Office of the Historian

790D.5 MSP/2–354

No. 189
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Acting Secretary of State1

top secret
Washington, February 3, 1954.

Subject:

  • Present Status Turkish–Pakistan Security Pact and Military Aid to Pakistan

The Turkish Government and ourselves are in full agreement in their taking the lead in working out with Pakistan an arrangement involving consultation on political, economic and security questions. The following steps are anticipated.

1.
We expect the Turks to approach Pakistan within the next couple of days. We will support the Turkish approach and at that time secretly give a commitment to Pakistan to provide military assistance within the framework of the Turkish–Pakistan pact. Other countries with special interest will be given advance information and the Turks will make an explanatory statement in NATO. The Turks and Pakistanis will issue a joint communiqué, it is hoped by early next week, stating that they will consult on matters of mutual interest in the political, economic and security fields.2
2.
Shortly thereafter, Pakistan would make a public request for military assistance, to which we would reply favorably. A day or two prior to our reply, the Indians would be informed and a special message from you handed to Nehru.

Immediately thereafter, the necessary mutual defense agreement would be negotiated and a military mission despatched to survey needs and arrive at program recommendations.

U.S. officials informed of the impending development of a Turkish–Pakistan pact should be warned of the danger of making public comments in such a way as to suggest the United States Government has played a prominent role in promoting it. … An indiscreet comment at this time, just before the anticipated announcement of Turkish–Pakistan plans, might have particularly unfortunate results.

  1. Drafted by Daspit.

    Virtually the same memorandum was transmitted to the President on Jan. 27 to brief him for a visit with the President of Turkey. Instead of the last paragraph in the memorandum printed here, the memorandum to the President ended with the following: “No doubt the President of Turkey will mention this subject and in addition to your expression of appreciation over the friendly and helpful attitude of his government you might wish to urge earliest possible action by Turkey in the light of the very regrettable publicity. We expect to have a fairly accurate estimate of the chronology of steps very shortly. At that time draft statements of your public reply to Pakistan’s request and of your personal message to Nehru will be sent to you for approval.” (780.5/1–2754)

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  2. Telegram Dulte 22 from Berlin, Jan. 30, from Secretary Dulles at the Four–Power Conference reported Eden had just received a message from Churchill suggesting it might be better if no public announcement of the Turkey–Pakistan accord were made while the Big Four were meeting, in order to avoid giving the Soviets a pretext for bringing it up at the Berlin meeting and propagandizing about the threat on their frontiers. According to the Secretary, neither he nor Eden was very concerned but he suggested that if the date of the announcement could be conveniently deferred until late February the United States could give Churchill satisfaction. (682.90D/1–3054)↩