake in making Jerusalem their capital; and that he could not give him any hope that our feeling regarding the Israel Foreign Office would change.