Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

262.84A41/4–153

No. 591
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria-Iraq Affairs (Funkhouser)¹

secret

Washington, April 1, 1953.

Subject:

• Syrian Ambassador’s Representations Regarding German Reparations to Israel

Participants:

• Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary for NEA
• Dr. Farid Zeineddine, Ambassador of Syria
• Richard Funkhouser—NE

Assistant Secretary Byroade expressed his regret that the pressure of work was such that the Secretary was not able to see the Syrian Ambassador at this moment, but he assured Zeineddine that he would personally carry to the Secretary all points which the Syrian Ambassador wished to make on behalf of his Government.

The Syrian Ambassador stated that he had been instructed by his Government to raise with the Secretary of State on an urgent basis the question of German reparations to Israel. He stated that his Government was unable to view these reparations the same way as did the Government of the United States, and he indicated that his Government did not have the same impression of the motives which prompted these reparations payments.

As his first point, Ambassador Zeineddine stated that the reparations payments to Israel were most substantial compared with the budgets of other countries in the Near East. The annual payments were, in fact, equal to the entire Syrian budget. His Government considered this as a matter of importance.

The Ambassador stated secondly that his Government was concerned with the list of materials which were reportedly being sent to Israel. His Government had noted that the bulk of these material shipments would fall under categories termed by the United States Government to be “strategic materials”. Directly or indirectly, this, according to the Syrian Ambassador, would create an impressive military potential in Israel which would be of concern to his Government.

Thirdly, Ambassador Zeineddine stated that his Government was concerned that these payments would be made to a “group in Palestine which had never experienced in their majority any persecution from the Nazis”. He listed numerically the Jewish population in Palestine before World War II, immigration of European Jews who were escaping from persecution which the Ambassador considered in no way connected to the Nazis, and post-war immigrants who the Ambassador stated were in no way escaping Nazi persecution.

As his fourth point, the Ambassador stated the Syrian Government viewed with great concern the serious jeopardy to equilibrium in the Middle East which would follow from such an agreement, particularly one which recognized Israel as a state which represented world Jewry. The Ambassador stated that this “political aspect” was of “supreme importance” and felt that the German–Israel agreement thus became an “international problem rather than one which could be considered solely within Israel-German relationships”.

Ambassador Zeineddine expressed his Government’s view that the United States was in large part responsible for this agreement. Ambassador Zeineddine referred to the essential financial assistance which the United States was giving to Germany which in turn made it possible for Germany to pay reparations to Israel. He also mentioned that his Government considered that the United States had given direct support to those groups in Germany which favored the reparations agreement. The Ambassador’s instructions concluded with a plea that the United States Government cooperate with the Syrian Government in “bringing about circumstances whereby German assistance would be channeled to those Jewish individuals directly affected by German persecution rather than go to Israel as a state representing world Jewry, and a state where such aid would be used not for the individual but directly or indirectly for the development of an economic and military potential which could be directed against Arab states”. If such a position were acceptable to the United States Government the Syrian Government, according to the Ambassador, would hope to discuss ways and means to put such a plan into effect.

“Having fulfilled my Government’s instructions”, Ambassador Zeineddine stated, “I will now try to convince you of the fairness of our approach”. He then discussed the fact that an Arab League meeting was to be held shortly at which time this subject would be considered. He also discussed the possibility of placing German reparations into a “pool” for those refugees who had individually suffered from the Nazi regime. He placed emphasis on what he considered an existing “moral relationship” between the German debt to the Jews and the Israeli debt to the Arabs. He conceded that, whereas the United States Government might not have the power of decision in this case, it was in a position to influence strongly both Germany and Israel. He hoped that the United States would be able to intercede with German authorities to postpone either the final promulgation of the agreement or at least its implementation until the above program could be fully studied. He stated that he had mentioned to the Director of Near Eastern Affairs his hope that such delay could at least take place until the Secretary of State completed his trip throughout the Middle East. He wondered if this question could not be discussed with Chancellor Adenauer during this forthcoming trip to Washington. He asked if the United States could not make an appointment for the Chiefs of Arab Missions to discuss these problems with Chancellor Adenauer during his stay in Washington. He felt that such a move, which he considered a small one, would be received most favorably among the states of the Middle East.

Assistant Secretary Byroade stated that he would bring these matters to the immediate attention of the Secretary of State. He stated that whereas he could not speak for the Secretary he would like to present his own views on several of the points made by the Syrian Ambassador. Mr. Byroade stated that many of the Ambassador’s points were well taken. He agreed that there was a “moral” connection between the German Jewish refugee problem and the Israeli-Arab refugee problem. He stated that the problem which had occupied the major part of his attention in his work as Assistant Secretary of State for NEA was the devotion of his energies to finding ways to right the wrong done to the Arab refugees.

However, the Assistant Secretary stated that whereas he could find fault with some of the details in the current German-Israeli agreement, he felt such a move by the German people was as Adenauer had put it “good for the German soul”. Mr. Byroade stated that he had come in close contact with the German problem in his previous position as Director of German Affairs and felt more encouraged by this gesture on the part of the West German people than perhaps any other single move they had made. He told Ambassador Zineddine that in Chancellor Adenauer the world possessed a great statesman and for the United States Government to make any moves which could be interpreted as opposing this Adenauer-backed agreement at this point could be used by Adenauer’s enemies in Germany to undermine his position. Assistant Secretary Byroade stated that those elements in Germany which had opposed the reparations agreement unfortunately included all those elements about which the United States was worried for Germany’s future. Mr. Byroade concluded by stating that rather than move backwards to block this reparations agreement, he believed it more proper and productive to devote all energies to righting the other wrong which had been done to the Palestine Arabs. Assistant Secretary Byroade was determined to pursue these efforts to a successful conclusion.²

The Syrian Ambassador stated that he appreciated the position of the United States Government in this problem and was promised the earliest possible official reply to his representations.

1. This memorandum of conversation was sent to Secretary Dulles under cover of a memorandum of Apr. 3 by Byroade, which reads as follows:

   “The Syrian Ambassador recently received a directive from his Government to place before you personally his government’s views on the question of German reparations to Israel. Your schedule has been such that I told the Syrian Ambassador you would be unable to see him for some time and that I had been designated to receive his message on your behalf. The attached memorandum of conversation presents his points and the general lines of my reply. He and I have talked about this matter so often that I did not feel it necessary to cover all the factors involved.

   “As the Ambassador was directed to see you I promised that I would bring this point to your attention as quickly as possible and that he would receive an official reply. I therefore feel committed to ask you to consider briefly the points he raised. If you agree with the general line of my reply I can give it to him again verbally as representing your position.”

   The following notation appears on Byroade’s memorandum of Apr. 3: “Sec saw & approved per our phone conversation—6 April R[oderic] L. O’C[onnor].” (262.84A41/4–1553)

2. The following notation in the Secretary’s handwriting appears in the margin of the source text opposite this paragraph: “OK J[ohn] F[oster] D[ulles].”